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Summary
Electoral democracies are built on the idea of representation. The electorate selects
politicians to represent their interests in the law-making process. Given that citizens
hold meaningful preferences about political outcomes, this electoral linkage is supposed
to ensure that implemented policies are in line with the public’s will. In political science,
spatial voting theories model this connection between citizens’ opinions about policies
and their electoral decisions. But what if ordinary voters are not equipped with policy
views that easily permit them to select matching candidates: does this distort the simple
model of representative democracy?
I argue that the electoral linkage between voters and candidates is affected if voters
do not reflect the assumptions made about their policy preferences in spatial voting
theories. Spatial voting theory builds on a rational choice framework in which policy
preferences are assumed to be well-defined, fixed and exogenous. For decades, be-
havioral theorists have questioned the usefulness of this oversimplified depiction in
attempting to understand and explain the democratic process. Consequently, theoretical
conceptualizations and argumentations have been developed that are built on a wider
notion of citizens’ policy preferences. In the latter case, opinions are represented as be-
ing: inconsistent with underlying political platforms; endogenous to the positions taken
by candidates, and ‘persuadable’ by political arguments. These differing approaches
led to quite some debate between the two political schools of thought regarding the
empirical adequacy of the contrasting depictions of public opinion. This dissertation
brings the two perspectives closer together on theoretical grounds. The origin of the
argumentation put forward is the view that the central link between citizens and their
representatives can only be established if voters with policy preferences that deviate
from the restrictive suppositions of standard models, do not behave differently at the
ballot box.
I study how citizens’ electoral decisions are influenced when a wider notion of policy
preference is assumed. Specifically, I offer an extension to the spatial voting model that
allows citizens’ policy views to be inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous. I find
that voting decisions are affected when this wider definition is employed. First, voters
put considerably less weight on policy when they presume that their political opinions
Summary
are inconsistent with underlying ideological dimensions. Second, citizens directly
change their voting decision if they are exposed to persuasive political arguments.
And finally, voters can alter their preferences and decisions in response to individual
candidates’ position-taking. The major theoretical contribution of this dissertation
is the introduction of a modeling approach that allows researchers to analyze these
mechanisms, building on the idea that citizens possess policy beliefs regarding which
policy platform is in their own best interest. This conceptualization greatly amplifies
our ability to assess how the electoral mode of democratic representation is affected, in
the case of a general public that lacks rigorous policy preferences.
Empirical evidence presented also emphasizes that the theoretical extension does
indeed help to generate a more accurate picture of how voters make up their minds.
The results indicate that for survey respondents who show inconsistent policy views,
the distance to a candidate on a general liberal-conservative dimension has a smaller
effect on voting probabilities. In addition, relying on a survey experiment, I show that
political arguments have a direct effect on voting decisions, by persuading respondents
to change their policy views. Finally, building on latent class models, I highlight
that partisans are considerably more likely to alter their positions in the direction of
their party’s candidate over the course of the campaign - making their policy views
endogenous to the relevant candidate’s campaign platform.
I conclude this dissertation by discussing the crucial implications these findings have
for democratic theory. If political systems adhere to the goal of political representation,
they must provide an environment that enables the public to converge towards the
homogeneous picture painted in the usual simple model of representation, in which all
citizens gain perfect knowledge regarding which political outcome promises to be most
beneficial for them personally, and for society in general.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and research question
Modern democracies are built on the idea of representation. In recurring elections,
citizens are allowed to choose between different candidates or parties that represent
their interests in parliament. Because governments are controlled by these citizens’
representatives in parliament, the voters’ interests should also be reflected in govern-
ment behavior. Essentially, elections should lead governments to only implement those
policies which mirror the will of the people. For example, if the majority of citizens
are in favor of high-income taxation, governments should take initiatives to implement
such a policy. Conversely, unpopular policies should not be implemented. Political
theories have argued that this electoral link between citizens and their representatives
assures “continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens,
considered as political equals” (Dahl, 1972, p.1), and thereby guarantees electoral
representation.
The crucial stage at which democratic representation can go wrong is at the ballot box.
If citizens do not elect candidates who match their preference for a particular political
outcome, governments are unlikely to be responsive. However, for the dominant
perspective in political theory, and therefore the main body of research in this field, this
fear has been regarded as irrelevant. This perspective builds on the idea that citizens
know exactly what kind of policies they would like to see implemented. If this were
really true, finding a matching representative would be child’s play. Those opposed
to minimum wages, wanting increased taxation for higher incomes and in favor of
gay-marriage, would simply vote for candidates or parties with political platforms that
aim to implement these same goals, once elected. This assumes that citizens’ policy
views determine their voting decisions, which in turn guarantees that each person’s
policy interest will be represented in parliament. In consequence, only parties or
candidates that are in line with a certain share of the citizens’ preferences regarding
policies, have a chance of gaining a majority of the votes and forming a government.
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1.1. MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTION
But what if ordinary voters are not equipped with policy views that easily permit
them to select matching representatives? Arguably, this simple model of political
representation assumes a quite demanding picture of citizens’ involvement in politics.
Critiques of this perspective have long asserted that such a model of democratic
representation is built on sand, as it makes presumptions about citizens’ policy views
being the origin of political representation that simply do not exist in the real world.
Instead there are many ways in which citizens’ policy views can fail the requirements
for selecting adequate representatives. It might be that citizens hold views that are
inconsistent with an underlying ideological dimension of politics, which would make it
potentially harder to select candidates based on ideology. Additionally, voters could be
in danger of being easily persuaded to adopt an opinion, opening the gate for parties
or candidates to impose their own political conviction on the people. It is important to
understand in how far concerns like this and their effect on voting behavior are valid.
The whole basis for establishing the merits of an electoral system based on democratic
representation is at stake. If such variable aspects of citizens’ policy views affect the
individual’s voting decision, then the crucial democratic-link between citizens and their
elected representatives could end up being out of order
In this dissertation I study the consequences of a wider notion of citizens’ policy views on
voting behavior. In political science, spatial theories of voting model the idea that voters
elect candidates or parties based on policy. During electoral campaigns nominees
communicate their policy positions to the general public. Political programs, speeches
and televised advertisements by the nominees, permit citizens to locate them on differ-
ent policy platforms along a liberal-conservative spectrum. Because policy platforms
aggregate policy positions and views in terms of ideology, the electorate will find
it easy to use them to find the candidate who is closest to their own policy views.
In classic proximity spatial voting, citizens’ policy preferences are, then, defined via
political platforms, so that candidates with closer platforms are preferred to those
further away. Many political scientists have found this simplified depiction of citizens’
policy preference to misrepresent important aspects of citizens’ viewpoints. Essentially,
spatial voting theories presume that citizens’ policy preferences are well defined, fixed
and exogenous. These assumptions imply that citizens’ views are consistently depicted
by their ideological platform; that evaluating political arguments does not change their
opinions, and political elites do not affect public opinion.
I offer an extension to spatial voting models that allows citizens’ policy views to be inconsistent,
persuadable and endogenous. Contrary to the position taken by spatial voting with regard
to citizens’ view points, research by political scientists, in public opinion and political
psychology all indicate that citizens possess policy views that are inconsistent with
underlying liberal-conservative dimensions, are persuadable by political arguments
and therefore can be endogenous to the nominees’ decision process. This debate can be
summarized as follows:
Policy preferences are inconsistent: Spatial voting theories often make demanding as-
sumptions about the structure of citizens’ policy-preferences. For example, citizens are
assumed to show preferences across multiple issues that are consistent with underlying
ideological orientations (e.g. Hinich and Munger, 1992). That this holds true for all
voters’ policy views is debatable. Research in the belief-system tradition of Converse
(1964) claims that actually only a small share of the general public possess meaningful
2
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attitudes towards political outcomes. Most citizens’ policy preferences are inconsistent
with underlying political ideology.
Policy preferences are persuadable: Spatial voting takes policy preferences as a natural
starting point and postpones the question of where these actually come from and
how they change. This depiction of policy preference precludes questions of why
some citizens hold more liberal, and others more conservative view points. Preference
formation models in political science indicate that preferences can be shaped and
changed through the ongoing process of evaluating political arguments and information
(e.g. Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989; Zaller, 1992). Political psychologists notice
that political arguments can persuade citizens to change their standing opinion (e.g.
Druckman, 2004; Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997).
Policy preferences are endogenous: A further assumption of the spatial voting models is
that citizens’ preferences are exogenous to the position taking of parties. This implies
that parties and candidates cannot affect citizens’ opinions towards their policies.
Empirically, this presupposition is disputable. All too often, research has found the
opposite to be true (e.g. Gerber and Jackson, 1993; Bartels, 2000; Milazzo, Adams and
Green, 2012). Policy-preferences are endogenous, in that a party’s orientations can
shape public opinion.
The main conclusion from this dissertation, is that integrating any of these three aspects
into the spatial voting model affects expectations about voters’ decisions. To reach this
conclusion, I develop a theoretical model that conceptualizes citizens’ policy preferences
in terms of policy beliefs about the benefit from different policy platforms. Within this
framework, citizens themselves are thought of as being uncertain about how much
better the outcome of any specific political platform will be. Theoretically, this allows
us to study inconsistent, persuadable, and endogenous policy views, and analyze the
theoretical effect these aspects have on voting decisions. In proving empirical support
for implications from the theory, this dissertation highlights the importance of a wider
notion of citizens’ policy views in explaining people’s electoral decisions and, thereby,
in understanding the key linkage between citizens and their representatives.
Compared to other research work, this dissertation offers an integrative theoretical
account. While the structure of voters’ opinions has been debated for decades, this
dissertation builds on the insight that representation can only be biased if different the-
oretical assessments of citizens’ policy preference also affect voting decisions. Therefore,
instead of debating presuppositions about citizens’ political preferences on empirical
grounds, I theorize what the consequences of variation in policy preference are for
voting decisions. Testing implications from this theory can provide evidence that such
variations make a difference in explaining voting decisions.
In addition, this approach attempts to alleviate tensions between spatial voting
theories and theories of political behavior. I show that the political behaviorist’s
objection to the spatial theorist’s depiction of policy preference can be integrated using
an extension of the theory. I also demonstrate to advocates of spatial voting that these
concerns actually make a difference in their theory. My theoretical conceptualization
allows spatial voting theories to address concerns about their depiction of opinions,
while political behaviorists are able to study the consequences of these concerns. Overall,
this dissertation broadens the theoretical tool-kit available to study how citizens’ policy
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views and their voting decisions are related, thereby leading to a better understanding,
in general, of electoral representation.
1.2 Main theoretical arguments
The electoral linkage between voters and candidates can be greatly affected if voters do
not reflect the assumptions made about their policy preferences in spatial voting theory.
Allowing for inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous policy preferences in spatial
voting, influences expectations about voters’ decisions: a) Voters with inconsistent pref-
erence put considerably less weight on policy; b) Citizens change their voting decisions
if they receive a persuasive political argument; c) Partisans alter their preferences in
response to the chosen candidate’s position-taking during electoral campaigns.
The major theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to introduce a model that
allows researchers to analyze these mechanisms within the far-reaching theory of
spatial voting. Thus, this dissertation amplifies our understanding of how a wider
notion of policy preferences influences the quality of of democratic representation. The
following section summarizes the central conceptualization of preferences in terms of
policy beliefs, and describes the major arguments put forward.
1.2.1 Policy beliefs in spatial voting
For ordinary citizens the political sphere offers plenty of aspects about which a voter
may feel uncertain. One such aspect is the question of what policy outcomes will be in
their own best interests. Forming reliable opinions about matters of politics can be time-
consuming, and some citizens dedicate less time to finding out what their opinions on
issues should be, than others. For example, there are different considerations as to why
a person can be in favor of, or opposed to, the policy of high-income taxation. When
only limited effort is invested, it is inconceivable for any one person to master all aspects
concerning an issue, and citizens are always left with a rest uncertainty about which of
the solutions offered will actually prove better for them. Another aspect arises, because
there are infinitely many policy issues that determine the political outcome. Instead
of forming opinions about all potential policy proposals, citizens employ underlying
political platforms to structure their policy preference. Policy platforms are related to
opinions about potential policy issues. Liberal platforms are more likely to be in favor
of high-income taxation, compared to conservative platforms.
Following this line of thought, citizens overall preference can be thought of as resting
on policy beliefs about how much better the outcome of a specific policy platform will be for
them, personally-speaking. These beliefs vary between citizens. Some believe that liberal
platforms better represent their interest than conservative platforms do. Beliefs also vary
in certainty: Some citizens are more certain than others that a specific policy platform
represents their interest. The origin of the argumentation is a conceptualization of
political preference in terms of citizens’ policy beliefs about how much better a certain
policy platform represents their interest. Such a prospect of citizens’ preference is well
integrated in a more general utility framework. Adaptive utility theory (Cyert and
DeGroot, 1987; Calvert, 1985b; Cohen and Axelrod, 1984; Houlding, 2008) allows one to
analyze situations in which the expected reward from an outcome is generally uncertain
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to the Decision Maker and depends on beliefs. Because spatial voting theories are also
formulated in terms of a utility-maximizing framework, this makes the adaption of
policy beliefs to spatial voting straightforward. The extension of this exercise allows
us to relax assumptions about citizen preference and to study their effects on voting
decisions.
1.2.2 Inconsistent policy preference
First of all, such an extension permits analysis of specifications in which political
preferences are more or less consistent with underlying liberal-conservative platforms.
Wider policy beliefs, with more uncertainty about which platform represents a citizen’s
interest, less strongly constrain policy views. This means that policy views are harder
to explain in terms of the underlying platforms. Inconsistency in policy beliefs implies
e.g. that a citizen’s opinion about gay-marriage, is not necessarily related to her opinion
about legalizing the use of marijuana. But what are the consequences when it comes to
choosing candidates?
I argue that inconsistent policy preference leads to a decrease in the weight voters place on
policy in their voting decisions. For citizens with inconsistent policy beliefs, increasing
distance between a citizen’s platform and the platform of the candidate has a weaker
impact on the probability to vote for that candidate. The reason for this is that
information about a candidate’s platform is not as informative for voters who are
uncertain which platform actually represents their interest, as it is for voters who
are certain. I further show that another line of argument is conceivable, that sees no
electoral effect resulting from inconsistency. As the uncertainty about a citizen’s own
platform generally concerns both candidates to an equal degree, it does not affect their
voting decision.
1.2.3 Persuadable policy preference
The concern that policy preferences are persuadable can be analyzed within this
framework as well. Arguments about policies (which are used to persuade others)
entail considerations regarding which political platforms best represent a voter. For
example, an argument in favor of gay-marriage implies that a voter is better represented
by liberal rather than conservative platforms. Finding such an argument persuasive
should alter a voter’s policy beliefs towards more liberal platforms. If arguments
are able to persuade voters to opt for a different political platform, and the choice of
political platform affects voting decisions, then arguments should directly affect voting
decisions as well.
I, therefore, argue that one political argument can affect the state in which a voter is otherwise
indifferent to two political candidates. While the standard theory claims that citizens
are undecided between two candidates who take on platforms slightly to the left and
slightly to the right of their views, evaluating one political argument changes this state.
Citizens should be likely to favor the candidate in the direction of the argument.
1.2.4 Endogenous policy preference
The theoretical extensions also allow a researcher to analyze endogenous preference
during the course of a campaign. Political platforms communicated during an election
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not only inform citizens about the position of a candidate, but they also persuade a
certain share of citizens to follow the candidate’s policy lead. The theoretical specifi-
cation permits me to derive expectations about this persuasion process. Specifically, I
derive expectations about voters’ policy distances to two competing candidates at the
beginning and the end of the campaign.
I argue that especially citizens who identify with a particular party are likely to decrease their
distance to their party’s candidate over the campaign. Therefore, policy preferences are
endogenous to the candidate’s campaign platform. Furthermore, I show under which
conditions such persuasion shifts can affect the outcome of an election. In particular,
they should affect electoral results if candidates manage to persuade citizens whose
initial views are closer to the other candidate’s platform.
1.3 Empirical implications of theoretical models
This dissertation provides rigorous tests for empirical implications of the arguments
put forward. The empirical evidence emphasizes that the theoretical extension helps
generate a more accurate picture of how voters actually make up their minds. First,
I find that for survey respondents who show inconsistent policy views, the distance
to a candidate on a general liberal-conservative dimension has a smaller effect on
voting probabilities. Second, relying on a survey experiment, I point out that political
arguments have a direct effect on voting decisions by persuading respondents about
their policy views. Finally, building on latent class models, I highlight that partisans are
considerably more likely to alter their positions in the direction of the candidate over
the course of the campaign - making their policy views endogenous to the candidate’s
campaign platform.
Throughout the dissertation a wide range of methods is applied to create reliable
tests for the theoretical implications. The overreaching empirical approach of this
dissertation is best described by the NFS’s Political Science program initiative known as
the ‘Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models’ (EITM). The objective of this initiative
“is to encourage political scientists to build formal models that are connected to an
empirical test” (Granato and Scioli, 2004, p.313). The EITM approach calls for a direct
connection between theoretical formalized models and their empirical test. All too often
researchers attempting to explain the interplay between voters and candidates, focus on
either one of the two: Rigorous theoretical argumentation, or the empirical test of the
hypothesis. This prevents the bringing together of acquired theoretical knowledge and
empirical evidence, harming the ability to explain democratic representation on both
empirical and theoretical grounds. The great benefit of the EITM approach is to bring
theoretical models closer to empirical tests, and empirical tests closer to the theoretical
models. The research design of this dissertation is based on that presented in the
EITM initiative: I offer formalized argumentation and direct testing of the implications
concerned.
The next paragraphs outline, how I derive theoretical motivated empirical models,
develop measurement instruments for the central conceptualization and employ survey
experiments, in order to follow this empirical approach.
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1.3.1 Theoretically motivated empirical models
The formalized theoretical argumentation offers concrete guidance about the specifi-
cations for empirical models. Whenever possible, I closely follow this guidance and
employ empirical models that mimic the theoretical formulas. In all three chapters, I
derive the systematic component of the statistical models from the theoretical specifica-
tions. This results in none-of-the-shelve estimators that infer about parameters from
the theoretical process, rather than linear approximations of the process.
For example, for the argumentation pertaining to how inconsistent policy preferences
affect voting decisions, I opt for a probit model, where the effect of policy distance
depends on a weight that is affected by inconsistency. This specification amplifies the
standard approach in testing a conditional hypothesis in empirical models - interaction
effects, in situations where researchers theoretically expect that the weight voters place
on specific considerations will vary with covariates. In another situation, I employ a
latent class model to gauge the heterogeneity of persuasion processes during campaigns.
Because the theoretical argumentation calls for an unobserved process that is hard
to measure directly - namely, persuasion - I employ implications of the different
processes to classify voters who have been persuaded. This permits me to show that a
certain share of respondents follows implications for an endogenous preference model,
in which they are persuaded by the candidates’ campaign platform, and model the
likelihood of such persuasion shifts as a function of the respondents’ partisanship.
Finally, for the experimental set-up, I show that a ordered logit model for the treatment
effect coincide with the theoretical effect that one political argument has on voting
decisions.
1.3.2 Survey data and measurement instruments
Most parts of this dissertation rely on survey data from the American National Election
Study (ANES). Survey Data have long served electoral research in helping to test ideas
about citizens’ involvement in politics. In order to test their theoretical arguments,
survey researchers need accurate instruments which help measure these theoretical
concepts. The same holds true for the subject of this dissertation. The novel conceptual-
ization of citizen policy beliefs requires appropriate measuring techniques. Building
on an item response model and the theoretical conceptualization, I derive a simple
estimate for the variance in policy beliefs. This measurement can be employed to test
implications, building on empirical models that relate preference to voting decisions.
1.3.3 Survey experiments
Often social scientists find themselves in a situation in which standard survey methods
do not permit the testing of implications for their theoretical arguments. In such
situations, experimental manipulation can allow the researcher to create convincing
tests for their theory. Over the last decade, the use of survey experiments permitted
researchers to introduce “compelling” concepts that have “had a major impact on
political science” (Iyengar, 2010, p.190). The implication that one political argument
should affect the state of indifference is impossible to test when relying on standard
survey questions. In this case, I rely on a survey experiment in which I ask a share
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of respondents to read through a political argument. This way I can compare their
subsequent voting decisions to those from a control group who did not read the
argument. Based on this, I can make inferences about the effect of political arguments.
1.4 Plan of the dissertation
In Chapter 2, I establish the central conceptualization of citizens’ preferences in terms
of policy beliefs, by discussing the major theoretical division as found in the literature.
First, I introduce the standard canton of spatial voting, discussing central assumptions
about policy preference. Second, I carve out the similarities of studies that share a
different perspective on peoples’ opinions about politics. Researchers understand
citizens’ opinions in terms of beliefs. Beliefs allow for inconsistency, can be persuadable,
and endogenous to party platforms. Overall, the chapter shows that a belief-based
model is a promising way to integrate concerns raised about spatial voting’s depiction
of citizens’ policy views.
Chapter 3 formalizes the conceptualization of policy beliefs and integrates them
in a formalized spatial voting model. In particular, I describe how adaptive utility
theory can be used to represent the idea that citizens posses beliefs about political
platforms that differ in direction, but also in certainty. The chapter highlights that
the standard spatial model is nested within this extension, but allows us to take into
account inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous preferences.
Chapters 4 to 6 analyze how the inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous pref-
erences affect voting decisions within the theoretical framework. The chapters also
provide empirical tests for the implications. They are written in a way that allows them
to be read and understood without going through the introductory chapters.
Chapter 4 asks if policy preference is well defined for all voters? The chapter analyses
how inconsistent policy preferences affect spatial voting decisions. Theoretically, allow-
ing voters to have a varying degree of consistency affects voting decisions systematically.
Voters with inconsistent preferences place less weight on policy distance, than voters
with consistent policy preference. The chapter shows that this theoretical expectation is
confirmed when tested. Voters with inconsistent policy preference place considerably
less weight on policy distance.
Chapter 5 analyzes whether political arguments impact spatial voting decisions.
Building on the model extension, I expect that one political argument can change the
state in which a voter is indifferent between two policy options. In a survey experiment
I am able to confirm this hypothesis. I confront respondents with an artificial voting
decision in which they should be indifferent between two candidates. Respondents
confronted with a political argument, who then found the argument persuasive, are
less likely to be undecided about whom they should vote for.
Chapter 6 analyzes how far policy preferences are endogenous to the political process.
I investigate the consequences of campaigns in which parties not only communicate
their position, but also attempt to persuade voters about their platform. Based on this,
I argue that a share of voters alter their positions in the direction of one candidate.
This greatly affects the likelihood of their decision to vote in favor of that candidate, by
whom they have been persuaded. Empirically, I find this pattern confirmed, especially
for partisans in the American National Election Study Panel of 2008.
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The dissertation concludes with Chapter 7, which sets out a discussion of the impli-
cations of my findings for the representation-link between voters and their candidates
and outline those research questions that still need to be addressed, employing the
policy-belief extension of spatial-voting models.
1.5 Key innovations
The dissertation breaks new grounds theoretically as well as empirically. I would like
to stress the innovations that are of special interest to a wider spectrum of the political
research community.
1.5.1 Theoretical innovations
Representation of preference in terms of policy beliefs
I show how adaptive utility theory can be used to represent citizens’ preferences in
terms of policy beliefs. Introducing this conceptualization brings together political
behaviorist’s depiction of policy attitudes with the spatial voting idea of policy plat-
forms. The framework, I offer, underlines that the two contrasting foundations of
citizens policy views, can be expressed in the same theoretical framework. Spatial
voting’s idea of citizens preference is nested within political behaviorist’s perspective.
Employing this modeling approach, spatial voting theorists can, thereby, test what the
consequences of concerns about their restrictive perspective on preference are, and
political behaviorist can employ a wide-reaching theoretical framework to study the
connection between citizens and their representatives.
Integration of the evaluation of arguments in a general voting theory
This dissertation offers a way to connect preference formation processes and the evalu-
ation of political arguments with spatial voting theory. Research in political psychology
and public opinion have acquired extensive knowledge about the process of preference
formation. However, these studies have been somewhat disconnected from electoral re-
search. While they study how political attitudes are shaped, manipulated and affected,
voting researcher studied how resulting attitudes affect voting decisions. What has
been missing to get this connected perspectives closer together, is a conceptualization
that permits to integrated the evaluation of arguments in a standard voting model.
Formalization of belief-systems in mass publics, and non-attitude models
In this dissertation, I show that adaptive utility theory offers an option to model varying
belief constraints that allows to mimic Converse’s original formulation. In his influential
chapter “The nature of belief systems in mass publics” Converse (1964) argued that
a vast share of the general public lack meaningful opinions about politics that are
- in any way - constrained by underlying ideological dimensions. This influential
perspective has seldom been adopted to formalized models of politics, because there
has been no appropriate way to represent this idea in a utility-terms. Moreover, with
some modifications this formalization also provides a model of attitudes as resting on
varying considerations, as discussed in Zaller (1992) famous book.
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Novel approach integrating partisanship in spatial voting theories
Researcher in the tradition of “The American Voter” (Campbell et al., 1960) highlight
the importance of partisanship in voting decisions. Political behaviorist key concern
with spatial voting is that these models tell the story the wrong way round. It might
be that citizens vote for candidates or parties because they adopted the parties’ policy
views, not because the party offers policy platforms that match citizen’s preferences.
In other words, party identifiers align their positions with their party’s proposals.
Although, researchers offer empirical evidence for this perspective, this dissertation is
among the first to offer a theoretical account of this process. While parties campaign
for their political platform, a share of citizens adapts these positions as their own.
Discussion of a learning model, how voters form expected utility
I specify a modeling approach how voters learn about the expected utility from a
candidate that contrast the standard solution in the literature. Formalized models of
politics build on the idea that voting preference can be approximated by specifying
utility functions. Certain information that affect these utility functions, are associated
with uncertainty. For example: Which platform a candidate will implement once
elected? The mechanical way to account for this uncertainty is that voters employ the
expectation of the random utility terms to compare political options. I argue that in
many instances the uncertainty enters utility specifications through a learning process.
Aspects about a candidate, for example her policy platform, gets more informative,
the less uncertainty a voter has about the positions. Weakly communicated platforms
contain high uncertainty on the voter side and result in narrow ability to learn about
candidates. This can make them appear the same in utility terms and thereby can have
a direct effect on voting decisions. In addition to the application at hand, this approach
should especially speak to researcher that are concerned with the electoral effects of
ambiguous position taking.
1.5.2 Empirical innovations
Provide a case how to use the EITM approach to introduce novel theoretical concepts
This dissertation provides rigorous test of empirical implications from novel formalized
theoretical models. Although the NFS’s Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models
(EITM) initiative called for this, all to often empirics and theory a still disconnected.
Researchers that put forward novel arguments, either focus on the empirical evidence,
or their rigorous formalized implementation. An example might illustrate this: While
Enelow and Hinich (1981) proposed a novel conception of uncertainty over candidate’s
platforms, 5 years later Bartels (1986) offered an empirical test of this. Some might see
this as a good example, how theories can inform empirical models, but all to often
important theoretical insights get lost if not directly applied. For example, up to date
there is no empirical model that estimates non-separable preference over multiple
policy dimensions in spatial voting, a theoretical concept that has been developed more
than 40 years ago. To avoid such an unsatisfactory history, this dissertation has clearly
focused on providing empirical evidence for all the theoretical specifications.
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Introduction of latent class models employing theoretical implications to classify
and learn about difficult-to-measure phenomena
I discuss latent class models using implications of theoretical processes to learn about
phenomena which are difficult to observe. Many political processes are, by nature,
of the sort which prove impractical to observe. As a result they often bypass valid
and reliable empirical measurement. In such situations, researchers find it difficult to
explain the phenomena they are studying. Oftentimes, however, social scientists have
expectations about the heterogeneous consequences stemming from these processes.
In my case, I classify voters who are likely to be persuaded by a candidate’s platform.
This model strategy can permit other researchers to explain the process, by modeling
class assignments as a function of covariates and thereby facilitating understanding of
political processes which are difficult to measure.
Development of an estimate of inconsistency in political attitudes
I propose an estimate for inconsistency, as the degree by which policy views expressed
in a survey are constrained by ideological platforms. Since Converse’s seminal contri-
bution regarding mass belief systems, inconsistency in political attitudes has become an
important empirical concept. Previous proposed measurements lacked the connection
between political attitudes and underlying ideological platforms (Barton and Parsons,
1977; Wyckoff, 1980; Jacoby, 1995). The estimator I propose builds on the theoretical
model and a linear item response specification.
Design of a survey experiment that combines experimental set-ups in political psy-
chology with set-ups in spatial voting
Survey experiments have helped political scientists to make conclusive findings in
many areas of research. Survey experiments are most prominently used by political
psychologists. They have addressed the questions: under which conditions and for
whom, political arguments proved especially persuasive (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997;
Druckman, 2004; Jerit, 2009; Arceneaux, 2012; Lau, Smith and Fiske, 1991). In recent
years, survey experiments have been given particular attention by those studying spatial
voting, as they allow one to manipulate aspects of the theory, such as a candidate’s
policy platform. This has allowed researchers to learn which specific decision rules
voters employ (Lacy and Paolino, 2010; Tomz and Van Houweling, 2008; Claassen,
2009), and how ambiguity of a candidate’s platform can affect voting decisions (Tomz
and Van Houweling, 2009). I use a survey experiment that combines both set-ups to
test the effect of political arguments on spatial voting.
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CHAPTER 2
Policy beliefs to represent preference in spatial voting
2.1 Introduction
Democratic theory deals with the conditions under which the democratic ideal can be
achieved and maintained. “The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is
the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented” (Mill,
1861, p.53). As a form of government, modern democracies attempt to comply with
this idea by allowing eligible citizens to elect representative leaders. Many theorists
recognize modern democracies as being an especially appropriate ‘rule of law’ in order
to implement what Rousseau once referred to as the “will of the people”. In recurring
elections, the public is able to express their aggregated preference and, by this means,
determine the political outcome. In order to understand pitfalls in the democratic
aggregation of the public’s will, theories of democracy are in need of a reliable portrayal
of the citizens’ preferences regarding policy outcomes. The spatial model of democracy is
among the most influential theories of Democracy in contemporary political science.
Building on a set of assumptions about citizens’ policy preferences, the theory allows
us to analyze the electoral expectations, based on the interaction between citizens and
their representatives.
In this chapter, I discuss the spatial model’s depiction of citizens’ policy preferences
more closely. I outline recent developments regarding this theory and reveal that
most of them are built on a set of three implicit assumptions about citizens’ policy
preferences viz that these are: well-defined, fixed, and exogenous. I discuss why the
restrictive nature of these assumptions can be seen as a virtue for the explanation of
electoral democracy, but only if they do not systematically affect the actual voting
decisions. This insight demands a framework in which we can study the consequences
of relaxing any of these assumptions.
Furthermore, the chapter offers a conceptualization of citizens’ policy preferences
in terms of policy beliefs. I elaborate on a wider notion of policy preference based
on a discussion of stances in the literature that are in opposition to the spatial voting
portrayal of citizens’ policy views. These alternative theoretical arguments and research
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models present citizens’ opinions, attitudes and preferences (in contrast to the spatial
model view) as being inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous. Subsequent discussion
permits me to highlight that these accounts share a definition of policy beliefs that can
in fact be incorporated into spatial voting theories.
2.2 Spatial voting theory
Over the last few decades, the application of spatial models of democracy has turned
out to be useful in understanding key aspects about representative democracy. Their
application helped to explain how citizens choose parties or candidates based on their
political programs. This stimulated thoughts as to how representatives can react to
citizens’ voting behavior by proposing political programs (or acting in ways) that
increase their political support. Overall, the literature points to a close connection
between candidates and citizens: because citizens judge parties or candidates by their
policy platforms and this, in turn, impacts on the parties’ or candidates’ electoral
success, this perspective expects that political entrepreneurs will seldom propose or
implement policies that are too extreme. A political party with an unpopular policy
platform, would not receive enough votes in the next election and thereby be punished
for their political program.
Since Downs’ seminal book, “An economic theory of democracy”, spatial models
have analyzed the interaction between parties, governments and citizens in terms of
citizens’ policy preferences, as well as their voting decisions and nominees’ position-
taking in order to gain a majority in elections (Downs, 1957). One of the key insights
from Downs’ original model, which was also derived in Hotelling (1929), is the well-
known median voter theorem: two parties that compete with each other on a liberal-
conservative ideological spectrum tend to converge to the center of the spectrum.
Although the empirical validity of this model is debatable, without doubt it served as
the building block for subsequent research on representative democracy. Spatial models
of party competition have been extended to gain more accurate expectations and an
understanding of the democratic linkage between citizens and parties (e.g. Adams, 1999;
Grofman, 2004; Laver and Sergenti, 2010; Kollman, Miller and Page, 1992; Wittman,
1983; Groseclose, 2001; Alesina, 1988; Calvert, 1985a).
The starting point for the spatial model of democracy is the set of assumptions
made about citizens’ policy views and how voting decisions are based on these. In
the classic proximity voting model, citizens’ policy preferences are represented by
political platforms along the liberal- conservative ideological spectrum. Some citizens
prefer more liberal and others more conservative policy platforms. Voting decisions
are affected by candidates’ position-taking on the same dimension. Voters choose the
candidate who occupies the policy-platform closest to their most preferred platform,
such that a liberal citizen would rather vote for a liberal, than for a conservative
candidate. Policy proximity has indeed proven to be a key factor in citizens’ voting
decisions (e.g. Jessee, 2009) and is the building block for spatial models of party
competition.
Spatial voting has become a subfield within the literature in which proximity voting
has seen plenty of extensions: a) models that allow for a multidimensional policy
space (Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970) and that highlight the different salience
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of this policy dimension in voters’ calculus (RePass, 1971; Carmines and Stimson,
1980); b) models that clarify the connection between policy preferences and ideological
dimensions (Enelow and Hinich, 1994; Hinich and Munger, 1992; Jessee, 2009); c)
strategic voting models, in which citizens take into account post-election bargains
(Duch, May and Armstrong, 2010; Grofman, 1985; Kedar, 2005); d) extensions that
integrate the uncertainty voters have about a party’s position (Bartels, 1986; Enelow and
Hinich, 1982, 1989), and e) probabilistic models of vote choice that allow non-policy
factors (valance-issues) to influence voting decisions (Adams, Merrill and Grofman,
2005; Stokes, 1963). Although the list of extensions is far longer than the one outlined
here, many extensions of spatial voting share a set of important aspects, especially as
their overarching depiction of policy preferences is quite similar.
2.2.1 Three implicit assumptions about citizens’ policy preferences
Spatial voting theories take citizens’ preferences as the natural starting point for their
analysis and therefore have to suppose certain aspects about them. In consequence,
spatial voting theorists make a set of theoretical assumptions that permit them to study
how voters employ their policy views to choose between candidates. Major newer work
in this area of research relies on the same set of implicit assumptions, namely, that
citizens’ policy preferences are well- defined, fixed and exogenous (see e.g. Adams,
Merrill and Grofman, 2005; Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008; Jessee, 2009;
Kedar, 2005; Schofield and Sened, 2006).
Well-defined refers to the assumption made about the structure of political preference.
The structure supposes that citizens’ platforms capture all important aspects about
citizens’ policy preferences for concrete issues. A citizen whose ideal-platform is liberal
would then be assumed to be in favor of a minimum-wage, high income taxation
and abortion rights. This implies that two citizens with the same ideal platform
are likely to have the same policy views. This simplification allows researchers to
abstract citizens’ policy preferences in terms of their platforms. As such, it imposes a
homogeneity assumption: all citizens are equally well represented by their position on
the liberal-conservative spectrum.
Fixed represents the idea that policy preferences are not shaped within the analytical
model. Within theoretical models some aspects always need to be fixed to facilitate
explanation. The decision regarding what should be considered fixed and what should
be allowed to move, would be tailored to the purpose of the study. Fixed policy
preferences allow researchers to focus on how citizens’ opinions affect voting decisions.
However, as such, this decision precludes our studying other aspects e.g. how changing
preference may affect voting decisions. Furthermore, it sidesteps the important question:
where does this variation actually come from?
Exogenous means that citizens’ preferences are not affected by aspects within the
model. Similar to assuming that preferences are fixed, the assumption also allows
a researcher to focus her attention on specific questions, the most important being:
how variation in citizens’ policy preference impacts preference for parties, and not the
other way around. That is to say, assuming that political preferences are exogenous
concentrates scrutiny on one aspect of the political process: given citizens’ policy
preference what candidates do they elect? Needless to say this is an oversimplification;
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it is entirely conceivable that parties (which are clearly part of the political process) can
have a strong impact on citizens’ points of view.
Many spatial voting theorists see the above assumptions as the correct position
in a simplicity-complexity trade-off. The assumptions are restrictive, but they focus
attention on the important aspect of how voters make up their minds. It is important
to note that researchers do not make these assumptions because they are necessarily
convinced that they hold “true” in a literal sense. The aim is to simplify the complexity
in citizens’ decision-making in order to gain a better understanding of the political
process. Models about voting behavior always face the trade-off between simplicity
and complexity. Essentially it would be possible to assume that each voter has her own
set of factors that explain why she voted for a specific candidate. This idiosyncratic
explanation, however, would undermine the purpose of understanding the aggregated
result in electoral democracy. Researchers would find it difficult to explain why a
particular party receives 40% of the votes and another party only 5%. Therefore,
researchers should restrict their models to aspects about the world that they believe are
most important in explaining voting behavior and leave out aspects that are viewed as
being less important.
For spatial theorists the most important aspect is how policy platforms affect voting
decisions. This simplicity is seen as a virtue. In Jesse’s words:
“Spatial theory represents a profitable approach to the study of voting
and politics more generally despite, and in many ways because of, its
simplicity”(Jessee, 2012, p.11).
Accepting this epistemological position stresses that it is not so much the question of
whether the assumptions are valid, but in how far they capture the central aspects
about the electoral process. Following this line of thought, the correct question has to
be in how far the assumptions impact on voting decisions in any meaningful way.
2.2.2 Do the assumptions affect voting decisions?
Any depiction of citizens’ policy opinions will only bias spatial model’s representation
of electoral democracy if the expectations about citizens’ voting behavior are affected
by the assumptions. What should be clear from the above epistemological discussion,
is that it is not about the truthfulness of the assumptions made in these models
itself, but rather their impact on the complete picture. Most spatial theorists take an
instrumentalist perspective on their assumptions about citizens’ policy views, as not
being right or wrong but either useful or not (Friedman, 1953). Following this dominant
conviction in economics, advocates of spatial voting can rightfully reject doubts raised
about assumptions by referring to the usefulness of their models in explaining the
electoral process. In other words, showing an advocate of spatial voting that any of
the assumptions do not hold, by no means distracts from his or her point of view, as
long as this perspective is still useful in understanding the electoral linkage between
citizens and their representatives. Complementarily, a spatial voting theorist can utilize
the scientific principal of parsimony to avoid unnecessarily relaxing these assumptions.
In order to make a valid point as to why a portrayal of democracy should take into
account aspects about citizens’ policy views that are precluded by the assumption,
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researchers would need to show that such aspects actually affect the link between
citizens and their representatives: i.e. their voting decisions. The democratic-linkage
can only be affected, if relaxing these assumptions a) results in different theoretical
expectations about citizens’ voting behavior and b) is better suited to explain empirical
patterns about voting decisions.
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to develop a framework that allows us to
study in how far changing these three assumptions changes expectations about voting
behavior. In order to find a conceptual synthesis that allows the relaxation of these
assumptions, a good starting point is the theoretical argumentations that propose a
wider notion of citizens’ policy views.
2.3 A wider notion of citizens’ policy preferences
There is a long-standing argument against the oversimplified depiction of citizens’
policy views in theories of democratic representation. The aggregation of citizens’
opinions, through the electoral selection of representatives, supposes that citizens
possess reliable opinions in the first place. The belief that this a reasonable starting
point has been criticized throughout the development of modern democratic theory. A
quote by Joseph Schumpeter summarizes these theoretical concerns:
“If we are to argue that the will of the citizens per se is a political factor
entitled to respect, it must first exist. That is to say, it must be something
more than an indeterminate bundle of vague impulses loosely playing about
given slogans and mistaken impressions. Everyone would have to know
definitely what he wants to stand for” (Schumpeter, 2013, p.253).
Since the 1950’s the perspective on elections as an aggregation mechanism of citi-
zens’ policy opinions has been represented by spatial models of democracy. As such,
they have been subject to similar critiques in the fields of political behavior, public
opinion and political psychology. As I shall outline below, researchers question in
how far policy preference can be depicted as being well-defined, fixed or exogenous.
Theoretical conceptualizations and argumentations have been developed that are built
on a wider notion of citizens’ policy preference. Opinions have been represented as
being inconsistent, endogenous and persuadable and thereby provide insights which
standard assumptions in spatial voting preclude. For many researchers who build their
knowledge on these theoretical models, they do not only undermine assumptions made
about policy preference, but also the validity of the spatial model as such.
The goal of this section, then, is to examine research which takes a converse approach
on the specification of policy opinions in order to find out what the studies have in
common. Consequently, the aim in the next subsections will not be to cover every
case where the assumptions failed, but rather to bring together how these theories, in
general, devise citizens’ policy opinions.
2.3.1 Citizens’ policy preferences are inconsistent
One aspect that diverges from spatial voting’s portrayal of policy preference can be
found in research on public opinion. The idea that public policy views can be portrayed
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by ideal policy platforms stands in contrast to theories of mass belief systems. The
sociological model of belief systems asserts strong heterogeneity in how strongly
citizens’ views are structured by underlying ideological dimensions. The fundament of
this approach is the idea that political attitudes “are organized into coherent structures
by political elites for consumption by the public” (Feldman, 1988, p.417). This implies
that political platforms along ideological dimensions do not exist per se, but are created
by political elites to structure the political process. For example, it is well-known
that the political spectrum that ranges from left to right was created by the seating
arrangement in the French parliament. What these left-right platforms imply exactly,
was then later manifested by elite discussions about policy proposals in parliament.
Only after that, did citizens employ the same categories to structure their beliefs and
choose matching representatives. An important step in the process was the exposure to
these structures. If the general public adopts the same ideology considerations as the
political elites, ideology should also constrain their opinions about the policies. If not,
citizens’ attitudes do not mimic the ideological structures.
This perspective is most famously associated with Phillip Converse’s chapter, “The
nature of belief systems in mass publics”(Converse, 1964). Based on analysis of survey
responses, he argued that a vast proportion of the general public lack meaningful policy
attitudes. Voters’ attitudes are most often inconsistent and unstable, as the general
public does not organize their beliefs in accordance with the underlying ideological
dimensions used by political elites. In Converse’s own words:
“Large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs even on the
issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among
elites for substantial periods of time. Where any single dimension is con-
cerned, very substantial portions of the public simply do not belong on the
dimension at all” (Converse, 1964, p.245).
There has been much subsequent research on mass belief systems. Most noteworthy,
are researchers who stress the importance of “core values” and “predispositions” in
belief systems (Feldman, 1988), and theoretical extensions to the model (Zaller, 1992).
However, Converse’s empirical results evoked much criticism. The critiques explain his
findings as a result of measurement error rather than citizens’ incompetence (Achen,
1975; Jackson, 1983; Moskowitz and Jenkins, 2004). Nonetheless, Converse’s non-attitude
conclusion has affected both debate and writing in American politics, ever since its
publication.
Survey researchers relied on this early perspective to explain and understand an-
swering behavior in surveys. Zaller, for example, notes that “[. . .] individuals do not
typically possess ‘true attitudes’ on issues [. . .] but a series of partially independent
and often inconsistent ones” (Zaller, 1992, p.93). Individuals form attitudes off the
“top of the head at the moment of confronting survey questions [. . . ]” (Zaller, 1992,
p.39). For many researchers this non-attitude is better suited to explain survey question
effects (e.g. Schuman and Presser, 1996) and thereby yield a more accurate picture of
public opinion.
The idea that citizens lack meaningful policy attitudes is found in many textbooks on
political behaviour. For example, Kinder states that:
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“Precious few Americans make sophisticated use of political abstraction.
Most are mystified by or at least indifferent to standard ideological concepts,
and not many express consistently liberal, conservative, or centrist positions
on government policy” (Kinder, 1998, p.768).
The perspective on citizens’ limited ability to abstract in ideological terms, is still so
influential because it mirrors the theoretical concerns about the simple representative
link in political theory. If citizens possess policy attitudes that are inconsistent with
the basic dimensions of politics and unstable, how can they potentially elect matching
representatives? In this way, recent publications can be understood that attempt to
rescue the electoral-linkage, by showing that once we use appropriate ways to measure
citizens’ issue positions, citizens truly choose leaders that match their preference
(Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008; Jessee, 2012). I argue that this will by
no means end the debate. What is needed is a theoretical model that allows us to
incorporate concerns about citizens’ heterogeneity in ideological constraints.
2.3.2 Citizens’ policy preferences are persuadable
An additional aspect about citizens’ preference that the spatial voting assumptions
preclude is that the public first has to form reliable opinions about matters of politics.
Riker once argued that it “ is unfortunate that the spatial model as usually presented
does not allow voters’ positions to change and thus precludes persuasion”(Riker, 1990,
p.56). This statement describes the state of affairs today, just as it did 25 years ago.
For the sake of simplicity, the canon of spatial voting models still assumes that policy
preference is fixed, which confines spatial voting to studying how political views affect
voting decisions, and prevents political scientists, who are interested in persuasion and
the question of how policy views are formed, from employing these models.
For many political scientists, persuasion is the essence of politics. The important part
of the political process is not how citizens use their policy views to elect candidates, but
why they hold the views in the first place. “Where people start off politically matters,
but what counts is where they wind up after the pushing of shoving of political
arguments” (Sniderman et al., 1996, p.55). From this point of view, spatial voting offers
a truncated picture of the political process. Put in the words of Mutz et al.:
“Politics, at its core, is about persuasion. It hinges not just on whether
citizens at any one moment in time tend to favor one side of an issue over
another, but on the numbers of them that can be brought, when push comes
to shove, from one side to the other”(Mutz, Brody and Sniderman, 1996,
p.1).
Political psychologists know that political arguments can persuade citizens to change
their standing opinions. Confronting respondents with political arguments in experi-
mental settings allowed them to find out about the structures of political arguments
that are particularly persuasive (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997). Similarly it was possible
to study framing effects (Druckman, 2001, 2004; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997),
how different “interpretations” about proposals affect evaluation (Lau, Smith and
Fiske, 1991), as well as the effect of predictive appeals (Jerit, 2009), and cognitive biases
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(Arceneaux, 2012). The focus of these studies was to find out under which conditions
and for whom, political arguments are particularly persuasive.
Models of preference formation in political science indicate that preference can be
shaped and changed through the ongoing process of evaluating political arguments
and information. Both memory-based models (Zaller, 1992; Zaller and Feldman, 1992)
and on-line models (Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989) point out that the evaluation
of any policy depends on the “considerations” an individual has received about this
policy1. Considerations are defined as “any reason that might induce an individual
to decide a political issue one way or the other” (Zaller, 1992, p.40). In these models
citizens change their beliefs about a specific policy by receiving and evaluating political
arguments that entail different considerations as to why a certain policy proposal is
better or worse. Adopting this perspective in spatial voting would mean that voters’
change their beliefs regarding what position is best for them, by evaluating political
arguments.
The idea that arguments can persuade recipients to alter their preferences, can also
be found in more formalized parts of the literature. “Cheap-talk” models underscore
the idea that the strategic exchange of privately known facts can persuade other
actors(Crawford and Sobel, 1982). These models have been adopted as a means of
studying political phenomena, and to explain both political debates and democratic
outcomes (see e.g. Austen-Smith, 1990; Lupia, 1998). Newer models within this same
literature, rely on the idea that arguments contain considerations that are relevant to
citizens when deliberating political outcomes(Dickson, Hafer and Landa, 2008; Hafer
and Landa, 2007)2. In particular, newer theoretical models which perceive “deliberation
as self-discovery” (Hafer and Landa, 2007, p.332) correspond with those earlier studies
discussed above. The formalized argumentation put forward by these researchers will
become an important building block for the theoretical conceptualization presented in
next chapter.
2.3.3 Citizens’ policy preferences are endogenous
Citizens form their opinions about matters in politics by following political debates,
discussing issues with friends and following the news. In many ways, the resulting
opinions are a product of the political process, in which elites, political groups, parties
as well as citizens take part. Often, however, spatial voting models assume that policy
preferences are exogenous to the political process. This proposition is disputable. Policy
preference can often be thought of, as being a result of the political process itself, rather
than a ‘stand alone’ entity. Most important for political representation is the effect party
positions can have on citizens. If citizens adopt the positions of their preferred party,
rather than choosing a party that matches their policy preference, the simple chain
1The two models differ in the way individuals form their preference based on received considerations.
While memory-based accessibility models argue that individuals rely on considerations that are at the “top
of the head” in certain situations , on-line processing models contest that individuals seldom can recall
the considerations that lead them to prefer one policy over the other, and they process considerations
unconsciously using a “running-tally” of positive and negative considerations about an object.
2Contrary to other models, the credibility and convincibility of an argument is thereby not merely
determined endogenous to the situation of the strategic communication process
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of command in representation might be reversed. According to Milazzo, Adams and
Green:
“If party elites shape citizens’ policy beliefs then public opinion may simply
mirror these elites’ own viewpoints, and the correspondence between mass
and elite opinion tells us little about whether parties provide faithful policy
representation”(Milazzo, Adams and Green, 2012).
Political scientists have put considerable effort into understanding the reciprocal rela-
tionship between policy orientation and partisanship. Do party- identifiers adopt their
partys’ platform, or do they change their party identification if their party proposes
policies that are too far away from their own? Although the large body of literature that
developed throughout the last decade comes to contrary conclusions, under which con-
ditions partisanship affects citizens’ positions, most accounts highlight the importance
partisanship can play in determining policy views (Bartels, 2000; Carsey and Layman,
2006; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Hetherington, 2001; Layman and Carsey,
2002; Milazzo, Adams and Green, 2012; Gerber, Huber and Washington, 2010). The
aforementioned literature is directly connected to behavioral models of voting, which
stress partisanship as the major determinate of voters’ behavior (Campbell et al., 1960).
Partisanship as the ‘unmoved’ mover not only explains voting but also alters policy
views. This challenges the exogenous preference assumption made within the spatial
model: Voters select parties not because these parties are close in policy terms, but
because they identify with these parties, and alter their preference to align it with their
party.
The reciprocal effect of partisanship is addressed by newer research that highlights
a persuasion process that can lead individuals with certain predispositions to adopt
their party’s communicated positions. Central to these studies is the idea that “the very
reason for public political debate between parties is to sway” citizens’ “preferences in
one or the other direction”(Jerit, 2009, p.102). Lenz (2013) shows that party position
does not only inform individuals, but also persuades them to adopt the perspective
of their party. Carefully disentangling the effect of political campaigns, Huber and
Arceneaux (2007) find evidence that citizens are persuaded by the party’s position
taken during campaigns (see also Gerber et al., 2011). However, it is not entirely clear
if the mechanism behind changes in political preference in these cases is persuasion
and the careful evaluation of political arguments. A few experimental investigations
show that partisans even alter their policy view when only informed about the party’s
or candidate’s position-taking (Sanders et al., 2008). As such, citizens take cues from
their parties without being persuaded by their arguments. Nonetheless, there is an
increasing interest in how candidates employ the possibility to persuade individuals
in designing their electoral campaigns (see e.g. Hillygus and Shields, 2014; Jacobs and
Shapiro, 2000), that requires a theoretical foundation of this process3.
3For spatial model of that incorporates endogenous preference see Jackson (2014)
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2.4 Policy beliefs
Studies that account for inconsistency, persuasion, learning processes and endogeneity
in policy preference share a common conceptualization that builds on policy beliefs.
In many approaches, citizens’ opinions are understood in terms of beliefs regarding
how much better a certain political outcome will be for them personally. Although this
concept has influenced research in political psychology, public opinion and political
behavior, it has not been fully synthesized as a wider definition of policy preference.
The following subsections offer a concept of policy beliefs. I pay particular attention
to how policy beliefs are able to account for the three aspects about political preference
outlined above. Overall, the discussion aims to emphasize how policy beliefs can widen
the understanding of preference in spatial voting theory.
2.4.1 Policy beliefs and inconsistency in policy views
Important for the discussion is how the concept of belief constraint can potentially be
incorporated in spatial voting models. It is remarkable to note that although both the
belief system and the spatial voting perspectives accept that ideological dimensions are
the central aspect for the political processes, they have always been seen as incompatible
theoretical accounts. Actually, they only diverge in assessing how far ordinary citizens
adopt ideological categories to structure their attitudes. While the spatial voting
perspective supposes that all citizens know exactly which platform best represents their
policy interest, the sociological model of mass beliefs sees differences: The degree to
which policy views are constrained by ideological categories differs between citizens.
Both perspectives agree that political elites structure their communication in terms of
ideological platforms. In classic spatial models, parties announce their policy platform
to the general public. Employing the assumption of well-defined preference, this
communication makes it easy for citizens to choose matching parties. In the sociological
model citizens differ in their capability to abstract their policy views in terms of these
platforms. Essentially, the heterogeneity between citizens can be understood in terms
of beliefs about the political platform that best represents their interest. While citizens
with well-defined preference are perfectly certain which platform represents their
interest, citizens with inconsistent attitudes are less certain.
Instead of defining well-defined preference in terms of citizens’ ideal policy platform,
citizens’ policy preference can be understood in terms of policy beliefs about these
platforms. Some parts of the general public are more confident in judging ideological
platforms than others. In contrast to spatial preference, policy beliefs can differ not
only in direction, but also in consistency. Some citizens are more certain that a specific
ideological platform is in their interest. Policy beliefs allow us to incorporate Converse’s
concerns that a share of the mass public does not hold meaningful political beliefs and
thereby to relax the assumption that all citizens posses well-defined preferences.
2.4.2 Policy beliefs, political arguments and persuasion
The focus of preference of formation models and research in political psychology is
on how policy positions of voters evolve, and how these can be shaped by persuasive
arguments and information about an issue. These studies generally pay less attention
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to how this process affects the final voting decision. For political representation, such
accounts miss an important aspect, namely : How do changes in political preference
affect the democratic linkage between citizens and their representatives? If changes
in preference lead to changes in voting decisions there is a direct connection between
persuasive effects and their democratic candidates. A model that allows political
arguments to affect policy views in terms of spatial preference, would provide a natural
way to integrate these connected aspects in a general voting model. The evaluation
of political arguments affects policy preference, and policy preference affects voting
decisions.
What the political psychologist and models of preference formation share is a defini-
tion of beliefs that can be affected by considerations of political arguments. Persuasion,
is commonly defined as “the exchange of political arguments designed to influence oth-
ers by modifying their beliefs” (Simons, 1976, p.26). Persuasion therefore involves the
deliberate use of political arguments by one actor to change the beliefs of another actor
that a certain policy outcome is better for her. Following this definition, it is impractical
to study the effect of political arguments and persuasion if a voter’s preferences are
assumed to be fixed and independent of beliefs. Understanding policy preference in
terms of beliefs about the best outcome, allows a researcher to model the effect of
political arguments. Political arguments entail ‘consideration’ what policy positions
are best for the voter. Accepting these considerations allows voters to learn, which
positions actually represents their interest.
A conceptualization of opinions that allows for this perspective can be found in
Bartels (1993). Bartels studies the persuasive effect of media exposure. In his theory,
citizens’ opinions are represented by a belief distribution regarding a political issue,
such as foreign aid, abortion or taxation. These opinions can be shaped by new
information about any of the issues. People’s policy beliefs change as a function of
political arguments. Newer theoretical studies of deliberation are in accordance with
this perspective. Dickson, Hafer and Landa (2008) model opinions as being dependent
on considerations. “Individual views on a given policy issue may be influenced by a
number of considerations that the individual finds to be relevant”(Dickson, Hafer and
Landa, 2008, p.974). The exchange of arguments in deliberative situations activates
considerations about policy issues, enabling actors to learn about beliefs concerning
their most-preferred outcome.
2.4.3 Policy beliefs, persuasion attempts and endogenous policy preference
Given the evidence about reciprocal effect between party identification and citizens’
policy-views, the question arises, how the endogenity of voters’ decisions to party
position-taking, can be integrated in spatial voting models? The most common way to
integrate partisanship in spatial voting models is to assert that partisanship, next to
policy considerations, has an additional effect on voting. For spatial voting, this merely
implies that partisans differ regarding the point at which they are undecided between
two candidates. While independents are indifferent if two candidates’ platforms are
equidistant to their ideal policy platform, partisans are biased towards their party, such
that they still vote for the party although the other party is closer (see e.g. Adams,
Merrill and Grofman, 2005). It is clear, that this extension of spatial voting does not
sufficiently express the reciprocal effect. Partisanship affects policy views in the first
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place; simply treating partisanship as if it has a separate effect on voting does not
capture or account for this aspect.
The findings have not been satisfactorily adapted to the theoretical specification of
spatial voting. One exception sticks out. In their article “Endogenous Preferences
and the Study of Institutions”, (Gerber and Jackson, 1993) provide a conceptualization
of preference that allows party position-taking to affect citizens’ beliefs and thereby
their political choice(see also Jackson, 2014). They contest that voters’ preferences are
endogenous to party position-taking, in that “voters perceive party positions and hear
the debate surrounding the adoption of those positions and alter their own political
attitudes in response” (Gerber and Jackson, 1993, p.639). Gerber and Jackson build their
theoretical model on a notion of voters’ preference in terms of beliefs. This covers the
ideas developed in the above section, in which citizens are uncertain about their ideal
policy platform, because “people do not know how much they will like an outcome
if and when it does occur” (Gerber and Jackson, 1993, p.640). Parties can provide
guidance and shape beliefs about how political platforms best represent a voter’s
interests.
I claim that persuasion is one mechanism how citizens’ policy beliefs can be shaped
by party positions. Parties not only announce their positions, but also attempt to
persuade voters to follow their lead. As individuals’ preferences rest on beliefs about
how much better a certain political platform will be for them, party positions provide
cues and can make policy preference endogenous to these positions.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, I brought together research that contrasts with the spatial voting
depiction of preferences. Conceptualizations in the literature share a common ground
in understanding preference in terms of beliefs. What I refer to as ‘policy beliefs’
depicts an individual’s uncertainty whether the implementation of a certain policy
platform will be more beneficial to that citizen personally. I showed that representing a
citizen’s policy preference in terms of beliefs allows for an inconsistent, persuadable
and endogenous preference.
• Inconsistent: Models of mass belief systems presume that the general public
adopt ideological dimensions to a varying degree, when structuring their policy
opinions. Policy beliefs can incorporate this idea by introducing different variance
in beliefs about a citizen’s ideal platform. Some people are more certain that a
specific policy platform represents their ideal political outcome, when compared
to others.
• Persuadable: Through the ongoing evaluation of political arguments, citizens
can form reliable opinions about political issues. In this view, citizens’ policy
preferences are persuadable, because the deliberate use of arguments can make
them change their standing opinions. Policy beliefs allow us to portray this idea,
as evaluating political arguments can alter the belief that a specific platform is
actually in a citizen’s best interest.
• Endogenous: Parties not only aim to inform citizens about their positions, but
furthermore, they attempt to shape citizens’ opinions in their direction. If a
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certain share of citizens has a predisposition to adjust their policy beliefs in line
with party cues, these citizens’ preferences are endogenous to the party’s position-
taking.
The next chapter discusses adaptive utility theory as a modeling approach, showing
how policy beliefs as a depiction of preference can be integrated into a general spatial
voting theory.
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An adaptive utility theory for spatial voting
3.1 Introduction
For the overall picture of electoral representation, it is crucial to know whether voting
decisions are affected by a wider definition of policy preference. In attempting to
comprehend the democratic representation of eligible citizens, theories focus on the
connection between these citizens’ view-points and the electoral decisions they make.
Do voters elect candidates whose platforms coincide with their own view-points?
Spatial voting theory addresses this question. Central to it, is the idea that citizens form
their opinions in terms of underlying ideological platforms and elect candidates who
make corresponding offers. The proceeding chapter revealed that most spatial voting
theories build on a narrow depiction of citizens’ policy preferences, which precludes
the study of aspects that other approaches in the literature deem important for the
electoral process.
In this dissertation, I offer a comprehensive extension to spatial voting that allows
the study of a wider definition of policy preference. The proceeding chapter stressed
that policy beliefs permit us to present exactly such a wider definition. In order to
integrate policy beliefs into a spatial voting context, in this chapter I model them in an
adaptive utility framework. This perspective ‘allows’ citizens to be uncertain about their
ideal-policy platform. The standard utility specification of a spatial proximity voting
model is also embedded in this perspective. If all citizens know exactly what platform
constitutes their ideal outcome, the adaptive utility perspective approximates the classic
spatial voting model. I discuss how the adaptive utility model can be extended to
integrate policy beliefs and thereby citizens’ uncertainty about their own ideal platform.
Furthermore, this chapter outlines how the adaptive utility model can be used to study
preferences that are inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous. This highlights that in
this policy belief model, researchers are able to study aspects about policy views that a
classic perspective did not permit.
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3.2 Spatial voting in terms of adaptive utility
Political scientists who employ a wider definition of political preference build their
models on a notion of policy beliefs that diverges from the perspective used in spatial
voting. A discussion of different stances in the literature emphasized how these models
portray citizens’ policy preferences as being built on beliefs: models of preference
formation assume that beliefs about policies are shaped through the ongoing process
of evaluating political arguments. Theories of sociological belief systems argue that
policy views are constrained to a varying degree by underlying ideology. Models of
endogenous policy preference build on the premise that voters take cues from parties
and align their beliefs with those of their most preferred party. In all of this, beliefs
take into account that parts of the general public struggle to exactly pin down what
policy platform matches their ideal political outcome and employ available information
to learn about it.
Policy preferences in classic spatial voting models stand in sharp contrast to this.
Essentially, in these models, beliefs about the benefit from policies are set to a specific
outcome: each citizen knows with certainty which policy platform is in her best interest.
For many citizens, however, assessing the profitableness of a political outcome in terms
of policy platforms is highly abstract and complicated. In addition, this modeling
decision does not allow policy preference to change. Supposing that each citizen knows
which is his ideal policy platform implies that policy preference does not change, nor
is it affected by any other political aspects. To demonstrate a ‘simplified decision’
by means of a theoretical example: if a person knows that voting for candidate A’s
platform yields a pay-off of 100, and voting for candidate B’s platform only yields 50,
the decision is straightforward and nothing in the world will make her change her
mind.
Policy beliefs can be integrated into the general utility maximizing framework of
spatial voting. Instead of supposing that citizens’ preferences are fixed, researchers
can assume that citizens are - to a specific degree - uncertain which platform is in
their best interest. This uncertainty can be embodied in terms of a belief distribution
about the ideal policy platform. The idea that preferences regarding outcomes are
uncertain is well integrated in general choice theory. Adaptive utility theory studies
situations in which the Decision Maker (DM) is uncertain about how much she benefits
from a specific outcome (Cyert and DeGroot, 1987; Calvert, 1985b; Cohen and Axelrod,
1984; Houlding, 2008). Houlding and Coolen (2011) give a compressive review of the
literature. The authors argue that for many theoretical problems and explanations of
observed behavior, the assumption that preferences are generally uncertain is useful.
“Rather than assuming that the [Decision Maker]’s strength of preference
and corresponding utility for every outcome is known, the theory of adap-
tive utility permits a [Decision Maker]’s to be uncertain and to learn about
her preferences”(Houlding and Coolen, 2011, p.3).
When modeling citizens’ decisions to find a candidate with a matching policy plat-
form, this is a reasonable proposition, as the benefit from a certain platform is difficult
for citizens to assess by themselves. Unlike in a game of roulette, the evaluation of the
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policy outcome in many instances hinges on individual beliefs as to how much better
this outcome actually will be for society. In the theoretical decision-making example
given above, this does not at first sight appear to change a lot: because the person
is uncertain which policy platform is in her best interest, the benefit from the two
candidates’ platforms are uncertain as well. The benefit received from candidate A’s
platform will vary around 100, and the benefit from candidate B will vary around 50.
The main difference between the two models is that the utility from a candidate’s
platform is random, because citizens are uncertain about their own ideal platform.
This modeling choice additionally permits us to analyze individuals who learn about
their ideal platform. Generally, modeling preference in terms of adaptive utility allows
real world actors to “learn about her likes and dislikes of new and novel rewards, a
situation that classical theory cannot account for as it has no element of utility learning
following new information”(Houlding, 2008, p.5). In the case of spatial voting, political
arguments and candidate platforms are sources that citizens can potentially employ
to update their own policy beliefs. Before elaborating on this idea further, in the
following subsection I will first outline how the classic proximity voting model can be
incorporated in terms of adaptive utility theory.
3.2.1 The classic proximity voting model in terms of adaptive utility theory
The spatial proximity voting model assesses voting decisions as the interplay between
voters’ ideal policy platform and candidates’ position-taking, along a one dimensional
ideological spectrum. Voters choose candidates who campaign on platforms closest to
their own views. A formalization of this idea can be obtained by formulating policy
platforms X along a liberal conservative spectrum. Suppose that this spectrum is one
dimensional, and thereby defined on the real line X ∈ R. High values indicate more
conservative and low values more liberal platforms. A fixed policy platform, in the
words of adaptive utility theory, means that the state of mind is given for each voter.
Where the state of mind Θi describes a voter’s beliefs about the ideal policy platform:
Θi = xi (3.1)
Because of this assumption, spatial models can refer to xi as a citizen’s ideal-policy
platform, which it supposes all voters recognise with certainty. What voters care about
is the policy outcome of a platform. In a representative democracy this might best
be understood as the attitude of representatives to either being opposed or in favor
of concrete policy proposals, where a candidate who possesses the same platform as
a voter will most likely be in favor, or opposed to, the same policy proposals. Thus,
spatial proximity of another policy platform to a voter’s ideal platform ensures that
their interests will agree on ever more policy proposals. Supposing that people vote
sincerely, which means that they only want to find a matching representative, without
taking post-election bargaining between representatives into account, then they should
choose candidates with seemingly close platforms. In other words, the closer the
candidate’s policy platform is to a voter, the higher his evaluation will be of that
candidate.
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Citizens’ preferences about different political platforms can be modeled using utility
functions. For each voter, this utility function maps each platform to a specific utility
value. Voters prefer platforms associated with a higher utility. In other words, the utility
function allows to compare a voter’s evaluation of a platform to any other platform, and
thereby generate preferences about all the platforms. The idea of the proximity voting
model, then, can be formalized: suppose that each voter i ∈ (1, . . . , N) receives utility
U given a fixed state of mind Θi = xi from the closeness of a candidate’s platform
Ck ∈ X, where k ∈ (1, . . . , K)1. For the closeness of a candidate’s platform, I employ
the negative quadratic distance of that candidate’s platform to a voter2 − (Ck − xi)2.
This implies that the further away a candidate’s platform from a voter is (which will be
referred to as ‘policy distance of candidate to the voter’) the lower the utility evaluation
of the candidate. Meaning that closer candidates are preferred to those further away.
Overall, the utility function yields different values for varying candidate platforms Ck,
given the state of mind Θi = xi.
U(Ck | Θi = xi) = −β (Ck − xi)2 (3.2)
In the utility function, β depicts the importance of policy distance for the evaluation
of platforms. The higher the value of β the stronger the utility evaluation of a candidate
is affected by a candidate’s platform. If β = 0 there is no effect of a candidate’s platform
on utility evaluation. The model, so far, constitutes preferences as outlined by the
classic proximity model of vote choice. It is clear that when comparing two candidates,
the candidate who occupies a platform closer to the voter’s ideal platform, will have a
higher utility evaluation and, thus, is preferred by the voter.
3.2.2 Policy beliefs in spatial voting
Sketching voters’ policy preferences in terms of adaptive utility allows us to relax the
fixed preference assumption made in the classic model. Instead of supposing that each
voter’s state of mind equals her ideal platform, citizens’ uncertainty regarding which
platform is in their best interest can be expressed in terms of policy beliefs3. These
beliefs can vary between citizens in two ways. First, citizens can have a different mean
belief. For example, some citizens believe that their interest is better represented by
liberal than centrist platforms. In this, the mean belief is (to some extent) analogous to
the ideal platform of the classic model. Second, citizens differ in their belief variance,
that depicts how certain they are that a specific platform matches their interest. The
lower the belief variance, the more certain a voter is that a specific platform is in her
best interest.
1For the purpose of illustration only, I suppose that a candidate’s platform is perfectly observed by
each voter.
2This functional-form assumption follows common conceptualization in the spatial voting literature
(see e.g. Jessee, 2009) and makes many of the analytical problems later on feasible.
3Representing uncertainty in terms of beliefs follow common conceptualization in the theoretical
political science literature (see e.g. Calvert, 1985b; Dickson, Hafer and Landa, 2008) and (as the literature
discussion revealed) in empirical parts of the literature (see e.g. Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 1993).
30
CHAPTER 3. THEORY
Policy platforms
Θ
i
∝
N
(x i
, 
σ
Θ
i)
l l
x1 x2
Figure 3.1: Policy beliefs about ideal policy platform
In our formula, the belief distribution about the different policy platforms can be
specified in terms of Θi. I assume that the distribution is normal with mean xi and
variance σ2Θi . This parametric assumption is made for two specific reasons. First of
all, a non-parametric representation of each voters’ beliefs would make many of the
problems that I will address based on the them intractable. Second of all, it makes sense
to employ a parametric assumption that entail the classic perspective. The assumption
that the beliefs equal a specific state, is nested within the normal belief model: If for all
voters the variance term is equal to zero, the beliefs recover the classic perspective. From
a modeling point of view, this takes into account the scientific principal of parsimony, as
relaxing the assumption of fixed preference can be represented by only one additional
parameter.
Θi ∼ N(xi, σΘi) (3.3)
The belief distribution represents the idea that each voter has a mean belief about
her ideal policy platform (therefore I use the same notation as in the classic model xi),
but is uncertain if her most-preferred position might be slightly to the left or slightly
to the right of it. The extent of uncertainty depends on the variance in beliefs σΘi .
Figure 3.1 exemplifies the policy beliefs of two different voters. The two voters have
different mean beliefs. The first voter’s mean belief x1 is to the left of voter two’s belief
x2. The voters also differ in their belief variance. While the first voter is quite certain
that her platform yields the most beneficial outcome, the second voter has a wider
belief variance and therefore is clearly less certain that a specific platform is in her best
interest.
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The belief distribution can be integrated in the same utility function as the one above
3.2. The beliefs are not fixed to a specific platform, but follow the previously discussed
distribution ( 3.3). This yields a random utility model:
U(Ck | Θi) = −β (Ck −Θi)2 (3.4)
Where a voter’s ideal platform follows the adaptive utility specification. The im-
portant difference between the classic utility and the adaptive utility specifications, is
that utility from a candidate’s platform is random in the adaptive utility specification,
because voters are uncertain about their own policy platform. In addition, the classic
model is nested within the adaptive utility model: if the belief variance decreases - so
that a voter becomes more and more certain that a platform represents her interest -
the model equals the standard model. The question remains how this allows for wider
notion of policy preferences?
3.3 How this allows for a wider notion of policy preferences
Integrating policy beliefs in the classic spatial voting model allows researchers to model
policy preferences that are inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous. In the following
subsection, I describe how policy beliefs can be employed to model these aspects. While
the subsections are meant to provide an illustrative introduction, the actual mechanisms
will be covered in more detail in Chapter 4 to 6, which addresses the electoral effect of
these types of preference.
3.3.1 Policy beliefs can be inconsistent
Inconsistency in policy views means that these are less strongly constrained by the
ideological dimensions of policy platforms. In the policy beliefs outlined above, citizens
differ in their degree of certainty that a specific platform constitutes their ideal policy
outcome. This uncertainty can originate from the fact that a citizen’s attitudes towards
policies are not organized in liberal vs. conservative terms. For example, two persons
might derive their policy attitudes about access to public health care, increasing the
minimum wage, and gay-marriage, to a varying degree from any one ideological
platforms.
In order to see this more clearly, one can set up a model that explains a citizen’s
attitude towards specific policies as a function of her policy beliefs. Denote pij as
persons i attitude towards a policy j, where positive values indicate support for the
policy , negative values indicate opposition to the policy and values around zero are
regarded as undecided opinions. The concept of the belief system tradition and that
of the spatial voting tradition are similar to one another, as both suppose that policy
attitudes can be expressed in terms of ideological policy platforms. Employing a
simplified linear Item Response Model (IRT)4, one can formulate this idea as follows:
4The IRT Model does not include a constant, nor additional measurement error.
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pij = bjΘi (3.5)
Where Θi are a citizen’s policy beliefs, for which we might suppose that increasing
positive values indicate more liberal, and decreasing negative values more conservative
platforms. In the equation, the policy specific parameter bj captures how policy beliefs
affect attitudes towards the concrete policy. If bj is positive, individuals with more
liberal platforms are more strongly in favour of this policy. Negative values indicate
that liberals should be opposed to it.
This simplified model allows us to illustrate how an individual’s policy views are
understood in spatial voting tradition. As argued, spatial voting’s depiction of policy
preference supposes that all individuals possess an ideal platform, and thereby fixed
policy beliefs Θi = xi. In the simplified model this implies that two respondents with
the same ideal platform, should also possess the same policy views. Because, whenever
x1 = x2 it follows that p1j = p2j. This illustrates what is meant by the well-defined
preference assumption: all policy views of citizens are perfectly determined by their
policy platform5. This assumption permits spatial voting theorists to model citizens’
overall policy preference via their ideal platform.
The direct connection between policy platforms and policy views changes once we
allow for policy beliefs with individual variance. Increasing belief variance about the
ideal policy platform adds a source of randomness to citizens’ policy views. Following
a common conceptualization of public opinion, which states that policy views are
created from the “top-of-the-head” (Zaller, 1992), implies that for citizens with high
belief variance, policy attitudes will be less strongly related to their mean policy
platform. Consider an example in which two citizens share the same mean belief
x1 = x2, but the one possesses a clearly higher belief variance σΘ1  σΘ2 . While the
first citizen’s attitudes on particular policy issues pij are closely connected to her mean
policy platform, the second citizen’s attitudes are less strongly constrained by her mean
belief. We can split the policy beliefs Θi into mean beliefs xi and random deviations
from this, with a specific belief variance θi ∼ N(0, σΘi). Such that: Θi = xi + θi. Policy
attitudes are then expressed as pij = bj(xi + θi), which illustrates that with increasing
belief variance, specific attitudes can strongly diverge from the mean belief. Overall,
this can lead to varying inconsistency: the first citizen’s policy views (someone with a
low belief variance) appear to be consistent with the ideological mean platform, but in
the second citizen’s case, the patterns can be quite inconsistent with the underlying
dimensions. This means that a citizen’s mean policy belief, which is analogous to a
citizen’s ideal platform, does not perfectly reflect all aspects about a citizen’s policy
preference6.
5At this point it is important to highlight that an appropriate IRT model would further suppose
additional measurement error. Which can still cause the policy views of two individuals to appear
different. For illustrative purposes this is set aside, as it would not change the conclusions from this
section in any specific way, because the error variance of this should be constant for different individuals.
6Additionally, increasing belief variance should lead to more unstable responses over time, which is in
line with Converse’s original measurement of the concept (Converse, 1964).
33
3.3. HOW THIS ALLOWS FOR A WIDER NOTION OF POLICY PREFERENCES
Policy beliefs allow citizens’ policy views to be inconsistent with underlying policy
platforms. Explaining how this type of variation in a citizen’s policy preference affects
voting decisions, adds an additional source of heterogeneity to vote choice. Citizen
policy preferences do not only differ in terms of their ideal-policy platform, but also
in how consistently their overall policy views are depicted by these platforms. The
consequences of this will be analyzed in Chapter 4.
3.3.2 Policy beliefs can be persuadable
Arguments can affect which platform a voter opts for, because they provide consid-
erations concerning which platform is in this citizen’s best interest. If an argument
persuades a voter to reconsider his standing opinion on a particular policy issue e.g.
from being opposed to an intervention in Syria, to being in favor of it, this should
directly have an impact on her policy beliefs. A more hawkish, conservative platform
should then better represent a voter’s policy preference. In the long-term perspective,
evaluating political argument therefore allows citizens to learn which political platform
will yield the highest benefit, and to form reliable political preferences. Modeling the
effect of political arguments becomes possible in the framework presented, because the
adaptive utility formulation relies on policy beliefs, and an argument’s consideration
can also be specified in terms of beliefs.
This line of argumentation can be manifested by formalizing a process that permits
citizen to learn about their ideal platforms, based on the evaluation of political ar-
guments. Suppose that each political argument mj about a specific policy j contains
considerations that try to persuade a voter to either be in favor or opposed to the policy.
Citizens receive these arguments, evaluate their contents and decide if they want to
accept the view-point promoted by the argument. In the political science literature,
such a receive-accept process is often employed to describe citizens’ ongoing interaction
with political information, and arguments (Zaller, 1992).
For citizens, the information contained in this receive-accept process, is the evaluation
of the argument. If an argument is accepted, this contains information about the ideal
policy platforms. From a learning perspective, the information originates from the fact
that the probability of specific arguments being persuasive, differs between citizens
with different policy platforms. A citizen with liberal policy beliefs is more likely to
accept an argument in favor of gay-marriage, than a citizen with conservative policy
beliefs. If a citizen finds an argument about gay-marriage persuasive, this contains
information that should slightly alter her policy beliefs towards more liberal platforms.
In modeling terms, this learning process can be depicted using Bayesian learning.
Given that an individual accepts a political argument, which shall be denoted as yj, she
can update her policy beliefs as to which platform is in her best interest.
Θi | yj ∝ Pr(yj | X) ·Θi (3.6)
Θi | yj describes the posterior policy beliefs, given the accepted political argument.
These beliefs will be proportional to the prior policy beliefs Θi and the likelihood of
finding an argument persuasive, given varying policy platforms Pr(yj | X). What is of
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special interest, then, is the likelihood of finding an argument persuasive, because this
will determine in how far the posteriori beliefs change, compared to the prior beliefs.
The probability of accepting a political argument about a liberal policy can be thought
of as increasing with more extreme liberal platforms. And decreasing in the case of a
conservative policy. Representing this idea formally allows the researcher to employ
the above equation ( 3.6) to study the consequences of accepting an argument about
liberal policy. While a function that implements this idea is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5, the basic idea stemming from this concept is straightforward: Accepting
an argument about a liberal policy should make a voter slightly more liberal, while
accepting an argument about a conservative policy, should make her slightly more
conservative.
All in all, policy beliefs naturally allow policy preference to be shaped by political
arguments. The receive-accept process outlined above, and the Bayesian learning
mechanism permit researchers to study the effect of political arguments on policy
preference, and to examine how the continued evaluation of political arguments can
affect a citizen’s preference. While this approach opens up a multitude of research
opportunities, this dissertation will focus on how one particular political argument can
affect the voting decisions in Chapter 5.
3.3.3 Policy beliefs can be endogenous
For politicians who aim at generating large support for their political programs, politics
is not only about giving the public what it wants, but also about how to alter what the
public believes to be best for society in a given situation. This line of thought implies
that politicians who communicate their policy platforms to the general public, not
only intend to inform citizens about positions, but also want to shape citizens’ policy
belief in their direction. At the end of the day, persuading a share of citizens to follow
their policy lead can tip the scale in their favor. But how does the alteration of citizens’
preferences towards a specific party become embodied in a spatial voting theory? One
aspect of this process is clear: it involves heterogeneity; while some are persuaded by
one political candidate, others are persuaded by another candidate, and yet another
group may decide to stick with their prior preference.
Understanding this process as the adaptation of policy beliefs, allows us to study
the electoral consequences of a shift towards a candidate’s campaign platform. From
this perspective, a candidate’s communicated platform entails an offer as to which
platform is in a citizen’s best interest. If a voter accepts such an offer, she should adjust
her policy beliefs in the direction of that candidate. Thus, if we compare this voter at
two points in time - before the offer, and after the accepted offer – there should be an
observable shift of her mean policy beliefs towards the candidate. Just as in the effect
of political arguments, this shift can be represented in terms of a Bayesian updating
process.
I opt for a specification of this persuasion-process in which a voter’s prior policy
belief follows the equation discussed above (equation 3.3). Another aspect about this
process is that a candidate’s offer is likely to contain an element of uncertainty about
the platform a voter should actually adopt. Information about a campaign platform
is limited, so that citizens are unlikely to be able to pin down exact details about the
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platform a candidate is offering7. This, essentially, results in uncertainty about the
candidate’s platform. I model this uncertainty as a normal distribution Cj ∼ N(Cj, τCj).
Where Cj describes the mean platform of a candidate, and the variance around it τCj .
The larger this variance, the less clearly a candidate’s platform is being communicated.
In this set-up, voters are uncertain about their own ideal-platform, but also about the
platform the candidate offers to them. If a voter accepts a candidate’s offer, she updates
her policy beliefs. Employing Bayesian learning, a voter’s mean belief xit at a specific
point in time can than be expressed as a weighted average between the candidate’s
platform and the candidate’s prior mean belief xit−1 .
xit = γijxit−1 + (1− γij)Cj (3.7)
The equation illustrates that if the voter finds the candidate’s offer attractive, she
will align her beliefs with the candidate’s offer. In terms of Bayesian learning, the
posterior beliefs will thus lie somewhere between the candidate’s platform and the
voter’s prior policy beliefs. This can be understood in terms of a shift towards the
candidate if a citizen is persuaded. Where γij in the above equation shows the size of
the shift. The parameter is bound between 0 and 1, and determined by a voter’s belief
variance, and the uncertainty about a candidate’s offer. This implies two things: a) The
clearer a candidate’s offer, the stronger the shift. b) The wider a voter’s policy beliefs,
the stronger a voter’s beliefs can be shifted around.
The outlined persuasion-process allows us to express endogenous policy preference.
If some citizens are generally more likely to accept offers by a specific party, they will
always alter their policy beliefs to align with this party. For example, suppose that
citizens who identify with a specific party might be likely to be persuaded. Thus, if a
party changes its nuclear power plant policy, party identifiers adopt this new position.
Overall, the process would keep these citizens close to their party. Independent of
what program their party offers, it would always match their policy beliefs, because
they tend to adopt their party’s view-point. In other words, they vote for the party not
because it offers a matching program, but because they aligned their policy beliefs with
those of the party they want to vote for. This would make their preference endogenous
to the party offer8.
To sum up, a similar process that describes how political arguments affect policy
preference, can allow policy preference to be endogenous to party position-taking.
Parties can potentially persuade a certain share of the voters to follow their policy lead.
7This important aspect of the relation between candidates’ position-taking and citizens’ preferences,
has been set aside in the beginning of the theory section, when debating how citizen’s policy beliefs are
integrated into a spatial voting model.
8One important alternative mechanism, how policy preference could be endogenous in the spatial
voting model, is by projection rather than persuasion. Projection effects are given if citizens generally
perceive a specific candidate as being closer to themselves than is it actually is the case. Although the
primary focus and application of this dissertation is on persuasion, I am convinced that the belief model
will be helpful in explaining projection processes as well. In the final chapter of the dissertation, I briefly
describe how this model can also be used to model projection effects.
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In Chapter 6, this dissertation puts considerable effort into understanding the electoral
consequences of such a process over the course of an electoral campaign.
3.4 Summary
This chapter outlined an adaptive utility model of spatial voting. In this model, citizens’
policy preferences are depicted by policy beliefs. I showed how this relates to the
classic perspective, and argued that in addition to the standard depiction of preference
used in spatial voting, this new analysis permits researchers to model inconsistent,
persuadable and endogenous preferences. For each of these three, I discussed theoretical
specifications which enable us to incorporate them in spatial voting analysis of the
electoral process.
• Policy beliefs can be inconsistent: Increasing variance in policy beliefs, which il-
lustrate that a voter is more uncertain about his ideal platform, can result in
inconsistent policy preference. In an item response model, this results in a situa-
tion where respondents mean policy beliefs less strongly constraint their political
view points on concrete issues, like high income taxation, or policies regarding
illegal immigrants. This can makes their preference appear inconsistent.
• Policy beliefs can be persuadable: Political arguments are one source by which citizens
can attempt to decrease uncertainty about their ideal platform. Arguments contain
considerations why a person should adapt a specific policy platform. I showed
that this argument- evaluation process can be modeled in terms of Bayesian
updating. Given that a persons accepts a political argument, she should update
her policy beliefs. This learning process makes preference persuadable: Actors
could deliberately use arguments to alter citizens’ policy beliefs.
• Policy beliefs can be endogenous: Party position-taking can offer crucial information
to its supporters. I demonstrated the expected consequences of citizens adapting
a candidate’s position as signaled via a campaign: If a voter accepts a candi-
date’s campaigned platform, the voter’s mean policy belief will lie somewhere
in between her prior beliefs and the candidate’s offer. People who identify with
a specific party might be prone to always altering their policy beliefs to mir-
ror their party’s position. This will make their preference endogenous to party
position-taking.
The focus of this dissertation is on how this wider definition of policy preference
affects voting decisions. Building on the discussed specifications already outlined,
the following chapters will derive theoretical expectations as to how the three aspects
can impact citizens’ voting decisions. When the implications of the theory has been
established, I shall further proceed with the provision of empirical evidence for these
implications.
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CHAPTER 4
Inconsistent policy preferences and their electoral
consequences
4.1 Introduction
Decades of democratic theory build on the premise that citizens possess well-defined
preferences about policy outcomes (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966). Parties and candidates
announce policy platforms to communicate their positions, and citizens choose from
them to elect representatives who match their interests. Policy-based voting is an
important mechanism in these models, as it couples governments’ actions with citizens’
preferences: In order for governments to get reelected, they need to offer policy
platforms which are approved by a majority of citizens. Spatial theories of voting and
empirical tests thereof promote the idea that policy-distance is indeed an essential
factor in citizens’ voting decisions (see e.g. Westholm, 1997; RePass, 1971; Jessee, 2009).
A long-standing school within this field of political science has challenged the
perspective that citizens’ well-defined preferences are especially useful in explaining
and understanding democratic representation. The researchers stress that citizens
base their political behavior on unstructured beliefs and attitudes rather than well-
defined preferences. From Converse’s early “non-attitude model” (Converse, 1964),
through studies of preference formation (Zaller, 1992; Feldman, 1988), to the impact
of ideological thinking (Jacoby, 1991; Lavine and Gschwend, 2007) the bottom-line of
this area of research is, that it doubts whether well-defined preference is a sensible
assumption for explaining voters’ behavior. One general conclusion emerging from all
of the above studies, is that citizens differ in the degree of consistency in their policy
preferences - some citizens express preferences that are more constrained by underlying
political dimensions than those held by others.
Spatial voting theories cannot address the concerns raised by behavioral researchers
as they assume that all citizens possess well-defined preferences. Conclusions from
behavioral research, on the other hand,are seldom incorporated in a coherent policy-
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based voting model 1. In this chapter, I employ the adaptive utility model as outlined in
Chapter 3 of this dissertation to integrate inconsistent policy preference into a general
policy-based voting model. The conceptualization of policy beliefs makes allowance
for varying consistency in preferences: some voters are more certain than others that a
specific policy platform represents their interest.
Based on this, I analyze whether inconsistent policy preferences affect citizens’ voting
decisions. I discuss two mechanisms for doing this. First, an expected utility model
predicts that inconsistency should not affect voting, as it maintains that the evaluation
of all candidates’ policy platforms is influenced by inconsistency to an equal share.
Second, a learning model would stand in contrast to this hypothesis. For citizens
with inconsistent policy preferences who attempt to learn about the utility-difference
between two candidates, policy platforms would prove less informative. This is because,
for citizens, the information contained in the candidates’ platforms depends on their
own policy beliefs. Therefore, citizens with inconsistent policy preferences will put
considerably less weight on policy when learning about utility differences between
candidates.
This chapter tests the two contrasting expectations using Data from the American
National Election Study (ANES). I find that for respondents with a higher inconsistency
in self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale, policy-distance is less important in
explaining voting decisions. This finding supports the implications from the learning
model, and questions to what degree the assumption that all voters possess the same
well-defined preferences is a reasonable starting point for studying representative
democracy.
4.1.1 Inconsistent policy preferences and voting
Since Downs’s seminal contribution (Downs, 1957) , spatial voting theories have ana-
lyzed voting behavior under the premise that citizens’ hold well-defined policy prefer-
ences about political outcomes. Political outcomes are described by policy platforms
that are ordered along a liberal-conservative ideological dimension. Well-defined, then,
refers to the idea that all citizens’ policy views are perfectly captured by these platforms.
Building on this idea, most spatial voting theories make the implicit homogeneity as-
sumption that two voters with the same ideal platform also possess the same policy
views (see e.g. Jessee, 2009; Kedar, 2005; Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005; Schofield
and Sened, 2006; Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008).
The assumption that citizens’ preferences are well-defined by ideological platforms
stands in contrast to results from studies regarding public opinion and mass belief
systems. Here, research highlights the varying degree of consistency in citizens’
preferences, and questions in how far all citizens’ policy views can be approximated
by political platforms. We might express this in a more drastic form by saying that
Converse’s “Black and White” model divided the general public into citizens with
ideologically consistent and constrained policy views, and those without (Converse,
1964). While early work addressed the methodological and epistemological questions
concerning this supposition (Stimson, 1975; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1978), later
1A notable exception is Lavine and Gschwend (2007)
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research attempted to deepen our overall understanding of it. Researchers argued
that while citizens show little sign of consistency and stability in policy views, it is
still possible to identify individual “core values” and “predispositions” that appear to
be consistent and stable (Feldman, 1988). Generally-speaking, citizens seem to vary
in their reliance on ideological thinking about matters of politics (Jacoby, 1995) and
therefore show varying degrees of inconsistency (Jacoby, 1991). More fine-grained
theoretical models were developed to explain where this variation came from. Zaller’s
well-known Receive-Accept-Sample model explains individual variation via varying
attention to public debate about politics (Zaller, 1992).
Overall, this school of thought within the literature claims that there is considerable
heterogeneity between citizens, as to how far view points are approximated by policy
platforms. Although for some citizens, ideal policy platforms are a reliable abstraction
of their opinions, for others they are not. Many studies reject these concerns, by
attributing such conclusions to falsely specified empirical models that do not sufficiently
account for measurement error. While Converse used the lack of correlation between
different survey waves and within-surveys as an indication for his “non-attitude” model,
subsequent papers, relying on structural equation models (Achen, 1975; Jackson, 1983;
Moskowitz and Jenkins, 2004), or other approaches (Ansolabehere et al., 2008), show
that latent policy preferences are actually consistent and stable enough to reject the
notion of an unsophisticated public with no meaningful preferences about policies.
These findings strengthen spatial voting’s portrayal of representative democracy, by
justifying the well-defined policy preferences’ assumption. Nonetheless, the central
claim of follow-up public opinion research is not that all citizens possess inconsistent
preferences but that important heterogeneity between citizens exists. In fact, recent
studies in the measurement error tradition, like those by Ansolabehere, Rodden and
Snyder (2008), find heterogeneity between citizens’ policy preferences.
Moreover, what matters for representative democracy is not that some citizens show
signs of potential inconsistency, but how this could affect the election of representatives.
This chapter departs from the standard debate about citizens’ preference structure, by
posing the question of the electoral consequences, rather than debating the assumption
itself. This follows leading researchers in the field, who advise that we should take
findings that question well-defined preference seriously, when thinking about repre-
sentative democracy, because without preferences, understanding democracy as the
aggregation of its citizens’ preferences, reduces to absurdity (Bartels, 2003). Earlier
research, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs, had picked up this focus
and tried to explain the electoral effects of variation in citizens’ preference structures.
Within the spatial voting literature, there is a long-standing political-sophistication
supposition. This supposition states that politically sophisticated individuals are more
prone to follow a policy-based evaluation of politicians and parties, when compared
to less politically sophisticated people (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Jacoby, 1995;
Knight, 1985). The idea is that ‘less-sophisticates’ rely less on policy-distance, but
rather use other factors to evaluate candidates and parties. Put in the words of Lavine
and Gschwend: “whereas sophisticates are attuned to the abstract liberal/conservative
character of political debate, non-sophisticates respond to political stimuli using simpler
more proximal considerations” (Lavine and Gschwend, 2007). Lavine and Gschwend
were the first to offer a theoretical framework of how heterogeneity in ideological
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thought conditions vote choice. Based on dual-processing theories of information, they
argue that capacity for ideological thought increases reliance on policy considerations,
and decreases reliance on other factors. Unfortunately, their approach is not directly
integrated in a formalized policy voting theory, which potentially prevents Downsian
theorists from relying on their perspective in modeling representative democracy. In this
chapter I formalize this supposition and integrate this perspective into a comprehensive
theory of spatial voting.
Directional theories of spatial voting also tried to integrate doubts about citizens’
ideological competence into a general policy-based voting theory. Directional theories
of vote choice argued that citizens have a less concrete notion of policy preferences, as
outlined by the classic model. The basic claim is that citizens’ preferences are actually
directional, citizens prefer parties that are on their side of the ideological spectrum
(Matthews, 1979) and prefer parties that take on more intense positions (Rabinowitz
and Macdonald, 1989). An ongoing debate between supporters of directional theories
and supporters of proximity theories yields no clear supportive evidence for either
perspective (Lewis and King, 1999). From my standpoint, there is one major reason
why directional and classic models have not been synthesized sufficiently. Directional
models make the same homogeneity assumption as the classic models do, but formulate
them in the ‘opposite’ direction: All individuals possess a vague directional policy
preference. This is opposed to the homogeneity assumption in the classic model, in
which all citizens possess the same coherence in policy preference2. I take a different
perspective on how inconsistent policy preference can be integrated into a spatial voting
model. I argue that citizens have a different degree of policy consistency and model this
in terms of individual uncertainty: Some are more certain than others that a specific
policy-platform represents their policy interest.
All in all, none of the extensions in classic spatial voting gives a sufficient theoretical
answer to the question regarding the consequences of heterogeneity in consistency of
policy preferences. In the following section, I outline how the extension of this disserta-
tion can be used to represent inconsistent preferences and to formulate expectations
about the effect of these on voting decisions.
4.2 Theory
Building on the adaptive utility model of this dissertation, the following section derives
expectations about the impact of inconsistent policy preference on voting decisions.
I first repeat how exactly the conceptualization of policy beliefs can be employed
to represent inconsistency in policy views3. I then outline two approaches of how
inconsistency can influence expected utility and thereby voting decisions: An expected
2Another aspect about the debate is that preferences, as outlined by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989),
are defined on different policy dimensions from those in the classic model. While the classic model defines
preferences over policy dimensions, where positions are platforms that have consequences regarding policy
decisions of the politicians, directional models define dimensions, where positions represent intensity. It is
unclear how these two conceptualizations can be tested against each other with the same data-source.
3Readers who feel comfortable with the conceptualization from Chapter 3 might decide to skip the
next section.
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utility model and a learning model. The two approaches result in opposing implications
that are discussed in the final part of this section.
4.2.1 Representing inconsistent policy preferences
Inconsistency in policy preferences can be modeled in terms of varying policy beliefs.
The conceptualization of policy beliefs in this dissertation is based on the sociological
model of belief systems as it is most famously associated with Converse (1964). The
sociological model of belief systems states that policy views are organized into a
consistent ideological structure by political elites, and that the general public adapts
these constraints to a different degree. While citizens differ in their tendency towards
liberal or conservative platforms, they also differ on how strongly this constrains their
policy attitudes. I assume that policy beliefs are represented by a normal distribution
about the ideal political platform4. Let policy platforms X be defined on one dimension
X ∈ R and Θi describe a voter’s (i ∈ (1, . . . , N)) policy belief. We can write:
Θi ∼ N(xi, σ2Θi) (4.1)
This expression equals the central specification of policy beliefs from the Chapter 3
(Equation 3.3). It implies that each voter’s preference over platforms differs in position
xi and variance σ2Θi . The policy beliefs can also be understood in terms of individual
uncertainty about their ideal policy platform. This idea is covered in adaptive utility
theory (Cyert and DeGroot, 1987; Calvert, 1985b), in which the reward from a certain
outcome is uncertain for the decision maker themselves and depends on individual
beliefs. Adaptive utility has been argued to be a useful model for spatial voting, as it is
reasonable to assume that the rewards from a certain policy platform are never directly
observed, but are to some degree always dependent on political beliefs about how
much better the implementation of the policy will be for a voter (Gerber and Jackson,
1993). The perspective put forward here notes the close connection between adaptive
utility theory and models of belief systems.
Policy beliefs can systematically affect consistency of policy views. For example,
a voter might expresses opposing attitudes for two liberal polices; an inconsistency
that might be related to a wide belief variance. To illustrate this, I set up a simplified
linear item response model for two liberal policies: pij = β jΘi + eij, where j ∈ (1, 2)
refer to two policies and i ∈ (1, 2) to two different citizens. Values of pij below zero
indicate opposition to a policy, and values indicate the favoring of a policy. Suppose
that both policies discriminate equally well (β j = 1) and that our instrument shows
only little normally distributed measurement error (Var[eij] = 1). Although both voters
can have the same liberal position (xi = 1), unequal belief variances (σ2Θ1 = 0.1 and
σ2Θ2 = 1) might have the effect that the policy preferences of one voter seem consistent
(as the probability that both preference are liberal is quite high Pr(p11 > 0 ∩ p12 >
0) = 0.99), while the other voter’s preferences seem to be inconsistent (probability one
4I will rely on one underlying dimension throughout the chapter. The model can easily be extended to
multiple underlying dimensions.
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conservative other liberal is high 1− Pr(p21 > 0 ∩ p22 > 0) = 0.33). The reason for
this is straightforward: in addition to measurement error, voters vary in the extent to
which their attitudes are constrained by underlying policy dimensions5. This simple
example can be generalized to account for inconsistency in surveys. Increasing belief
variance adds an additional source of randomness to answering patterns on different
policy issues - and causes answering patterns to be inconsistent with political platforms.
This line of thought is picked up in the empirical section of this chapter to derive a
operationalization of inconsistency that reflects the theoretical conceptualization of
policy beliefs.
In contrast to the model I introduce here, standard models of spatial voting rely on
the assumption that beliefs over policy platforms only vary in position. The implicitly
assumption is that all voters have the types of constraints, which - from a adaptive
utility perspective - means they would all be equally certain with respect to which
platform represents their interests best. Formally, in these theories, voters beliefs’ are
fixed to a specific value Θi = xi, where xi ∈ X represents the most preferred policy-
platform. Obviously, the standard model is nested within this extension: Assuming that
all voters possess a belief variance of zero recovers the standard model. My extension to
this model allows to relax the fixed preference assumption and study the consequences
of varying inconsistency for voting behavior. In the next section I incorporate policy
beliefs into the standard spatial vote choice model.
4.2.2 The influence of policy beliefs on voting decisions
Policy beliefs can be included in the spatial model of probabilistic voting (Adams,
Merrill and Grofman, 2005), allowing for an analysis of the consequences of varying
inconsistency for observed voting behavior. Commonly, a voter’s evaluation of a
candidate is expressed in terms of expected utility E[Uik] and additional unobserved
factors eik. In the following sections, I analyze a voter’s i ∈ (1, . . . , N) decision between
two candidates k ∈ (1, 2). Voter i will vote for candidate 1 if Vi1 > Vi2, and respectively
for candidate 2 if Vi2 > Vi1. Vik will be determined by expected utility and other,
randomly distributed, factors.
Vik = E[Uik] + eik (4.2)
Of theoretical concern, then, is how voter’s form their expected utility based on
the candidate’s communicated platform. In spatial voting, utility is derived from the
closeness of a candidate’s policy platform to a voter. Thus, each voter i receives utility
Uik given her policy beliefs Θi from the closeness of a candidate’s platform Ck ∈ X.
5This model only holds if belief constraints affect responses about concrete policy like additional
measurement error. Building on models of survey response, I believe that this a reasonable assumptions.
Respondents express policy preference based on consideration that are at their “top-of-the-head” (e.g.
Zaller, 1992), and for respondents with narrow constraints, underlying dimension are stronger than for
those with wider belief distributions.
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In order to model the closeness of a candidate’s platform, I employ a quadratic loss
function from a voter’s policy belief towards a candidate6.
U(Ck | Θi) = −β (Ck −Θi)2 (4.3)
β depicts the importance of policy distance on a voter’s utility evaluation. Please note
that utility U(Ck | Θi) is a random variable as a voter’s preference over the platforms
follow the policy beliefs Θi, rather than fixed ideal-platforms. Put differently, voters are
uncertain about the utility they will receive from a candidate because they are uncertain
which platform they most prefer7.
4.2.3 Expected utility model
The standard way to deal with uncertainty in a spatial voting models is to set up
the utility function and form the expectation over the whole utility term, in order to
understand how uncertainty enters utility (see e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1981). Following
this expected utility approach, a voter’s policy beliefs concern both candidates, and as
result are expected to cancel out.
In order to arrive at this result, the expectation of the utility model in 4.2 can be
simplified by expressing policy beliefs in terms of a mean belief xi, and an additional
random belief variance, centered around zero θi ∼ N(0, σ2Θi). Following from this, we
can substitute Θi by xi + θi, and form an expectation over the whole utility term:
E
[
U(Cj | Θi)
]
= E
[
−β (Ck −Θi)2
]
(4.4)
= E
[
−β (C2k − xi − θi)2]
= E
[−β (C2k − Ckxi − Ckθi + x2i + 2xiθi + θ2i )]
= E
[−β (C2k − Ckxi + x2i + θ2i )]
= E
[
−β (Ck − xi)2
]
+E
[−βθ2i ]
6This functional form implies that voters are risk-averse in policy-distance (see e.g. Ye, Li and Leiker,
2011), which has the important implication that variance in policy beliefs negatively affects expected utility.
Assuming other commonly employed norms (e.g. euclidean or city block norm) would make conclusion
from the learning model analytically intractable. The intuition for this model does not change though: the
signal is more informative for voters with smaller belief variance, which results in a stronger updating
about the expected difference in utility
7Since the primary concern of this section is how policy beliefs on the voter side influences voting
decisions, I assume that all candidate platforms are perfectly observed. Analyzing the interplay between
uncertainty about a candidate’s position and variance in policy beliefs is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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The belief variance σ2Θi enters the expected utility, because (Ck −Θi)
2 is a concave
function, which implies that voters are risk-averse (expectation of the squared term is
E
[
θ2i
]
= σ2Θi ). Thus, the expected utility for a candidate’s platform can be written as:
E [U(Ck | Θi)] = −β (Ck − xi)2 − βσ2Θi (4.5)
where the penalizing uncertainty term −βσ2Θi is constant over different candidates.
Because voting probabilities are formulated in terms of the difference in utility this
term is equal for both candidates utility evaluation, (and as result cancels out,) when
analyzing the probability to vote for candidate one8:
Pr [Vi1 > Vi2] = Pr
[
−β (C1 − xi)2 − βσ2Θi + ei1 > −β (C2 − xi)2 − βσ2Θi + ei2
]
(4.6)
= Pr
[
−β (C1 − xi)2 + β (C2 − xi)2 > ei2 − ei1
]
= Pr
[
−β
[
(C1 − xi)2 − (C2 − xi)2
]
> ei2 − ei1
]
= Φ
[
−β
[
(C1 − xi)2 − (C2 − xi)2
]]
In accordance with the often-applied probit model in spatial voting, voting proba-
bilities are systematically influenced by the difference in distance of each candidate’s
platform to a voter’s mean policy belief. In this expression, only a voter’s mean belief
about her ideal policy platform matters xi. This implies that two citizens who have the
same mean belief but different belief variances are expected to have the same voting
probabilities. Variance in policy beliefs as the representation of inconsistent policy
preference does not influence voting decisions.
The expected utility approach comes with two questionable assumptions. It is neither
entirely clear where the homogeneous importance of policy-distance β in this model
comes from, nor does the model specify how the information about the candidate enters
into the expected utility. I argue that it is more reasonable to analyze the formation of
the expected utility in terms of two distinct actors that communicate with each other.
The next section describes a learning model that presents this idea more closely.
4.2.4 Learning model
An approach that highlights the interaction between candidates and voters might
suppose that candidates send certain information about themselves and voters process
8A few further assumptions about the unobserved factors in Vik are necessary to get to a standard
probit representation. As already discussed, if researchers observe that a voter chooses candidate 1 over
candidate 2, the expected utility plus unobserved other factors Vij = E[Uij] + eik has to be higher than for
the second candidate Vi1 > Vi2. Making the assumption that the additional unobserved factors follow a
normal distribution with an arbitrary error variance of .5, thus: eik ∼ N(0, 0.5), allows to derive a probit
model with difference in policy distance. The choice of the error variance is arbitrary and made for the
purpose of simplicity. Supposing a more general variance σ would effect the importance of policy distance
in the probit model, by a deviation of two times σ: β2σ . This would not change the general implications in
any meaningful way.
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this to learn what they can expect from the candidates. This learning model focuses
on how the communicated policy platforms alter difference in expected utility. The
argument based on this is relatively straightforward: For voters with inconsistent policy
preferences, information contained in platform signals is less informative, compared
to voters with consistent preference. This holds because the information contained in
the candidate signal depends on the degree of uncertainty a voter possesses about her
ideal platform. Expected utility is less strongly affected by policy distance for voters
with a strong policy belief variance who are uncertain about their ideal policy-platform,
when compared to those with a low belief variance.
In order to cover this idea more formally, a model might suppose that a priori, a
voter possesses certain information about the utility difference between candidate 1
and candidate 2 that is normal distributed around zero with some variance τ9. In this
modeling approach, prior utility difference is depicted by a distribution P
(
Uij −Uik
)
.
P
(
Uij −Uik
) ∼ N (0, τ) (4.7)
In the next step candidates signal their policy platform Cj, Ck. As the primary focus
of this analysis is on inconsistency, we might suppose that these signals are perfectly
observed by all voters. The information contained in these signals about the utility
difference between the candidates Ui1 −Ui2, follows the difference in policy distance as
outlined by 4.3. If candidate 1 signals that her policy platform is the same as the voter’s
mean belief, and candidate 2 signals a more extreme platform, the information for
the voter is that candidate 1 will yield considerable higher utility. However, although
the candidates’ signals are perfect, the information about utility is not, because voters
themselves are uncertain about their ideal policy outcome.
The information in candidate signals can more formally be denoted as the likelihood.
This function, essentially, depicts how likely the signals are given varying differences
in utility between the candidates. I obtain the likelihood of the signals by plugging in
voters’ policy beliefs (as outlined model by 4.3) in a utility function that is affected by
the difference in quadratic loss between two candidates platforms. Again, simplifying
9I suppose that the prior utility is centered around zero to simplify the posteriori expression.
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the expression by dividing policy beliefs in mean belief xi and random belief variance
θi ∼ N(0, σ2Θi) results in the following10:
P(C1, C2|Ui1 −Ui2) = −β
[
(xi + θi − C1)2 − (xi + θi − C2)2
]
(4.8)
∼ N (−β [(C1 − xi)2 − (C2 − xi)2] , 4β2(C2 − C1)2σ2Θi)
The likelihood is normally distributed around the difference in quadratic loss of the
candidates signaled positions (C1 and C2) to a voter’s mean policy belief xi. Of special
concern is the variance term: 4β2(C2 − C1)2σ2Θi . What can be seen from this expression
is that the variance depends on a voter’s belief variance. For voters with consistent
policy preferences, the variance is smaller, which makes the signals more informative.
For voter with a wider belief variance, the information in the signal is weaker.
Voters can use the information contained in the signals to update their prior utility
difference, addressing the question of what the utility difference is given the platform
signals P (Ui1 −Ui2|C1, C2). Supposing that voters form this expression employing
Bayesian updating implies that the posterior beliefs are proportional to the prior and the
likelihood P (Ui1 −Ui2|C1, C2) ∝ P(Ui1−Ui2)P(C1, C2|Ui1−Ui2). The posteriori is then
the mixture between two normal distributions. What matters for vote choice (because
voters employ expected utility) is the expectation of this posterior. As a mixture, the
expectation will lie between the expectation of the prior and the expectation of the
likelihood. Because I suppose that the prior is centered around zero, the posterior
expectation will lie between zero and expectation of the likelihood. Depending on
degree of information in the signals, which is affected by the variance term, this will be
closer to zero, or closer to the expectation from the likelihood. The expectation of the
posterior can be formulated in the following way11 :
10 Intermediate steps to get to this expression. I first rearrange terms
P(C1 , C2 |Ui1 −Ui2) = −β
[
(xi + θi − C1)2 − (xi + θi − C2)2
]
= −β
[
(C21 − 2C1xi − 2C1θi + x2i + 2xiθi + θ2i )− (C22 − 2C2xi − 2C2θi + x2i + 2xiθi + θ2i )
]
= −β
[
(C21 − C1xi + x2i )− (C22 − 2C2xi + x2i )− 2C1θi + 2xiθi + θ2i + 2C2θi − 2xiθi − θ2i
]
= −β
[
(C1 − xi)2 − (C2 − xi)2
]
− β [−2C1θi + 2C2θi ]
= −β
[
(C1 − xi)2 − (C2 − xi)2
]
− 2β [C2 − C1 ] θi
Because θi is a random variable the whole expression is a random variable as well. The expectation of
this expression is equal to the first part −β [(C1 − xi)2 − (C2 − xi)2], because the expectation of θi is zero.
The variance of the expression is constructed from the second part which is normal (because θi is normal)
with standard deviation of 4β2(C2 − C1)2σ2Θi
11
The complete posterior distribution is normal, according to:
P (Ui1 −Ui2|C1, C2) ∼ N
(
−β τ
τ + 4β2(C2 − C1)2σ2Θi
[
(xi − C1)2 − (xi − C2)2
]
,
τ4β2(C2 − C1)2σ2Θi
τ + 4β2(C2 − C1)2σ2Θi
)
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Figure 4.1: Contrasting observable implications of two models how voters form expected utility
for an illustrative example
E [P (Ui1 −Ui2|C1, C2)] = −wiβ
[
(xi − C1)2 − (xi − C2)2
]
(4.9)
where the weight wi = τ4β2(C1−C2)2σ2Θi+τ
depends on a voter’s variance in policy beliefs
σ2Θi and thereby on the inconsistency in policy preference. If inconsistency increases,
the weight on policy distance decreases. This is contrary to the expectation from the
expected utility approach, because in addition to the homogeneous effect parameter β,
voters put different weights on policy aspects. Following a similar voting model to the
one in 4.3.1, this shows that the voting probabilities are less strongly affected when
comparing voters with same mean positions but different inconsistencies. Formally,
the marginal effect of distance on expected utility wiβ decreases with higher levels of
inconsistency. For voters with consistent beliefs (limσ2Θi→0
wiβ = β), the effect is the
same as in the expected utility model, but for voters with inconsistent beliefs policy
distance less strongly impacts utility. In the most extreme case, policy distance has
no effect at all (limσ2Θi→+∞
wiβ = 0), because the platform signals are not informative
to these voters. This analysis permits to derive observable implications that shall be
outlined in the next subsection.
4.2.5 Implications: The effect of inconsistency on voting behavior
The two models of how a candidate’s platform affect a voter’s evaluation, yield opposing
expectations in how far inconsistency affects voting decisions. While the expected utility
model allows to derive the hypothesis, that the importance of policy distance is not
affected by policy inconsistency, the results from the learning model contrast this:
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Policy-distance should be more important for voters with consistent policy preferences,
and less important for those with inconsistent preferences. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
marginal effect on expected utility differences for the expected utility approach and the
learning model12. In the learning model, I expect that the marginal effect is decreasing
for higher levels of inconsistency.
H 1 Increasing inconsistency in policy preferences decreases the effect of policy-distance on
voting probabilities.
The effect stays constant in the expected utility approach, which allows to derive a
null-hypothesis:
H 2 Inconsistent policy preferences do not moderate the effect of policy-distance on voting
probabilities.
Both mechanisms are theoretically plausible: Inconsistency in policy preferences
might cancel out in the voter’s calculus, because it concerns all candidates equally, or
policy information about candidates’ platforms is more informative for voters with
consistent preference, compared to voters with inconsistent preferences. The fact that I
am able to derive contrary hypotheses underlines the importance of an empirical test
that closely follows the conceptualization of the theory model.
4.3 Empirics
In this section I put the two opposing implications about the effect of inconsistent
policy preference on spatial voting decisions to a test, employing data from the 2008
American Presidential Election. I first outline a modeling approach that closely mimics
the theoretical formulation of how voters form expected utilities. In order to test
if voting is affected by inconsistency, I introduce a novel approach to measuring
respondents inconsistency from survey responses and a policy-weighted model to
estimate the moderating effect this can have on voting decisions. The results from
the empirical analysis indicate support for the learning model - respondents with
inconsistent preference put considerable less weight on policy when deciding between
two candidates. I further describe how far the results are robust to other model
specifications, other measurements and unobserved confounders.
4.3.1 A policy-weighted model for voting decisions
The expectations from the theory section can be tested using an empirical specification
similar to the learning model 13. According to this model, respondents should put
12The illustration depends on speciifc paramters. I set the two candidates to (−0.25, 0.25) and the
importance of policy β to 2.
13The standard way to test mediation in generalized linear models are interaction effects. I decided to
use the outlined weight-model instead, as it closely matches the theoretical expectations. For example,
while an interaction model allows the marginal effect of policy distance on utility to change sign with
increasing inconsistency, the theoretical specification does not. Policy distance positively affects utility for
all voters, but is less strongly so for voters with inconsistent policy preference. Nonetheless, I also run the
analysis with interaction effect models. The results are unaffected by this decision.
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varying weights on policy-distance when deciding between two candidates. Weight on
policy-considerations should decrease with increasing inconsistency. If this hypothesis
were to hold, it would yield support for the learning model. Rejecting the hypothesis
would indicate support for the expected utility model. The expected utility specification
(E[Ui1 −Ui2]) according to is:
E[Ui1 −Ui2] = −wiβ
[
(xi − C1)2 − (xi − C2)2
]
(4.10)
where xi is a respondent’s mean belief, C1,C2 the candidates’ platforms, β the im-
portance of policy, and wi is the individual specific weight respondents assign to
policy-distance.
For the empirical specification, the theoretical weight needs to be slightly ad-
justed. The most important aspect of the theoretical weight (which I derived to be
wi = τ4β2(Cj−Ck)2σΘi+τ
) is the effect of inconsistency. In order to address the question
of whether the weight is negatively influenced by higher levels of inconsistency, I
simplify the denominator expression 4β2(Cj − Ck)2σΘi to only include the linear effect
of inconsistency δσΘi . This is sensible, as the other expressions 4β
2(Cj − Ck)2 do not
depend on individual factors. The denominator expression is further positive (because
all parts of the expression are). Thus, I employ a transformation of the linear effect of
inconsistency, using the exponential: exp(δσΘi). Moreover, to identify both β and the
effect of inconsistency δ on the weight, a few parameters are set to specified values14.
All in all, this results in a specification where one can estimate the weight at different
levels of inconsistency: 11+exp(δσΘi )
. In this, δ depicts the effect of inconsistency on the
weight. If δ is zero, the weight is constant over different levels of inconsistency, with an
effect of policy distance of 12β. If δ is positive, the effect of policy distance decreases
with inconsistency, and if δ is negative, the effect increases. Thus, under the learning
model, I would expect a positive effect, and under the expected utility model δ should
be zero.
The empirical specification is completed by further adding an intercept, a set of
sociodemographic and political controls (all covariates are collapsed in Xiγ, where X
is N × K matrix, and γ is a vector of size K and discussed further in the next section).
Given that yi is a binary indicator if a respondent intends to vote for the first candidate
yi = 1 or the second candidate yi = 0, the complete specification of the predicted
probability pii = Pr[yi = 1] is given by:
Pr [yi = 1] = Φ
[
− β
1+ exp(δσΘi)
[
(xi − Cj)2 − (xi − Ck)2
]
+ Xiγ
]
(4.11)
14First of all, τ from the theoretical specification is set equal to 1. Additionally, I do not include a
constant term in the parametrization of the weight. Otherwise higher values of β can always be substituted
by lower levels of τ and/or the constant term. As such, the effect of policy-distance on utility when only
including a constant in the weight-specification is not identified, as higher values can be substituted by
higher values of the constant 11+exp(δ0) β. To see this, suppose the overall effect of policy-distance is 2.
Different sets of parameters can yield this overall effect. E.g. β = 4 and δ = log(1), β0 = 8 and δ0 = log(2)
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I obtain estimates for the model using a Maximum Likelihood estimator (MLE).
Because a respondent’s voting intention is Bernoulli distributed yi ∼ Bern(pii), the
joined log-Likelihood is given by
lnL(β, δ,γ | σΘi , yi, Cj, Ck, xi, Xi) =
N
∑
i=1
yipii +
N
∑
i=1
(1− yi)(1− pii) (4.12)
Given the data, I maximize the log-Likelihood function directly, using the Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm implemented in R’s optim function. Measurements
of respondents’ inconsistency, candidates policy platforms, respondents policy beliefs,
voting intentions and a set of controls are taken from the American National Election
Study. The next section describes theses operationalization more closely.
4.3.2 Measurement of inconsistency and policy platforms in the ANES
Presidential candidate choice in the 2008 American election is used to estimate the
outlined model. During the panel-period of the American National Election Study
(ANES) the 56th United States presidential elections of 2008 took part. The democratic
party nominee Barack Obama defeated the republican nominee John McCain. I mostly
rely on wave 10 of the panel, as the interviews were conducted the weeks prior to the
election in November.
Voters’ mean policy beliefs xi are approximated using a one-dimensional factor
model. The ANES includes a battery of policy-questions concerning “Gay marriage”,
“Taxation”, “Health care”, “Terrorism” and “Immigration”15. Respondents are first
asked weather they favor, opposed or neither favor nor oppose a certain preposition -
e.g. “Are you favor or oppose illegal immigrants become citizens?” - and afterwards
asked about the strength of their expressed attitudes on a three point scale (“A great
deal”, “Moderately”, “A little”) . This creates a seven point scale for the different
policy proposals. Based on the these answering patterns, I calculate an explanatory
factor analysis and extract the factor loadings. The one-dimensional factor-model
has reasonable fit (RMSE of 0.09) and the factor loadings correlate highly with self-
placements in this wave16. Respondents further placed Obama and McCain on the
same policy issues. Using the factor loadings from the model, these placements can
be employed to project candidates on the same dimension. This allows to calculate
perceived as well as average factor scores for both Obama (C1) and McCain (C2).
While the average score for Obama is at 0.32, the average score for McCain is at -
0.91. Based on respondents scores, and scores for Obama and McCain, I construct
two measurements of difference in policy-distance ((xi − C1)2 − (xi − C2)2). The first
employs each respondents negative quadratic distance to Obama’s mean platform score
minus the distance to McCain’s mean platform score. The second useses perceived
candidate platforms instead.The policy-weighted model is separately estimated for
both measurements of policy-distance.
15Please find the exact wording of the question and descriptions in Appendix A.1
16A more detailed description of the results is given in the Appendix A.1
52
CHAPTER 4. INCONSISTENT POLICY PREFERENCES
0
10
20
30
0 5 10
Inonsistency
Figure 4.2: Measurement of inconsistency: respondent squared residuals from regressing
policy-attitudes on liberal-conservative self-placements
Crucial to the empirical analysis is the measurement of inconsistency σΘi . Different
measurements have been proposed17. I opt for close connection of the theoretical
specification of policy belief variance (which I argued results in formalized depiction of
inconsistency) with the emprical measurment. As allready argued, increased inconsis-
tency should result in more randomness when relating answering patterns for concrete
policy proposals to underlying platforms. The varying randomness can be approxi-
mated by each respondent’s average sum of squared errors from separate regressions
of a respondent’s liberal-conservative self-placement on different policy attitudes. This
measurement can be derived more formally by setting up a linear item response model
that uses self-placements as a measurement of the latent trait. Following this line of
thought, respondents’ attitudes towards specific proposals pij can be expressed as a
linear function of their beliefs Θi over policy platforms.
pij = aj + bjΘi + eij (4.13)
17 Barton and Parsons (1977) use a respondents standard deviation over different issues (see also Wyckoff,
1980). Higher standard deviations are taken as indication of unconstrained, inconsistent policy preferences.
Jacoby (1995) relies on a different measurement, employing mokken scaling of answering patterns to
measure the degree of ideological thinking about political stimuli (see also Lavine and Gschwend, 2007).
Converse and researcher from the measurement-error tradition rely on correlations in answering patterns
over different time points, to gauge citizens inconsistency and (especially) instability in policy preferences
(Converse, 1964; Achen, 1975; Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008). Most of these measurements lack
a direct connection between policy attitudes and underlying political platforms.
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where bj and aj are issue specific parameters, and eij is random measurement error,
distributed normally with item specific variance of σ2j
18. The beliefs are normal
distributed according to the theoretical specification (see Equation 4.1). Given that
respondents answer attitude questions according to standard survey response models
(Zaller, 1992; Schuman and Presser, 1996), in which respondents do not build the
expectation of their beliefs, but rather sample from the beliefs when answering survey
questions, my model specification results in an additional source of randomness in
answering patterns19. In order to integrate this source of randomness in the model, we
can again rewrite the beliefs Θi as xi + θi (, where θi ∼ N(0, σΘi)). This expression can
substituted in the above pij = aj + bjxi + bjθi + eij, which shows that answering patterns
are expressed as a function of a respondents mean policy belief and two sources of
randomness: measurement error (eij) and pbelief variance (θi). From this it follows
that answering patterns can be expressed in terms of independent normal distributions
with different variance terms:
pij ∼ N
(
aj + bjxi, b2j σ
2
Θi + σ
2
j
)
(4.14)
The aim of this enterprise is to obtain a estimate of σ2Θi - or at least an estimate that
orders respondents according to their inconsistency. The later is easier to obtain. I,
therefore, substitute b2j σ
2
Θi
+ σ2j with σ
∗
i . Whenever σ
∗
i > σ
∗
k it holds that σ
2
Θi
> σ2Θk .
Thus, I can estimate σ∗i instead, to get a representation of σ
2
Θi
. Suppose aj, bj and
xi are given, a simple estimate of σ∗i is constructed based on maximum likelihood
framework. The log-likelihood function of a respondent’s answering patterns over J
policy-questions is lnL
(
σ∗i |yij, xi, aj, bj
)
= −∑Jj=1 12 − ∑Jj=1 log(σ∗i )− ∑Jj=1
(pij−aj−bjxi)2
2σ∗i
.
The maximum of Likelihood function can be obtained by setting the first derivative to
zero. Which yields (similar to the error-variance in linear model) the average sum of
squared errors as the maximum likelihood estimate for σ∗i :
σˆ∗i MLE =
1
J
J
∑
j=1
(yij − aj − bjxi)2 (4.15)
This term can be calculated based on estimates of bj, aj and a measurement of xi. As
already stressed, for respondents’ mean policy belief xi I employ self-placements on
18This specification closely follows item response models that are often applied to estimate policy
platform positions from a set of policy attitudes (see e.g. Jessee, 2012). In item response models the
constant aj are named difficulty parameter, and the slope bj discrimination parameter. The focus here is not
on estimating the latent policy platform of a respondents but use the set-up to motivate the measurement
of inconsistency.
19Readers might wonder why I apply this assumption when modeling survey responses, but use
expected utility when modeling voting decisions. I believe that the two behavior follow different logics,
in that voting decisions are more considerate than survey responses. If one would like to work on the
premise that survey responses are also given by expected utility, a similar learning argument as in the
voting decision can be constructed. This would result in a similar measurement of inconsistency.
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Figure 4.3: Parameter estimates policy-weighted model
liberal-conservative scale 20. The item parameters are obtained by running simultaneous
linear regressions of self-placements on policy attitudes21. Based on each respondents
residuals from these regressions, I calculate the mean sum of squared errors as the
main measurement of inconsistency. The resulting distribution of inconsistency in our
sample can found in Figure 4.2. Values vary strongly between respondents, ranging
from (0.11), which implies almost perfect prediction on policy issues, to above 9.
For these respondents, an average error of 3 scale-points highlights the inconsistent
connection between policy-attitudes and ideological placements.
As controls (Xi) I include respondents’ party identification, age, gender, race (African-
American), education, home ownership and income. All are based on fairly common
survey-questions from the ANES22.
4.3.3 Results: The decreasing importance of policy
The results confirm the expectation derived from the learning model: The marginal
effect of policy-distance on utility is smaller for respondents with higher levels of
inconsistency. The estimates for the weight model are plotted in Figure 4.3. For policy-
distance (β) and inconsistency (δ). Relying once on the negative quadratic distance
to the mean candidate platform, and once to the perceived candidate platform. In
both cases, the estimate of β is positive, implying that the closer a respondent is to
Obama compared to McCain the higher the respondents chances to vote for Obama.
The estimate of δ which effects the weight voters put on policy-distance is also positive.
Thus, with increasing inconsistency the weight on policy-distance decreases. Both
parameter estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero, as the 95 % confidence
intervals do not include zero. The other parameter estimates are reported in Appendix
A.4. Party identification, as well as, race do have a statistical significant effect on the
voting probabilities for Obama.
20I actually use the average over the maximum number of a respondent’s self-placements up to panel
wave 10, instead of the self placement in wave 10, to decrease measurement error in self-placements.
21Results of these auxiliary regressions are reported in the Appendix A.2
22For a descriptive statistics please see Appendix A.3.
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Figure 4.4: Marginal effect of policy-distance on difference in expected utility for varying levels
of inconsistency
The parameter estimates imply a decreasing marginal effect of policy-distance with
increasing inconsistency. Figure 4.4 shows the marginal effect on expected utility23.
With increasing inconsistency the marginal effect decreases from around 0.7 to 0.2.
As in the theory section, this is calculated by 11+exp(δσ2Θi )
β. The resulting empirical
pattern is in line with the expectations from the learning model. This gets evident
when comparing the empirical to the theoretical expectations depicted in Figure 4.1.
Although in this case the theoretical interest is in the marginal effect on expected
utility, the direct examination of the parameters from a generalized linear model can
be problematic (Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010). It is well known, that the marginal
effect on predicted probability in binary choice models further depends on the predicted
probabilities (Ai and Norton, 2003). Still, a likelihood ratio test between the full-model
and a restricted model allows to examine in how far the inclusion of mediating aspects
increases the likelihood of the data. In our case, the restricted model supposes that
the effect of inconsistency δ is zero and compares the likelihood to the full-model
specification. For both measurements the likelihood significantly increases (p-value for
the model based on perceived distance data 0.018 and mean distance data 0.006).
The decreasing effect of policy distance gets also apparent by comparing the predicted
probabilities at different values of policy-distances for a respondent with median
inconsistency to a respondent from the 95% quantile of inconsistency. Figure 4.5
shows simulated predicted probabilities for this 24. While there is a strong effect of
policy-distance for a respondent with medium consistency, this effect is a weaker for a
23I obtain confidence interval using simulation (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). Drawing 1000 values
of both β and δ from the multivariate sampling distribution and calculate the expression for all these
draws. From that I take the mean as the point estimate and the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles as the lower and
upper bound.
24I use simulation techniques as described by (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000)
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Figure 4.5: Probability to vote for Obama by varying policy-distance, for a respondent with
consistent and inconsistent policy preference
respondent with strong inconsistency. It is important to note that the effect of policy-
distance at 95% quantile is still present, as the chances to vote for Obama increase
from 0.4 with same distance to Obama than McCain to above 0.75 for voters who have
the same position than Obama and are most far away from McCain platform. This
observation is underlined by the learning argument: Policy-distance is informative to
all voters when forming their expected utility. But less informative for voters with
higher inconsistency.
4.3.4 Robustness checks
I checked the robustness of the results when using an alternative model specification, a
different measurement for policy platforms and inconsistency. Furthermore, I checked
robustness for potential unobserved confounders.
First of all, as interaction effect models are the common way to specify mediating
effects, I also run the analysis using interaction effects models. The results are ba-
sically unchanged: The marginal effect of policy-distance decreases with increasing
inconsistency. A detailed description of the results can be found in Appendix A.5.1.
Second of all, I rely on a second measurement of policy-distance, using responses on
a seven-point liberal-conservative scale. From this I calculate the quadratic distance
of a respondents self-placement to perceived candidate platform on the same scale, as
well as the distance to the average placement of the two candidates. For the decreased
weight specification, as well as, an interaction effect model, I find similar results for
the distance to the average candidates platforms: Inconsistency moderates the effect of
policy-distance. For the perceived platforms, I find no statistically significant effect. This
does not directly allow to conclude that policy-distance in this case is not moderated,
but hints in direction that employing mean platforms reveals a different pattern. One
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apparent reason for the result when using perceived platforms is perception biases.
Respondents who I classify to posses inconsistent policy preferences, still place the
candidate they intend to vote for closer to their self-placement. Perception bias is
a well-known problem when using self-placements and perceived positions in the
specification of policy-based voting rules (Grynaviski, 2006). The results are reported
in Appendix A.5.2.
Thirdly, I run the analysis using a different measurement of inconsistency. An
alternative implication of the policy belief model (in combination with randomness of
survey response) is that respondents with wider policy beliefs (more inconsistent) have
a higher variation in self-placements over different panel waves. Therefore, as a second
measurement of inconsistency, I employ the standard deviation of self-placements in
different panel waves. Appendix A.5.3 reports the results from interaction effect models.
For all combinations of the different policy-distance measurements, the interaction
effects are negative, indicating decreasing marginal effects. However, only for the
self-placements the interaction effects are statistically significant.
Finally, it might be that the results are due to unobserved confounders. To minimize
this possibility, I re-run the analysis on five three-quarter subsets of the sample, combing
the estimates of inconsistency using methods from multiple imputation (King, 2002).
The results do not change over the different subset (see Appendix A.5.4)
Taken everything together the evidence presented in this analysis supports the
expectation from the learning perspective. Voters with inconsistent policy preference,
put less weight on policy-distance.
4.4 Summary
Citizens with inconsistent policy preference rely less on a candidate’s policy platforms,
than citizens with well-defined policy preference. This chapter offers a theoretical
explanation for this hypothesis. The way that citizens form expected utility from
political programs depends on each citizen’s own policy beliefs regarding what political
outcomes they would actually like to see. Because these beliefs not only vary direction
(some think that a liberal platform is better than a conservative one), but also differ
in certainty about the ideal policy platform. Candidates’ communicated platforms are
informative to a different degree to citizens. In seeking a representative match, citizens
place different emphasis on policy considerations.
While many previous empirical studies tested a related political sophistication hypoth-
esis about spatial voting decisions (Jessee, 2010; Lavine and Gschwend, 2007; Wyckoff,
1980; Knight, 1985), in which less informed or aware voters rely less on policy-distance,
this chapter is the first one to put these suppositions on a solid theoretical basis. I am
able to show that these kinds of argument cannot be directly derived from standard ex-
pected utility models regarding voting choice. The argumentation highlights two things.
First, the ongoing interaction between candidates and voters and how voters learn what
they can expect from different candidates, is the key to understanding heterogeneity in
a voter’s decision calculus. Second, standard measurements of information are only
an indirect approximation of the factors that condition voting decisions. Although
political information might matter for the structure of preference, more important are
the aspects about policy beliefs themselves.
58
CHAPTER 4. INCONSISTENT POLICY PREFERENCES
All in all, this chapter provides empirical evidence for the importance of a broader
conceptualization of policy preference. Building a theoretical argumentation on policy
beliefs led to a hypothesis that a standard depiction of policy preference would not
have been able to devise. This theoretical perspective is better suited in explaining
patterns as to how voters’ choose representatives based on their policy views. The next
chapter will build on the vital role of this perspective, by examining how it can be used
to explain the effect of arguments on voting decisions.
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CHAPTER 5
Do arguments matter? The effect of political
arguments on voting decisions
5.1 Introduction
Theories of representative democracy reserve different roles for political arguments.
Deliberative and discourse theories praise the exchange of arguments as the building
block of a democratic society (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2004; Chambers, 2003; Habermas,
1994; Cohen, 1997). They are seen as the essential mean by which citizens are able
to find out which policies are best for them and the society. Liberal conceptions
are in general more skeptical about the importance of political arguments. They
rather highlight the voting act as the crucial mechanism of assuring representation
in democracy (Key, 1966; Dahl, 1972). From this perspective political arguments are
dispensable for understanding the political process: The starting point are citizens’
policy preferences and their election of representatives based thereon.
A similar dichotomy of viewpoints has developed over the past 60 years of empirical
and theoretical research on the topic. Spatial voting theories neglect aspects of prefer-
ence formation and analyze in what way citizens’ policy views affect voting decisions
(Downs, 1957; Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970; Enelow and Hinich, 1984). The
question of how opinions are formed and what role political arguments play in this
formation process are treated as exogenous. By contrast, research in political psychol-
ogy and public opinion is interested in the effect of political arguments on preference
formation (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948; Zaller, 1992; Taber and Lodge, 2006;
Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989). In many of these models, citizens evaluate political
arguments and learn which policy platforms they actually prefer1. However, these
models generally pay less attention to vote choice. This shows that the two perspectives
1E.g. what is the effect of elite discussions about policy issues on public opinion (Bartels, 1993; Zaller,
1996; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997)? Or which political arguments are persuasive and which are not
(Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997; Druckman, 2004; Jerit, 2009; Arceneaux, 2012)?
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focus on different but connected aspects: While one side studies the effect of exogenous
political preferences on vote choice, the other examines how political preferences are
formed by means of political arguments.
Integrating these two perspectives can enhance our understanding of electoral democ-
racy in manifold ways. While spatial models have a competitive advantage in generating
hypotheses about how citizens’ policy preferences affect voting decisions (see e.g Kedar,
2005) and how candidates position themselves to gain citzins’ votes (see e.g. Adams,
Merrill and Grofman, 2005), theories of preference formation prevail in explaining
where political preferences originate from (Zaller, 1996; Nelson, Clawson and Ox-
ley, 1997), how they change (Mutz, Brody and Sniderman, 1996; Bartels, 1993) and
are framed, shaped and persuaded (Druckman, 2004; Jerit, 2009; Arceneaux, 2012).
The missing link between the two perspectives is a theoretical framework that allows
political arguments to shape policy beliefs and thereby affect voting decisions.
The theoretical model of this dissertation offers an extension to the spatial voting
theory that allows to study the effect of political arguments on voting decisions. In
this chapter, I show that this is important for the studying of electoral behavior as
one argument can directly influence a voter’s decision. Putting expectations from this
theory to a test using an experimental study, I am able to show that arguments about a
policy proposal (e.g. whether gay marriage should be legalized) changes the state in
which a voter is otherwise indifferent. While in the classic model a voter is indifferent
between two equidistant policy platforms, in the model I present, this state changes
after evaluating an argument. Voters learn: If a voter finds an argument about a specific
policy proposal persuasive, she will prefer the platform that is more likely to be in
favor of this policy. Therefore, the outlined model forges the link between findings in
political psychology and the spatial analysis of the electoral process.
5.1.1 Political arguments and fixed preferences
Researchers in the spatial voting tradition are mainly interested in the question how
voting decisions are affected by political preferences. Therefore, they take citizens’
policy preferences as given and leave aside questions where they actually come from (e.g.
Jessee, 2010; Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005). Why some citizens tend towards more
liberal, and others towards more conservative platforms is for this theory a different
matter. This perpective is described by the simplifying assumption in the spatial
voting models that citizen’s ideal policy platforms are fixed and exogenous (Sanders
et al., 2008). This proposition prevents studying preference formation processes, as
it precludes one influential way to think about democracy as the ongoing exchange
of political arguments: Only through the evaluation of arguments citizens can form
distinct opinions about matters of politics and make informed voting decisions. Before
spatial voting can cover this perspective, preferences as outlined by the theory have to
be persuadable by political arguments.
Policy beliefs, as outlined in this dissertation, allow for persuadable preferences and
can be integrated in spatial voting models. From a psychological perspective, a policy
platform can be understood as a multi-attribute object (Fishbein, 1963). In the context of
policy voting, the attributes are specific policies that a platform is in favor of. Persuasion
is about changing an individual’s preference for these attributes, which in the context of
spatial voting are the policies. As Nelson and Oxley put it: “to change the individual’s
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beliefs or cognitions about the attribute of the object constitutes traditional persuasion”
(Nelson and Oxley, 1999, p.225). Changing the preference for such attitudes will further
shift the evaluation of the multi-attribute objects. Adapting this to spatial voting means
that persuading an individual to change her preference in support of gay marriage,
should also positively affect her evaluation of liberal platforms.
The consequences of the ongoing evaluation of political arguments can be found
in preference formation models from political science (Zaller, 1992; Lodge, McGraw
and Stroh, 1989). The key thought of these models is that the evaluation of any policy
depends on stimuli, information or considerations an individual has received about
the policy. Political arguments entail considerations that should induce a person to
prefer one side of the issue over the other and change her policy beliefs. The idea that
opinions and preferences can be represented by beliefs can also be found in Bartels
(1993) study of the persuasive effect of media exposure. He represents citizens opinions
using a belief distribution over a policy issue. These opinions can be influenced by new
information about the policy. Furthermore, studies of deliberation integrate the idea of
persuasive considerations (Dickson, Hafer and Landa, 2008; Hafer and Landa, 2007).
In these models, actors themselves are uncertain which outcome is most beneficial for
them personally, and strategically choose to share their considerations with others.
Summarizing the points made above it can be stated that allowing considerations to
influence policy beliefs generates a useful model to study effects of political arguments
on voting decisions. Relevant considerations can influence citizens’ beliefs why a
certain policy position should be preferred. Voters might find these reasons appealing
and change their evaluation of policy platforms. The question remains as to how this
exactly influences voting decisions, and how the policy belief model allows to derive
hypothesis about this. They are addressed in the next section.
5.2 Theory
In the theory section, I argue that one political argument changes the state of indifference
in spatial voting theory. The effect political arguments can have on policy beliefs makes
political preference persuadable and highlights the importance of argument evaluation
in study the of electoral behavior. I first give an intuitive example why one political
argument can affect a voter’s decision calculus. Afterwards, I employ the adaptive
utility specification of this dissertation to show under which conditions voters are
indifferent2. Finally, I outline how political arguments affect this state. The theory
section, then, concludes with a discussion of the derived hypothesis.
5.2.1 Which policy platform represents my policy interest best?
Imagine a young voter who wants to decide which candidate to vote for in the upcoming
elections. She wants to select a representative that will favor policy proposals that she
likes, and opposes those she doesn’t. However, it is hard for her to foresee how much
she will like an implemented policy. Should taxes be raised on high incomes? On the
one hand, it seems to be fair that the privileged should give more back to society, on the
2This part will contain some unavoidable repetition from the theory chapter
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Figure 5.1: How political arguments influence voting behavior
other they also worked hard for it. She bases her preferences on these considerations.
While on the issue of high income taxes the two contrary considerations make her
undecided, for another proposal her attitude seems to be clearer: Should taxes be cut
for middle income classes? “Of course, they should. These people are the backbone of
our society, my father works so hard and gets so little back.”
The policy platform a candidate takes on contains information about policies repre-
sentatives are likely to implement when in office. A representative from a center-left
platform will likely be in favor of tax-cuts for middle income wages, and increase in
taxes for high incomes. In contrast, a representative from a middle right platform might
oppose the idea of tax increases for high incomes. The young voter from this example,
has a good sense which platform the two candidates, which are up for election, take
on. One candidate is middle left and the other middle right. But what policy platform
best represents her policy interest? Since she has mixed considerations about the issue
that discriminates between the two platforms (high-income tax), she is uncertain which
policy platform will better represent her interests. On policy grounds, this makes her
indifferent between the two camps.
As her preference towards a tax increase are essentially based on considerations, the
two candidates can try to persuade her using political arguments. The middle-right
candidate can try to provide her with another relevant consideration about why she
should be in favor of taxation for high incomes. For example3: “I’m not going to
raise taxes on anyone because when the economy’s growing slow like this, when
we’re in recession you shouldn’t raise taxes on anyone”. Suppose that she finds this
consideration appealing, she accepts it to represent her perspective on this issue. This
is likely to change her attitude towards this policy, but also influence her evaluation
of the different policy platforms. Basically, this accepted consideration makes it more
likely that a rightist platform represents her policy interest. When deciding, she would
not be indifferent between the two camps anymore. Based on the one accepted political
argument, she rather prefers the center-right candidate.
This simplified example illustrates how one argument about a policy can influence
the indifference between two candidates. Figure 5.1 shows this systematically. The
consideration entailed in one political argument has a indirect influence on a voting
decision. A voter’s evaluation of a consideration entailed in this argument can shape
the voter’s policy preference. This changes the state in which a voter feels indifferent
between two policy options and thereby her voting decision. Like in the example, while
the voter is indifferent between the two candidates based on the uncertainty whether
she should be in favor or opposed to high income taxation, one argument can influences
this uncertainty and thereby her position. In turn this also influences her evaluation of
the different policy positions, making her prefer the candidate that is more likely to
3Mitt Romney - Citation from the first presidential debate of the 2012 American Presidential Elections
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be in favor of the policy. The next section describes a formalized model of this line of
argumentation.
5.2.2 Spatial voting and indifference
In the classic proximity voting model, preferences about policy platforms are fixed,
meaning that each voter i is supposed to know which policy platform yields the highest
benefit for the voter personally. Let policy platforms X be defined on the real line
X ∈ R1. Following the theoretical discussion of this dissertation, a fixed policy platform,
in the words of adaptive utility theory, means that the textitstate of mind, is given
Θi = x (Houlding and Coolen, 2011). A voter knows that platform xi represents him
on policy grounds. Voters care about the policy outcome of a platform, which in
a representative system might best be understood as the attitude of representatives
to either be opposed or in favor of concrete policy proposals4. In spatial voting the
attitudes towards these policies are abstracted in terms of policy platforms. A voter i
receives utility U given a fixed state of mind Θi = x from the closeness of a candidate’s
platform Ck ∈ X. I focus on a situation where voters can choose between two candidates
k ∈ 1, 25.
E [U (Ck | Θi = xi)] = −β
(
Cj − xi
)2 (5.1)
I use quadratic loss to model the closeness of a candidate’s platform to the voter.
Additionally, β indicates the importance of utility on the evaluation of a candidate’s
platform. Another point to note, is that in the case of this model the expected utility
E [U (Ck | Θi = xi)] equals the standard utility U (Ck | Θi = xi), because there are no
aspects a voter is uncertain about.
The assumption that preferences over policy outcomes are fixed needs to be relaxed
in order to study the effect of political arguments. The adaptive utility model allows
for a individual specific policy belief over the different policy platforms Θi : X → [0, 1].
The beliefs are subjective, so what differs between voters is how certain they are that a
specific policy platform represents their interests. In accordance with theory chapter, I
assume that the prior belief distribution is normal with mean xi and variance σ2Θi .
Θi ∼ N
(
xi, σ2Θi
)
(5.2)
This symmetric policy belief represents the idea that each voter has a mean belief
position, but is uncertain if her ideal platform might be slightly to the left or slightly
to the right of it. In face of this uncertainty, voters can form the expected utility from
a platform. The functional form (quadratic loss) imposes the assumption that voter’s
4I assume that individuals vote sincere, which means that they do not take post-election bargain into
account, when electing candidates. Additionally, the model is decision theoretic: voters do not consider
how other voters might behave.
5I employ candidate’s platforms for illustrative purposes. The choosen description, however, connects
fairly well with the later experimental set-up.
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are risk-averse, such that the belief variance negatively affects utility evaluation. Thus,
in this case, the expected utility differs from the utility expression, because voters are
uncertain about their ideal-platform.
E [U (Ck | Θi)] = −β
(
Cj − xi
)2 − βσ2Θi (5.3)
Analytically not a lot changes moving from equation 5.1 to equation 5.3, expect for
additional effect of the belief variance. Apart from that, the expected utility from the
policy belief model equals the classic utility if the mean belief equals the fixed state of
mind and variance in policy beliefs tends towards zero. More important, in both cases
a voter is indifferent between two platforms C1 and C2 if a voter’s fixed position xi is
the midpoint between both candidates, or in the belief based model, if the mean belief
is equal to the midpoint between both candidates6.
E [U(C1 | Θi = xi)] = E [U(C2 | Θi = xi)] if xi = C1 − C22 (5.4)
E [U(C1 | Θi)] = E [U(C2 | Θi)] if xi = C1 − C22
There is one fundamental difference between the two models: While Model 5.3 allows
to analyze the effect of political arguments, Model 5.1 does not. As conceptualized, an
argument can influence policy beliefs which platform is better for a voter. In the classic
model there are no beliefs. In a way, relaxing the fixed preference assumption can be
seen as the necessary modeling decision that enables us to study the effect of political
arguments in spatial voting at all.
5.2.3 Political arguments to update policy beliefs
The next step is to study how political arguments can persuade voters and the effect
this can have on indifference between two policy platforms. I model an argument-
evaluation process based on Bayesian learning. An argument mj contains one relevant
consideration that tries to persuade a voter to be in favor or opposed to the policy j.
The way voters process arguments in this model is in line with receive-accept models
of preference formation (Zaller, 1992). A voter receives an argument and evaluates
its consideration, either accepts or rejects it to represents his or her view point. If a
voter accepts an argument that is in favor of policy j, this should also persuade her to
be in favor of this policy; rejecting it persuades her to be opposed. The information
contained in this process is the evaluation of the argument. The process of how political
6Excluding the trivial case, in which the two candidate’s platform are the same C1 6= C2, we can see how
to obtain the indifference state by setting the two expected utilities equal E [U(C1 | Θ)] = E [U(C2 | Θ)].
Which first results in−β (C1 − xi)2− βσ2Θi = −β (C2 − xi)
2− βσ2Θi where β and βσ2Θi cancel out. Extending
the equation allows to simply further as x2i are the same on both sides: −C21 + 2C1xi = −C22 + 2C2xi. Next
rearranging terms, xi =
−C21+C22
2(C1−C2) yields the midpoint as a solution. xi =
C1+C2
2 . It is obvious that the same
holds for the classic model.
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arguments work, can is conceptualized from a subjective Bayesian perspective. What
matters for updating the beliefs is the individual evaluation of the political argument.
The evaluation of the political argument can be summarized in a variable yj
yj =
{
1 if accept consideration of mj
0 if reject consideration of mj
(5.5)
Given the evaluation of the argument, voters update their policy beliefs: What policy
platform best represents a voter’s policy interest given that she accepted/rejected the
argument about the policy j. This conditional belief can be expressed in terms of Bayes
Theorem.
Θi | yj =
Pr(yj | X) ·Θi
Pr(yj)
(5.6)
Where Θi | yj is the posterior belief about the ideal policy platform, given the
evaluation of the argument yj. The posteriori beliefs will influence which candidate a
voter prefers after the argument evaluation. Pr(yj | X) is the probability to accept an
argument about policy pj given different platform positions. This part represents the
likelihood of accepting an argument. Θi is the prior policy belief, which are defined by
the distribution over policy platforms in 5.2. Pr(yj) is the general probability to accept
a message7.
Of special interest for the argumentation, is the likelihood to accept an argument.
A simple model that allows to connect the evaluation of the argument to a voter’s
position can be expressed in terms the characteristic of the policy: Are leftist voters
more likely to accept the consideration of the argument compared to rightist voters, or
the other way around? This can be modeled by mapping positions to the probability of
accepting an argument. How strongly the policy platforms influences the Likelihood
can be captured by a discrimination parameter aj:
Pr(yj | X) = f (ajX) (5.7)
Where f (·) is function that maps f () : R→ [0, 1]. For the purpose of the argumen-
tation, I assume that the function f (·) follows the cdf of the normal Φ(·). In essence,
this constructs an item response model for accepting considerations about policy pj.
The top panel in Figure 5.2 shows the likelihood for a policy with aj = 2: It gets more
likely to accept a message given positions with a higher value. In the example from
above, it is more likely to accept a message opposed to high income taxation the further
right and conservative a recipient is.
7This can be expressed as Pr(yj) =
∫
ΘiPr(yj | X)dX
67
5.2. THEORY
−2 −1 0 1 2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Probability of accepting a political argument
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
−2 −1 0 1 2
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Prior and posterior beliefs
Policy platforms
D
en
si
ty
Figure 5.2: Effect of accepting a political argument on policy beliefs
Based on this likelihood voters can update their beliefs. Given the assumptions about
the priors, the likelihood of accepting an argument and the fact that a recipient found
an argument persuasive, the posterior beliefs are proportional to the product of the
two. Because the likelihood is given by a cdf of the normal and the prior policy beliefs
are described by pdf of the normal. The product of the two, then, follows a skewed
normal distribution.
Θi | yj ∝ Pr(yj | X) ·Θi (5.8)
Θi | yj ∝ φ(ajX) ·Φ(xi, σ2Θi) (5.9)
The lower panel of Figure 5.2 shows the prior and posterior distribution, where
the dashed distribution is the posterior Θi | yj and the straight line depicts the prior
distribution Θi. In the example, the prior is normal with mean at 0 and standard
deviation of 0.5. The resulting posterior is to the right of the prior distribution. This
makes intuitive sense: accepting an argument that right platforms are more likely to
accept, changes a voter’s policy belief in this direction.
Based on the posterior skewed normal, interesting implications about the effect of
arguments can be derived. First of all, if accepting an argument about policy pj does
not discrimante between policy platforms βk = 0 (so that every policy platform is
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equally likely to accept arguments about this issue) the posterior is proportional to the
the prior beliefs. Second, the expected value of the posterior beliefs are moved to lower
values if aj < 0 and to higher values if aj > 0. So that a reciepient’s beliefs are shaped
towards the right, if he accepts an argument, that platforms to the right are more likely
to accept compared to platforms to the left. The strength of this effect depends on aj.
The stronger a policy argument discriminates between platforms, the stronger the effect.
All of this can be seen from the expectation of the skewed normal distribution, which
is given by:
E
[
Θi | yj
]
= xi + ξi (5.10)
where
ξi = σ
2
Θi
aj√
1+ a2j
√
2
pi
(5.11)
In this the prior mean belief is shaped by ξi. The shift is positive if aj is positive and
negative if aj is negative. Thus, aj affects the shift of the posterior mean policy belief.
The strength of the shift depends on a voter’s prior variance in policy beliefs σ2Θi and
the effectiveness of the political argument aj. Recipients who are certain about their
ideal platform will only be shaped marginally.
Most important is the general effect on voting decisions. The expected utility based
on the posterior beliefs can be written out in the following way.
E[U(Ck | Θi | yj)] = −β(Ck − xi + ξi)2 − βσ2Θi (5.12)
This model allows to derive hypothesis about the direct effect of political arguments.
Please note that the above holds for recipients that find the political argument persuasive
and accept the consideration. For recipients who reject an argument the shift goes
in the opposite direction, as the likelihood of rejecting a argument is the inverse of
accepting a argument.
5.2.4 Implications: How one political argument changes the state of indif-
ference
In classic spatial model, voters are indifferent between two candidates that take on
policy platforms in equidistant to their ideal-platform. This also holds for the outlined
policy belief model. However, in this model, one political argument about a policy,
that the voter finds either persuasive or not, can change this state. Depending on the
evaluation, the voter will either prefer the candidate to the left or the one to the right.
The hypotheses below summarize this argument.
H 1 One political argument about a policy, changes the indifference state of a voter.
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In order to show this, we can imagine two candidates that are in equidistant to the
voter prior mean belief xi. Equation 5.4 shows that this makes voters indifferent. After
updating beliefs through evaluation of one political argument, the expected utility is
described by Equation 5.12. For which it holds that expected utilities from the two
candidates are not equal anymore: E[U(C1 | Θi | yj)] 6= E[U(C2 | Θi | yj)]8. This is
because the prior mean belief is shifted by the evaluation of the argument.
This first implication of the theory holds if accepting the argument discriminates
between policy platforms. A voter will not be indifferent between the two candidates
who are in equidistant to her prior mean belief, after evaluating a political argument.
The candidate in the argument’s direction will be preferred by the voter. The same
holds the other way around: Candidates opposed to the argument’s direction will be
preferred by the voter if she rejects the argument. This idea can be summarized in two
hypotheses.
H 2 Given that a voter accepts an argument, a voter will prefer the candidate that is more likely
to be in favor of the argument.
H 3 Given that a voter rejected an argument, a voter will prefer the candidate that is more
likely to oppose the argument.
In total, I expect that political arguments to directly affect voting decisions. This
argumentation underlines the power that political arguments can have on electoral
behavior, by showing that already one political argument affects voting decisions. The
ongoing evaluation of political arguments can even have even graver effects. Consider a
situation in which a voter’s source of arguments are biased towards a specific platform
and the sender manages to make these arguments persuasive. In the long-run small
shifts will accumulate to large shifts and alter a voter’s position towards the platform
of the source. In order to underline this argumentation, the three hypothesis for the
effect of one political argument are put to a test in the next section. I employ one
experimental study to analyze voters’ indifference between two candidates and how
the evaluation of political arguments influences decision between the two.
5.3 Empirics
The implications from the theoretical model, how political arguments affect spatial
voting decisions, are tested using an experimental study. In the experiment a portion
of participants is asked to read through political arguments regarding policy issues.
Thereafter, all respondents are confronted with a voting decisions for which the spatial
voting model would expect them to be indifferent between two political candidates.
Comparing the treatment groups with the control group allows to estimate the effect
one political argument has on this indifference state. The following section describes
the recruitment of participants and experimental set-up. Afterward, I show that
8In order to see this, one can analyze under which conditions the expected utility terms are equal given
that xi =
C1−C2
2 . Substituting this in the equation gives −(C1 − C1−C22 − ξ)2 − βσ2Θi = −(C2 −
C1−C2
2 −
ξ)2 − βσ2Θi only holds if, the two candidates have the same position, or ξ is equal to zero.
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the experiment supports implications from the theory above: Reading the political
argument caused respondents to favor the candidate in the arguments direction. I
further discuss that the underlying mechanism of this treatment effect is persuasion.
5.3.1 Experimental study: political arguments and spatial voting
Participants
During the last weeks of October 2014, 165 participants took part in a 8-minute online
survey. I recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online panel9.
MTurk has been used by many recent studies in political science (see e.g. Arceneaux,
2012). Studies who evaluated the recruitment platform come to positive conclusions
(see e.g. Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Crump, McDonnell and Gureckis, 2013).
The experiment took on average approximately four and half minutes to complete10.
Subjects were granted with $0.6 in vouchers for amazon.com. The sample can be
described as being fairly representative of the wider voting population. The average
age in the sample is 37.9 with standard deviation of 11.35. About the same share of
female and male participants took part: 70 female, and 80 male. Most respondents are
white (120 respondents). A majority has a BA level degree (61 respondents), or went to
college without a degree (61 respondents). Party affiliation is slightly biased towards
the Democrats. While 48 respondents in the sample identify strongly or weakly with
the democratic party, only 19 see themselves as strong or weak Republicans.
Description of experimental design
The experiment is designed around three highly debated cultural policy issues. The first
issue is the question whether marijuana should be legalized as a medical option. The
second, if gay marriage should be legalized. The third, in how far illegal immigrants
should be granted a pathway to citizenship. All of these issues received notable
media coverage in the United States during the year 2014, and especially shortly
before the interview time11. As such, the three issues should be sufficiently salient to
the respondents, which makes these issues a conservative test case, when analyzing
the persuasiveness of political arguments. Due to the large media coverage many
respondents potentially already made up their mind and were familiar with the political
argument brought forward. On the plus side why arguments about these issues should
still matter, one can state that as a result of public debate they should discriminate
sharply between liberal and conservative platforms.
9Actually 181 participants took the survey. 16 of these observations had to be dropped beforehand
because the survey was answered from the same IP address twice.
10After the set of questions for this experiment, the survey included question designed for an additional
experiment, also related to spatial voting decisions. As the question for the second experiment were asked
after the ones described here, the results for mthe here described experiment should not be contaminated
by the second experiment.
11Before the interviews the Supreme Court rejected cases against gay marriage, which caused quite
some public debate. After the interview period, on 21th of November President Obama offered amnesty to
illegal immigrants, information about this decisions was leaked during October and caused quite some stir
up among Republicans. The legalization of Marijuana has been an ongoing debate, as illegal immigrants
five states decided to decriminalize the use of marijuana.
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Within the survey, all respondents were first asked about their attitude towards the
the three issues. The first question regarding the marijuana issue reads : “We would
like to know your opinion about three highly debated policy issues. One issue is
whether marijuana should be legalized as a medical option. What is your opinion on
this issue: Are you in favor or opposed to the medical use of marijuana?”. Respondents
could indicate their opinion on five point scale, ranging from “Strongly opposed” to
“Strongly in favor”. The other issues have similar question wordings and the same
attitude scale12. 52 % of the respondents indicate that they would favor marijuana
as medical option, only 7 % answer that they are strongly opposed. On the issue of
legalizing gay marriage 23 % are opposed or strongly opposed, and 68 % are in favor or
strongly in favor. The most controversial issue in the survey is the question regarding
illegal immigrants. An equal share of respondents are opposed or in favor of this issue
(43 % are opposed and 40 % are in favor).
After expressing their policy attitudes, the survey asked participants about their
position on a liberal-conservative scale. I adapt the same wording as in the American
National Election Study, but stretch the scale from 7 to 11 points. Low values indicate
that respondents place themselves as being “extremely liberal” (-5), high values show
that a respondent is “extremely conservative” (+5). Participants are spread over the
whole range, with a mean of -0.1 and standard deviation of 2.93. Respondent’s
ideological self-placements discriminate sharply between their attitudes. Among the
25% most conservative (with a self-placement higher than +2) 40% are strongly opposed
to granting illegal immigrants a pathway to citizenship. Only 7% express the same
attitude among the 25% most liberal respondents (with a self-placement lower than -3).
Similar patterns hold for the other issues.
For the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to four groups: The first
group is asked to read an a counter argument about the legalization of gay marriage;
the second group receives an argument opposed to the issue that marijuana should
be legalized as a medical option; the third group reads an argument opposed to the
proposal that illegal immigrants should be granted a pathway to citizenship , and a
control group is not asked to read an argument. 46 people are part of the control
group; 36 in the first group, 43 in the second group, and 40 in the third group. All
arguments are are taken from the website procon.org, a website that collects debates
about controversial and important issues in United States. Following the theoretical
expectation that every argument, as long as it entails a consideration that promotes one
side of an issues, should be suitable to test the hypothesis, I picked three arguments that
come from different actors - a citizen, a politician and an organization. The arguments
are all in opposition to the issue, as prior research showed that counter-arguments can
have stronger effects in survey experiments (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997). Furthermore,
they are all targeted in the same direction: All arguments are conservative, as they
oppose a liberal policy. Thus, they should work in the same way which allows to
combine them in the later analysis.
12The full version of the questionnaire can be found in the Appendix B.1.
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The argument that is opposed to gay marriage was brought forward by Maggie
Gallagher, President of the National Organization for Marriage wrote on PBS.org ”Issue
Clash” 13:
“Marriage has its own dignity and purpose and its own mission: bring-
ing together male and female so that children can know and be known by,
love and be loved by, their own mother and father. Same-sex marriage is un-
just because it is founded on an untruth. Same-sex unions are not marriage.
Only a fairly small minority of same-sex couples actually enter marriages
where they are available. What gay marriage will do and is doing is discon-
nect marriage as an idea from its natural roots, and increasingly stigmatize
the people (and institutions) who adhere strongly to our traditional views
of marriage. Same-sex marriage is profoundly unjust because it misuses the
law to require something that is not true: these unions, however great they
are in other ways, are not marriages and nobody should be required by law
to treat them as marriages.”
The argument opposed to medical marijuana is a quotation from a Mark Souder, a
Member of the US House of Representatives who expressed the following opinion14:
“The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency charged with
protecting the health of Americans, has never found smoking marijuana
to be a safe and effective drug. In April 2006, following my request, the
FDA released an interagency advisory confirming that smoked marijuana
is not medicine because: (1) marijuana has a high potential for abuse; (2)
it has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States;
and (3) it has a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.
The advisory also stated: ...there is currently sound evidence that smoked
marijuana is harmful.”
The Heritage foundation expresses opposition to granting illegal immigrants citizen-
ship, in the following statement15:
“Do not grant amnesty to illegal aliens. Regardless of the penalties
imposed, any program that grants individuals who are unlawfully present
the legal permission to remain here rewards illegal behavior and is unfair to
those who obey the law and go through the regulatory and administrative
requirements to enter the country legally. Those who enter the United States
illegally should not be rewarded with permanent legal status or other such
benefits, and they should be penalized in any road to citizenship. Those
who enter and remain in the country illegally are violating the law, and
13 procon.org: Should Gay Marriage Be Legal? Last accessed: 25 November 2014. Neither the authors
name, nor any other information about the source is revealed to the participants.
14 procon.org: Should Marijuana Be a Medical Option? Last accessed: 25 November 2014
15 procon.org: What Are the Solutions to Illegal Immigration in America? Last accessed: 25 November
2014
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Figure 5.3: Voting decisions between two candidates with positions on ideological scale for a
respondent with self-placement at -1
condoning or encouraging such violations increases the likelihood of further
illegal conduct.”
After reading the argument, participants in the the three treatment groups were
asked to evaluate the content of the quote. First, the respondents indicate, whether
in their opinion “the arguments of the quote [are] in favor or opposed to the issue”.
This question is included in the online survey to encourage participants to considerably
understand the content of the argument16. Subsequently, respondents can formulate
their opinion regarding the persuasiveness of the argument, using a 5-point-scale that
ranges from not “persuasive at all”(1), over “neither persuasive nor not persuasive”(3),
to “very persuasive”(5). The illegal immigration argument is perceived to be the most
persuasive one, with a mean of 3.67, followed by the argument about medical marijuana
(mean 2.71). The argument about gay-marriage has the lowest persuasiveness (mean
2.19).
Directly after the argument evaluation, all respondents were confronted with a voting
decision between two candidates that occupied different ideological platforms17. The
position of the candidates were presented using an arrow that points at specific position
on the same 11 point scale they used to indicate their self-placement (See 5.3). All
reference to real world candidates is removed, referring to Candidate 1 (C1) and
Candidate 2 (C2). The idea to communicate candidates position in this way is common
in the spatial voting literature (see e.g. Tomz and Van Houweling, 2008; Lacy and
Paolino, 2010; Claassen, 2009). The candidates’ platforms were selected conditional on
the respondents’ self-placement. Candidate 1 is placed one scale point to the left of the
respondent, and Candidate 2 one position to the right. Accordingly in all scenarios,
Candidate 1 is more liberal and Candidate 2 more conservative than the respondent.
Figure 5.3 shows the graph that is shown to a respondent with self-placement at -1.
The voting decision is the key variable of interest for the later analysis. According
to the proximity voting model the choice situation should induce respondents to be
indifferent between the two candidates, as both are in equidistant to a respondent’s
self-placement. Directly after exposure to the candidates, respondents were asked
about their preference: “Based on their political ideology, do you prefer one of the two
16A pre-test indicated that a small portion of participants simply clicked forward. In this survey, 12
participants considered the quotes to contain pro arguments.
17Because the experimental treatment is only sensible for respondents that do not position themselves
at the extremes of the ideological spectrum, 28 respondents with self-placements at -5 or +5 had to be
excluded from the experimental manipulation.
74
CHAPTER 5. PERSUADABLE POLICY PREFERENCES
candidates, or are you undecided between the two?”. The options allowed respondents
to indicate if they are undecided between the two candidates, or prefer candidate 1 or
candidate 2. In order to test, if the mechanism that affects this decision is persuasion
the questionnaire, further ask respondents if the argument changed their “previously
stated opinion in any specific direction”. 14% indicate that the argument did either
changed their opinion to be “more in favor” or “more opposed”. The survey ends with
a set of background questions about the respondent’s age, education, gender and party
identification.
5.3.2 Results from experimental study
The results from the experiment provides support for the implications of the theory.
I find that the political argument affects the state of indifference. Respondents who
read the conservative argument shift their preference towards the more conservative
candidate. The next paragraphs describe these findings more closely.
Treatment effect
Respondents in the control group are indifferent when presented with the voting
decision. The indifference state can be seen by comparing the voting decisions between
the treatment and control group. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of respondents who
prefer the more conservative candidate (C1), the more liberal candidate (C2), or are
undecided between the two. In the control group a majority of respondents answer
that they are undecided between the two candidates (49%). The proportion in this
group that prefers candidate 1 or candidate 2 are about the same size (C1: 27%; C2:
24%). The distribution in the control group is symmetric around being undecided in
the choice situation. Some respondents tend to choose the more liberal candidate, some
express that they prefer the more conservative candidate. From this, it appears that
only random factors make some respondents decide to vote for either the liberal or
conservative candidate.
The aggregated pattern differs for the treatment groups. The right panel of figure 5.4
shows that a larger proportion of respondents in the three treatment groups prefer
the more conservative candidate (40%), compared to the more liberal candidate (19%).
Although compared to the control group there is no strong difference between the
share of voters that are undecided (42%), the asymmetric pattern reveals that on
average respondents shifted their preference as a result of reading the argument. The
figure further shows the error bars for the percentages. In order to take the sampling
uncertainty into account, I formulate a statistical model for the treatment effect.
The effect can be analyzed more thoroughly, relying on an ordered logit model. The
experimental situation calls for an ordered logit model for three related reasons. First
of all, the options are ordered along the ideological spectrum. For all participants
candidate one is the more liberal choice, candidate two the more conservative and
being undecided somewhere in between. Second, the decision for the undecided cases
is affected by the utility-difference between voting for candidate one or candidate two.
Only if the difference in utility is zero a respondents should be undecided. This permits
me to interpret the utility-difference as a latent continuum that influences the voting
decision. Finally, the experiment is arranged in a way that only aspects concerning the
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Figure 5.4: Percentage voting decision by treatment and control group
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Treatment Group 0.60∗
(0.36)
Treatment Gay-Marriage 0.07 0.05 0.03
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Treatment Legalize Marijuana 0.92∗∗ 0.90∗ 0.89∗∗
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45)
Treatment Illegal Immigrants 0.80∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.77∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
Attitude Gay-Marriage −0.25
(0.17)
Attitude Strength Legalize Marijuana 0.24
(0.16)
Attitude Strength Illegal Immigrants 0.04
(0.13)
Liberal-Conservative −0.09
(0.07)
Log Likelihood -139.26 -137.39 -135.85 -136.53
Num. obs. 133 133 133 133
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.1: Results from ordered logit models (1)
policy platforms should affect voting decisions. In addition, the treatment should have
a linear effect on the utility difference, because the distance to both candidates is fixed
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and arguments shift the mean beliefs. The ordered logit model can also be derived
more formally. For a discussion of the model’s derivation please see Appendix B.2.
The results from the ordered logit models are presented in Table 5.1. Model 1
includes a dummy variable that combines all treatment groups, Model 2 estimates the
treatment effect of the three arguments separately. Model 3 and Model 4 control for
prior attitudes on polices and liberal conservative platforms. What can be seen from
the effect of the combined treatment is that the treatment has a positive effect on the
latent continuum of the ordered logit model. As discussed, the latent continuum can
be understood as the difference in expected utility. It follows that for the treatment
groups the expected utility for the more conservative candidate is systematically higher.
In the experimental set-up this can directly be traced back to the evaluation of the
political argument, leading to the conclusion that the argument directly affects the
voting decision. Interestingly, this effect does not depend on a voter’s evaluation of
the argument. Respondents in the treatment group are more likely to prefer the more
conservative candidate. In how far this confirms the first hypothesis further depends
on the estimates of the thresholds. Because these are centered around zero (-0.91, 1.05)
and the model specification does not include a constant, the control group is most likely
to indicate that they are undecided. Model 2 further shows that the treatment effect is
even stronger for the argument about legalization of marijuana and illegal immigrants.
The effect of the gay-marriage argument, on the other hand, is not distinguishable from
zero. The other two models confirm this pattern. In Model 3, I controll for the prior
attitudes. The treatment effects are unaffected and the effect of the prior attitudes are
rather weak. In Model 4, I check the results including the effect of self-placements. It
might be that more conservative respondents always vote for the more conservative
candidates. This supposition is not confirmed and the effect of the political arguments
not affected 18.
The estimated treatment effect of the arguments (from Model 2) is shown in Figure 5.5.
I calculate predicted probabilities to choose candidate 1, candidate 2, or being unde-
cided. I do so for the three argument groups and compare their predicted probabilities
in the control group. The first difference between each treatment group and the control
group show in how far the argument influenced the voting decision. What can be seen
from the figure is that both the contra argument about marijuana legalization as well
as the contra argument about illegal immigration made respondents less likely to be
undecided and more likely to prefer candidate 2 - the more conservative candidate.
For example, the probability to be undecided decreases by -0.14 percentage points for
the marijuana-argument group. The figure further shows 90% confidence intervals,
which both cases allow to reject the Null-hypothesis that these voting patterns are due
to sampling error. Overall, in these cases the hypothesis are clearly confirmed: both
arguments affect the state of indifference. The same does not hold for the argument
18I further check if liberal respondents are more likely to vote for the more liberal candidate - a
hypothesis that a directional model (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989), or a strategic spatial voting model
(Kedar, 2005) would allow to derive. Interestingly, I rather find the opposite to hold: Liberal respondents
(self-placement on liberal-conservative scale below -1) are actually more likely to vote for the more centrist
candidate. The same holds the other way around: Conservative participants (self-placement above +1) are
more likely to vote for the more liberal candidate. The treatment effects do not change.
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Figure 5.5: First difference in voting probability compared to control group for different treatment
groups
about gay-marriage. One reason might be that for this policy the largest share of
respondents has strong attitudes. For the 41 % of respondents that are strongly in
favor or opposed, the argument potentially contained no new information about their
policy preference. Another explanation might be that the evaluation differed among
respondents, such that some accepted the argument and others rejected it. On average
the treatment effect on the expected utility difference between the two could cancel out.
The next section takes a closer look at this line of reasoning.
All in all, the results support the supposition that political arguments can change
voting behavior. Two of the three arguments change participants’ voting decisions
substantially. In bot instances, responders are less likely to be undecided, and are more
likely to vote for the more conservative candidate. In this respect, the two arguments are
truly persuasive: The conservative position promoted in the arguments lead participants
to vote for a more conservative candidate. The direction of the treatment effect does
not seem to depend on the evaluation of the argument. Nonetheless, to assure that the
underlying mechanism is truly persuasion, the next paragraphs investigates how the
evaluation of the argument and attitude change affect the voting decisions.
Is the underlying mechanism persuasion?
The results further support persuassion as the underlying mechanim of the treatment
effect. Especially those that found the argument persuasive are likely to vote for
the more conservative candidate. Additionally, respondents who reconsidered their
attitude to be more liberal after reading the argument are more likely to prefer the
liberal candidate. This subsection further attempts to rule out other explanations for
the observed treatment effect.
There a two alternative explanations why in the presented experimental set-up the
treatment could have an effect on the voting decision. First of all, respondents in the
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Attitude Change More Liberal −0.58 −2.24∗
(0.95) (1.25)
Attitude Change More Conservative 0.34 0.41
(0.81) (0.82)
Prior Attitude 0.04 0.19 0.03
(0.13) (0.19) (0.14)
Argument Evaluation Positive 0.47
(0.63)
Argument Evaluation Negative 1.18∗
(0.63)
Log Likelihood -100.04 -98.46 -82.91
Num. obs. 96 96 80
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.2: Results from ordered logit models (2)
treatment group could learn about the candidates’ position. The experimental design
attempts to rule out this possibility by paying close attention to assuring that there are
no cross-reference in the text of the argument and the final voting decision. However, it
is still possible that some respondents understood the argument content as one of the
candidate’s position. Second of all, the arguments could have primed the perception
of the participants what the ideological platforms are about. I hope to minimize this
possibility by letting all respondents indicate their attitude towards all three policies.
Nonetheless, the additional time the treatment groups spends to read through the
argument could still prime this group with this policy, when thinking about ideological
platforms. In order to rule out these alternative explanations, I attempt to test the
underlying persuasion mechanism more carefully.
The second hypothesis derived from the model, is that the argument evaluation
should influence the voting decisions in a specific direction. Finding support for this
would underline the persuasion-process. In order to test this hypothesis, I analyze in
how far attitude changes affect the voting decision in the treatment groups. In addition,
I test whether the evaluation of the persuasiveness of the arguemnts has a similar effect.
I calculate three ordered logit models for respondents in any of the treatment groups.
The results are reported in Table 5.1.
Model 1 includes a dummy variable indicating if respondents changed their attitude
as a result of the argument towards a more liberal, or more conservative position. The
effects should go in opposite directions: Voters who change their attitude to be more
conservative should be more likely to vote for the conservative candidate. Although the
estimates reveal this pattern, the uncertainty around the estimates are quite large, such
that it is statistically impossible to distinguish the effect from zero. One reason might be
that respondents did not truly read through the argument. To check for this possibility
I excluded 16 observations, the 10% that took the lowest amount of time to read the
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argument or did not rightfully indicated that the argument is opposed to the policy19.
The results are reported in Model 3. In this, the effect of liberal attitude change has a
substantial effect on the voting decision. Respondents who altered their attitude as a
result of the argument are more likely to vote for the more liberal candidate (with an
predicted probability of 0.66 percent compared to 0.22 percent).
Model 2 estimates the effect a respondent’s evaluation of the argument’s persuasive-
ness has on the voting decision. I include a dummy variable indicating whether a
respondent evaluates the argument positively or negatively. For the positive evaluation
the model estimates a substantial effect on the voting decision. Respondents who
positively evaluated the conservative argument shift their preference in direction of the
conservative candidate. However, for the negative evaluation of the arguments, there is
no substantial effect on the voting decisions.
In all three models, I further control for the respondents’ prior attitudes on the
respective policies. If the alternative priming explanation holds - the prior argument
should have a direct effect on the voting decision. Respondents who are primed with
e.g. illegal immigration and think about illegal immigration when voting for the
candidate should vote for the more conservative candidate if their attitude towards
illegal immigration is negative and vise versa. In all models the prior attitude does not
have a substantial effect. Overall, I find support for the argument that the treatment
effect observed in the experiment are due to persuasion and further mimize the
possibility that the effects origin from priming.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, I showed that political arguments can influence voting behavior. One
political argument is able to influence the state in which a individual feels indifferent
between two policy options. I derived these expectations from the policy belief model
outlined in this dissertation. The model allows arguments to directly influence the
policy beliefs of voters, and as a result the way they decide when facing a choice
between two political candidates. Based on evidence from an experimental study, this
chapter offered support for the idea that political arguments can directly influence
voting decisions.
Political arguments are the instrument of persuasion. Political actors attempt to
change other actors’ beliefs by convincing them of the right or wrong effects of certain
policies. Persuasion attempts and the use of political arguments are omnipresent in
politics: speeches in parliament, televised debates or deliberations among citizens. Most
of them are intended to affect other actors behavior. The most important political act in
representative democracy is voting: Citizens electing representatives, representatives
voting on proposals, and so forth. Explaining if and how political arguments are able
to influence voting behavior can improve our understanding of politics as such.
I built a bridge between formalized models of spatial voting and studies on persuasion.
While arguments are central to the latter, voting is central to others. Combining both
allows to integrate findings from studies on persuasion into a well-studied model of
19The cut-point for excluding respondent is 20 seconds. In a pre-test among Mannheim doctoral students
noone took less than 20 seconds to read the arguments.
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voting and democratic representation. What remains undisclosed in this chapter are the
conditions under which this persuasion attempts by political actors are successful. So far,
the model analyzes the persuasiveness of political arguments as something subjective:
The effect of political arguments depends on the voters’ evaluation. However, studies
of persuasion, framing effects, and processing of political arguments have generated
more fruitful knowledge under which conditions arguments are especially powerful
to influence attitudes. Integrating these findings will be one of the further steps when
developing a model of democratic representation that is able to analyze persuasion
effects.
In the following chapter I study how political candidates can promote their policy
platforms in political campaigns. The underlying mechanism is taken from this chapter.
The fact that citizens’ preferences are persuadable opens the possibility for candidates
to not only inform citizens about their positions but also to persuade them to follow
their policy lead.
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CHAPTER 6
Campaigns with endogenous policy preferences: a
spatial model with persuasion
6.1 Introduction
According to one view of democracy, the key function of electoral campaigns is to
inform citizens about the different candidates’ policy platforms. Following this idea,
the spatial model of politics describes campaigns as a process in which candidates
communicate their policy platform and citizens elect those who best match their
preferences. The common premise of these models is that citizens’ preferences are
exogenous to the electoral process (e.g. Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005), so they
assume that citizens’ preferences are formed prior to the candidates’ campaign strategies
and are not shaped by them. Such a theoretical perspective stands in contrast to
newer research that highlights a candidate-persuasion process by which candidates can
effectively alter citizens’ voting intentions (e.g. Hillygus and Shields, 2014; Huber and
Arceneaux, 2007; Gerber et al., 2011; Lenz, 2013; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000).
One mechanism that can lead citizens to change their voting intention during cam-
paigns, is actually rooted in the spatial model of electoral politics, but has been mostly
ignored by spatial theorists. Models of spatial voting imply that changes in citizens’
policy preferences directly influence voting decisions. Thus, candidates could attempt
to persuade citizens about their campaign platform, so that citizens alter their position
in the direction of the candidate. Changes in policy preference in the direction of
the candidate increase the probability that the persuaded citizens will vote for the
candidate. As intriguing as this perspective might sound, it has not yet been given suf-
ficient attention by spatial models of campaigns. Spatial models generally build on the
premise that citizens’ policy preferences are exogenous, which implies that candidates’
attempts to persuade voters do not affect citizens’ policy orientations. This exogenous
preference assumption precludes us from studying the electoral consequences of the
persuasive effect of electoral campaigns.
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In this chapter, I outline how the policy belief model of this dissertation can be
used to study preferences that are endogenous to a candidate’s campaign platform.
I offer a model that is tailored to a campaign situation in which two candidates not
only announce their policy platforms during the campaign, but further attempt to
persuade voters about their individual positions. During the campaign, a certain
share of the voters is persuaded and will change their preference in the direction of
one candidate. Depending on the percentage of citizens who follow this process, the
electoral consequences may be important. In general, persuaded citizens decrease their
distance to a particular candidate’s policy platform over the course of the campaign,
making it more likely that they will cast their vote for this candidate. If more citizens
who may have been previously undecided between the two candidates platforms, now
follow one candidate’s policy lead, this can systematically affect the outcome of the
election.
The theoretical model increases our ability to make inference about the importance of
a persuasion-process in a particular electoral campaign. Researchers find it challenging
to identify persuasion effects during electoral campaigns, based on survey data, as the
process involves strong heterogeneity and the observable implications are often unclear.
The new theoretical model reveals observable implications, which can be employed to
categorize different types of citizens. Relying on latent class analysis, this approach
permits me to estimate the share of voters who alter their policy preference in the
direction of one of the two candidates.
Furthermore, the empirical model allows us to test a hypothesis about the group
of voters who are likely to be persuaded during the campaign. For the 2008 electoral
campaigns, I find that partisans are especially likely to adjust their policy preference in
accordance with their party’s candidate. In addition, an expectation derived from the
theoretical model is supported: respondents who reveal less consistent policy preference
in survey responses, show a greater reduction in policy-distance to their candidate.
Although this highlights the importance of the individual campaign-persuasion-process,
in the case of the 2008 presidential elections the aggregated effect seems to have been
marginal. For the group of voters, for whom the decrease in distance to a candidate’s
platform means an increase in electoral support, the share of respondents in a McCain
and Obama persuasion-class is balanced. In other words, the candidates persuaded
voters about their policy-orientation, but they persuaded the wrong ones. Namely, those
who were likely to vote for them anyway. Which leads me, at the end of the chapter,
to discuss how these findings can be informative for future candidates’ campaign
strategies.
6.1.1 Exogenous policy preferences and electoral campaigns
Since Downs’s original model, spatial models of the electoral process rely on the
assumption that citizens evaluate candidates on the basis of their exogenous policy-
preference (Downs, 1957). This means that candidates cannot affect a voter’s policy
preference. They have to follow the distribution of voters’ preferences in a given
election, when choosing their policy-platform and informing the general public about
it, during their campaign. What platform they choose does not actually affect voters’
policy positions.
84
CHAPTER 6. ENDOGENOUS POLICY PREFERENCES
The spatial-model perspective on electoral campaigns is in line with long-standing
evidence that campaigns show “minimal effects” on the outcome. Empirical studies
find that the electoral campaign has hardly any influence on the predictions for the
electoral outcome (Finkel, 1993; Gelman and King, 1993). The focus on the aggregated
effect has been challenged in subsequent research (Bartels, 2006; Iyengar and Simon,
2000; Hillygus and Jackman, 2003) as it might be that “highly effective campaign efforts
on both sides may cancel each other out” (Bartels, 2006, p.79). Newer research finds that
campaigns are actually able to persuade voters (Huber and Arceneaux, 2007; Gerber,
Green and Larimer, 2008; Lenz, 2013; Greene, 2011; Brader, 2005), and speculates that
one reason for changes in voting intentions might be a change in policy preference
during the course of the campaign (Huber and Arceneaux, 2007, p.962).
Researchers often questioned the strong assumption of exogenous policy preferences.
Empirical studies concerned with the reciprocal relationship between policy orientation
and partisanship find that partisanship, under specific conditions, alters policy attitudes
(Bartels, 2000; Carsey and Layman, 2006; Milazzo, Adams and Green, 2012). These
findings (although informative for theoretical conceptualization) have not been adapted
to fit into a spatial model in any meaningful way (for an exception see Gerber and
Jackson, 1993; Jackson, 2014). Other empirical studies test if there are significant
changes in citizens’ policy attitudes and often find that citizens alter their preference in
an endogenous way. For example Matsubayashi (2012) recently tested the exogenous
preference assumptions using a quasi-experimental design, and found that incumbents’
positions affect voters’ opinions. These new findings complement many older studies
on endogenous preferences (see e.g. Dunleavy and Ward, 1981; Jacobs and Shapiro,
2000).
Research explicitly concerned with the formation of policy attitudes allows that
campaigns do not only inform, but can also affect citizens’ opinions. Models of
preference formation build on the idea that citizens form their policy-preference by
evaluating political arguments (Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989; Zaller, 1992). Studies
show that this process is affected by the sender of the argument: citizens tend to
accept arguments according to their predisposition and reject those counter to it (Taber
and Lodge, 2006). If policy preferences are not strictly exogenous, and citizens form
preference on the basis of received arguments, candidates can attempt to persuade
voters during the campaign. Persuasion has been studied extensively in political
psychology literature (Mutz, Brody and Sniderman, 1996; Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997;
Druckman, 2004; Arceneaux, 2012; Jerit, 2009).
Brody and Page once argued that persuasion is one potential reason why researchers
identify such a strong correlation between policy-closeness and vote choice (Brody
and Page, 1972). Rather than forming voting decisions on the basis of their exogenous
attitudes, citizens might be persuaded to accept a candidate’s policy attitudes and
then to vote for that candidate (see also Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones,
1979). This line of argument clearly questions the simple chain of command in common
spatial models: it might be that candidates can influence a share of the electorate’s
preferences. In order to gain a better understanding of the electoral consequences,
the next section outlines a model of electoral campaigns in which candidates not only
communicate their position, but also attempt to persuade voters about it.
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6.2 Theory
In the theory section of this chapter, I outline a campaign-persuasion model as the
basis on which I argue that partisans in particular should be likely to alter their policy
beliefs over the course of a campaign. Contrary to classic spatial voting models of
campaigns, in which politicians simply announce their positions, the model presented
here allows candidates to also promote their political platforms. Citizens with a
certain predisposi- tion are likely to be responsive to these offers and alter their policy
beliefs in the direction of the candidate. Successful persuasion attempts can make
citizens’ preferences en- dogenous to a candidate’s campaigned policy platform. First I
describe how voters’ policy beliefs and candidates’ campaigned platforms can result in
persuasion shifts. I show the electoral consequences of this process regarding policy-
distance and voting probabilities. The theoretical section ends with a discussion of
observable implications, concentrating on determinants that make citizens more likely
to be persuaded by a candidate’s platform.
6.2.1 Policy beliefs, candidates’ platforms and persuasion attempts
The foundation of electoral campaigns is persuasion. Campaign advertisements, cam-
paign speeches and public debate aim at persuading voters about political orientations.
To theorize about persuasive effects of political campaigns, a simplified depiction of this
process requires at least two points in time: Before the campaign, and at the end of the
campaign. Prior to an electoral campaign, voters possess policy beliefs about their ideal
policy platform. During the campaign, candidates inform and promote their policy
positions, making an offer to the general public to adapt their own policy platform.
This offer can be seen as a persuasion attempt: Candidates attempt to persuade voters
about their campaigned positions. Persuasion alters a voter’s prior policy beliefs in the
direction of the candidate, resulting in a systematic change when comparing preferences
at the beginning of the campaign with preferences at the end of the campaign. In the
following, I study the consequences of this process in a situation with two candidates
k (1,2), who position themselves on a one-dimensional policy space X ∈ R1, and N
voters (i ∈ (1, . . . , N)). The two points in time are denoted with t ∈ (0, 1).
Policy beliefs and candidates’ platforms
Voters’ prior campaign preferences are represented by policy beliefs about the ideal
policy platform, which shall be denoted as Θi0. Employing the same specification as in
the proceeding chapters, I asuume that these policy beliefs are normally distributed
with a mean belief xi0, and belief variance of σΘi0 . The policy beliefs imply that voters
differ in position (in terms of their mean belief about their ideal policy platform), but
further face varying uncertainty about their ideal-platform (captured by belief variance
σ2Θi0).
Θi0 ∼N
(
xi0, σ2Θi0
)
(6.1)
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I further propose that the candidates’ communicated platforms are perceived by all
voters in a similar way1. One aspect about candidates’ platforms is of importance for the
discussion. Most often, a candidate’s campaigned policy platform is ambiguous; voters
can not perfectly pin down what platform a candidate actually occupies. This can either
be the case because candidates have restricted ability to get their positions across, or
because they blur their positions for strategic reasons. From the perspective of the voter,
this results in uncertainty about the platform a candidate is promoting (Enelow and
Hinich, 1981; Bartels, 1986). To incorporate this in the model, candidates’ platforms Ck
can be modeled by a normal distribution2, which is centered around a mean platform
Ck with a candidate-specific variance τCk . The variance term τCk represents a candidate’s
platform ambiguity. The lower the variance, the clearer a candidate’s promoted position,
the higher the variance, the more ambiguous the platform position.
Ck ∼N (Ck, τCk) (6.2)
The top panel of Figure 6.1 illustrates the situation prior to the campaign, using one
voter and two candidates. The voter’s policy beliefs about her ideal policy platform
are mainly located between the two candidates. Of interest is how this prior campaign
situation changes as a result of the attempt by the two candidates to persuade her.
Persuasion attempts and their consequences
During the campaign, candidates attempt to persuade voters to adapt their campaigned
platform. The effect of such persuasion attempts are fundamentally heterogeneous:
Some voters find a candidate’s platform offers appealing, others do not. I model
this process as a deliberate decision. Each voter decides if she finds any of the two
candidates’ platform-offers persuasive and updates her beliefs accordingly, or decides
to stick to her prior policy beliefs ignoring the candidates’ platform offers. Denote Ki as
the result of this decision: Let Ki = 0 if a voter decides to stick to her prior belief, Ki = 1
if a voter is persuaded by the first candidate’s platform , and Ki = 2 if persuaded by
the second candidate.
If voters find either candidate’s platform persuasive, they alter their prior preference
in direction of the candidate. I assume that this adoption of a candidate’s platform
can be understood in terms of Bayesian learning. Voters update their policy beliefs
given the accepted candidate offer3. Suppose that the voter from the example finds the
1This precludes projection as another process how policy preferences can be endogenous to candidates
platforms: Some voters perceive a candidate to be closer than the candidate actually is (Brody and Page,
1972; Visser, 1994). Although the primary focus of the chapter is on persuasion, there will be more to
say about projection in the empirical section, especially when it comes to differentiating between the two
empirically.
2Because candidates only communicate one platform over the course of the time, this platform does
not depend on time.
3In this I treat the reasons for the persuasion decision as exogenous. This essentially adapts a subjective
Bayesian learning perspective. While this has been criticized by Taber, Cann and Kucsova (2009), at this
stage of the argument I find this perspective appealing, as it permits me to formulate a simple learning
process. Later on, I will discuss who is likely to be persuaded during campaigns and adapt his policy
beliefs in line with the candidates’ platforms
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t=
0
C1 x10 C2
t=
1
C1 x11 C2
Figure 6.1: Policy beliefs, candidates’ platforms and consequences of persuasion attempts
second candidate’s position persuasive and updates her beliefs accordingly. Because
the voter’s prior and the candidate’s position both follow a normal distribution, her
posterior beliefs Θi1 are a mixture between the two normal distributions. The lower
panel of Figure 6.1 shows the posterior beliefs, which are shifted in the direction of the
second candidate.
Of special concern is the persuasion-shift in terms of a voter’s average policy belief.
Given that the voter updates her prior beliefs in accordance with a specific candidate’s
offer, the conditional expectation of the posterior is given by:
E [Θi1 | Ki] = xi1 =

xi0 if Ki = 0
γi1xi0 + (1− γi1)C1 if Ki = 1
γi2xi0 + (1− γi2)C2 if Ki = 2
(6.3)
where the weight γik =
τCk
τCk+σ
2
Θi0
is derived from the posterior beliefs and depends on
each voter’s variance in prior policy belief σ2Θi0 and a candidate’s ambiguity τCk
4.
4For persuaded voters the variance of the policy beliefs can decrease as a result of this learning process
and make them more confident with respect to which platform represents their interest. This can also be
seen in the lower panel of figure 6.1. The posterior policy beliefs have lower variance compared to the
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Two expectations about the size of the shift can be derived from this term. First,
if a candidate’s platform is not ambiguous (where τCk = 0) and a voter accepts the
candidate’s offer Ki = k, the resulting voter’s mean belief is equal to the candidate’s
offer. The more ambiguous a candidate’s platform, the less the expectation is updated
in the direction of the candidate’s mean platform. Second, for voters with larger belief
variance the persuasion shifts should be larger as well. Most interestingly, voters with
no belief variance (who are perfectly certain about their ideal platform σΘ2i0 = 0) being
persuaded does not alter their beliefs at all. This last implication underlines one of the
major points in this dissertation: Standard spatial models, which essentially make this
assumption, do not allow us to study the effect of campaign persuasion.
The expectations from this persuasion shift are essential. Persuaded voters should
shift their prior campaign policy beliefs in the direction of the candidate’s promoted
platform. Conditional on persuasion, the posterior beliefs should lie between the prior
beliefs and the candidate’s platform. Moreover, the size of the persuasion shift depends
on a voter’s variance in policy beliefs σΘ2i0 and the ambiguity of a candidate platform
offer. But what are the electoral consequences of such a persuasion shift? In the next
subsection, I discuss them in terms of policy-distance as well as voting probabilities.
6.2.2 The electoral consequences of persuasion in campaigns
If a sufficient number of voters shift their preference as a result of candidates’ campaigns,
this can affect the outcome of an election. The electoral consequences can be understood
in terms of decreasing policy distance, which directly affect probabilities to vote for a
candidate. As a result of this process, candidates can gain a notable share of votes by
promoting their platform in electoral campaigns.
Decreasing policy-distance
As a result of the outlined persuasion-process, a voter’s distance to any one of the
candidates can be affected. A voter who is not persuaded during the campaign has the
same policy distance prior to the campaign, those who are persuaded by one of the
candidates have a smaller policy distance to one of the candidates after the campaign.
For a voter with prior preferences between the two candidates, being persuaded by
one of the candidates decreases policy distance to this candidate, and increases the
distance to the other candidate. For persuaded voters who possessed more extreme
prior preferences, (than one of the candidates) the policy distance can decrease towards
both candidates.
I now analyze how distance to the two candidates should evolve for voters who are
persuaded, and those who are not. Policy-distance can be calculated as the quadratic
loss of a voter’s mean belief xit to a candidate’s mean platform Ck. Voters’ policy
distance to candidate k at the end of the campaign is given by −(xi1 − Ck)2. To
understand the evolution over the campaign period, I formulate this end-of-campaign
distance as a function of the prior campaign distance. The functional relationship
prior. The potential decrease in variance directly follows from the Bayesian learning mechanism, based on
normal distributions, where the posterior variance is given by: Var [Θi1] = 11
σ
Θ2i0
+ 1τCk
.
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between the distance to the first candidate, conditional on the persuasion process Ki, is
given by5:.
−(xi1 − C1)2 =
 −(xi0 − C1)
2 if Ki = 0
−γ2i1(xi0 − C1)2 if Ki = 1
−γ2i2(xi0 − C2)2 + 2γi2(C1 − C2)(xi0 − C2)− (C1 − C2)2 if Ki = 2
(6.4)
The equation shows the three cases of how policy distance to the first candidate can
evolve over the course of the campaign. First, for an individual who is not persuaded
(Ki = 0), the distance to candidate one actually stays the same. In this case, the
campaign has no effect on the policy distance. Second, if a voter is persuaded by the
first candidate (Ki = 1), distance decreases to this candidate. The decrease in distance
depends on the strength of the persuasion-shift in the direction of the candidate. If
γi1 is 0 (which from equation 6.3 implies that a voter’s posterior mean belief equals
the candidate’s position) independent of the prior distance, the distance at the end of
the campaign will be zero. If shifts are minor γi1 > 0 the distance will shrink by γ2i1.
Third, if a voter is persuaded by the second candidate’s platform Ki = 2, distance to the
first candidate is also affected. The term is slightly more complicated, but essentially
the resulting distance depends on a voter’s prior position. If a voter is more extreme
than the second candidate, distance can decrease to both candidates, if a voter’s prior
belief lie in between the two candidates, distance decreases to the second candidate
and increases to the first candidate. The inverse pattern holds for the distance to the
second candidate. For both candidates, systematic changes in policy-distance influence
the voting decision. In the following I illustrate this effect more closely.
Decreasing voting probabilities
A key insight of spatial voting models exposes the electoral consequences of the
persuasion-process. A change in police distance directly affects voting behavior. Because
persuaded voters alter their position in direction of one of the candidates, depending on
their prior position, they should be more or less likely to vote for one of the candidates
due to the persuasion process.
A spatial vote choice model illustrates these electoral effects. Suppose that voters
make voting decisions solely based on policy distance. Employing a logit specification
to model the probability that a voter casts her vote to candidate two Pr(yi0 = 2) prior
to the campaign (where yi0 shall be defined as the intended vote choice before the
campaign, and yi1 at the end of the campaign). The probability is affected by the
difference in distance6 to the two candidates: Pr(yi0 = 2) = 11+exp(β[−(xi0−C2)2+(xi0−C1)2)] .
The difference of this prior voting probability, compared to the end of the campaign
probability Pr(yi1 = 2) − Pr(yi0 = 2), reveals the electoral consequences. The first
5The full theoretical model development is presented in Appendix C.1
6Difference in distance naturally results from a utility-maximizing framework, in which voters compare
the expected utility for the two candidates. This was more formally derived in the previous chapters, see
e.g. Equation 4.6
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Figure 6.2: Difference in voting probabilities for candidate one, before the campaign minus at
the end of the campaign. For a voter persuaded by candidate two.
difference shows whether a voter is more or less likely to vote for the candidate as a
result of the persuasion process7.
For illustration, we can analyze how a voter, who is attracted by the second candidate
platform (Kk = 2), changes her predicted probability over the campaign. Figure 6.2
shows the difference in predicted probability for voters with different prior mean beliefs
xi0. In the scenario, the two candidates take on the same positions as in Figure 6.1. I
further assume the same persuasion shift of γi2 = 0.5 as in the illustration. The first
aspect to note, is that the highest increase is found among voters that have prior mean
policy beliefs, between the mid-point of the two candidates and candidate one. To
understand this correctly, if candidate two manages to persuade voters with prior beliefs
closer to candidate one, their probability to vote for candidate two will increase over
the course of the campaign. In our example, the increase can be around 0.6 percentage
points. Of further interest is the decrease in first difference in predicted probability
for voters with prior beliefs more extreme than candidate two. Due to the persuasion
process these voters become less extreme. Based on the quadratic loss-function, the
decrease to candidate one is stronger, compared to candidate two. This increases their
probability to vote for candidate one, although they are persuaded by candidate two.
In our case, the decrease is of such small margins that it can be disregarded.
Overall, from Illustration 6.2 it should be apparent that for the candidates there is
much to gain through the outlined persuasion process. If a candidate manages to
persuade voters close to the other candidate’s platform, he can heavily increase his
7This set-up can be used to derive general conditions under which the difference voting probabilities
is especially important. I decided to stick to an illustrative example, as the key insights from such an
exercise will be fairly similar.
91
6.2. THEORY
expected vote share from among this group. On the other hand, there is essentially
nothing to lose. If they persuade voters more extreme than their platform, this slightly
increases the chances that these citizens will vote for the other candidate, however
losses in predicted probability are minor. Of course, the illustration depends on a set
of parameters8, but the key insight can formulated without them. Only if a candidate
manages to persuade voters that are closer to the other candidate’s platform are large
margins to be gained. This is a most important point as it leads to the question: which
voters are likely to be persuaded by the candidates. I address this question in the next
subsection outlining hypotheses about the persuasion process.
6.2.3 Implications: Who can be persuaded? And how strongly?
Which voters are persuadable? And how strongly do they decrease their distance to a
candidate over the course of a campaign? Two sources of determinants are important to
explain the outlined persuasion process. On the one hand, individual predispositions,
such as the general tendency towards a political party, potentially play a significant role.
On the other hand, the structure of citizens’ policy beliefs is an important factor for the
persuasion process. Essentially, the determinants should be incorporated differently
within the outlined model framework. While predispositions affect the likelihood that a
voter is persuaded by one of the candidates (the probability being of class Ki), variance
in policy beliefs impacts the shift size over the cause of the campaign (γik).
Individual predispositions have been found to affect many aspects of political behav-
ior, but are especially known to impact information processing. Since the ”American
Voter” (Campbell et al., 1960), theories of political behavior have reserved a central
role for partisanship.. Partisanship as the ”unmoved mover” is theorized to anchor
political perceptions, the evaluation of arguments, and platforms. Recently, Greene
(2011) showed that partisanship strongly influences campaign effects. Lenz (2013)
argues that partisans are not only informed by their party’s communication but also
adjust their policy-orientation to match their party. Building on a field experiment,
Gerber, Huber and Washington (2010) underline the active force partisanship plays
in anchoring perceptions of the political world and shaping attitudes. Following this
behavioral tradition, I argue that voters who identify with a specific party alter their
distance during the campaign as they are more likely to be persuaded by their party’s
candidate9.
H 1 Voters who identify with a political party are more likely to be persuaded by their party’s
candidate.
8Such as the importance of policy-distance in voting decisions (which implicitly has been set to 1 in
our example). Moreover, the persuasion shift is of importance to determine the margins of changes in
predicted probability. Additionally, the distance between the candidates’ platforms affects the expectation.
9Of course, there are further predispositions that can affect an individual’s likelihood of being per-
suaded by a specific candidate. One could, for example argue that prior policy beliefs affect the process.
Liberal voters are more likely to alter their policy beliefs towards the liberal candidate compared to a
conservative candidate. The sociological background might affect the probability of being persuaded as
well: Sharing a common background with a candidate influences the probability. Although these are
important aspects, the focus of this chapter is on candidate’s party identification.
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The strength of the persuasion shifts will depend on each voter’s structure of political
preferences. As discussed above, the theory expected persuaded citizens with larger
variance in policy beliefs, to show stronger shifts. This argumentation directly follows
from Equation 6.3, in which γik depends on a voter’s variance in beliefs. Voters who are
uncertain about their ideal-platform can be shifted more strongly, compared to those
that are certain10. This argumentation can be summarized in the following hypothesis:
H 2 For persuaded voters, larger variance in policy belief has a positive effect on the persuasion-
shift.
Empirical tests of the outlined process and the two hypotheses involve a strong focus
on heterogeneity in observed outcomes. The process calls for campaign-panel data, in
which at least two waves of measurements for policy attitudes help to identify changes
of policy-distance and the strength of these changes. The methodological challenge to
identify the different patterns is addressed in the following sections.
6.3 Empirics
In the following analysis, I generate estimates for the campaign-persuasion model
outlined in the theory section. I use data from the American National Election Panel
Study that covers the 2008 presidential election. The dataset contains measurements
of respondents’ attitudes about policy issues at the end of the campaign and before
the presidential campaign started. On the basis of this data, implications derived from
the theory allow me to estimate the share of voters who shift their preference in the
direction of Obama’s or McCain’s campaigned platform. Building on a latent class
model, I show that the probability of a persuasion-shift depends on a respondent’s party
identification: Democrats were more likely to adopt Obama’s platform. Republicans
were more likely to change their policy beliefs in McCain’s direction. Moreover, the
size of the shift depends on a respondent’s structure in policy beliefs. The model shows
that citizens with wider policy belief variance have substantially larger shifts.
6.3.1 Data from the U.S. presidential election 2008
The U.S. presidential election of 2008 constitutes an ideal case to obtain estimates for
the campaign-persuasion model and test the outlined hypotheses. After George W.
Bush’s second term, both the Democratic, as well as the Republican Party went through
a process to find their presidential nominee. While McCain secured the Republican
nomination by March, it took until the beginning of June 2008 for Barack Obama to
win the nomination of the Democratic party. The fact that at the beginning of the year
the nomination was uncertain excludes the possibility that partisans already gathered
around their candidate’s platform, as one might could expect from a situation in which
the president is up for re-election and simply re-announces her positions. Hence, the
10The persuasion-shift is further affected by the ambiguity of a candidate’s campaigned platform. The
clearer a candidate’s platform is formulated, the stronger persuaded voters alter their beliefs in the
candidate’s direction. Because I will not be able to test this implication with the data used in this chapter,
I will not follow this argumentation further.
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data gets us close to the theoretical situation depicted prior to the campaign, in which
both candidates’ platforms are unknown and are announced once the campaign started.
The election itself took place on the fourth of November 2008.
An additional aspect that makes the US presidential election of 2008 a valuable case is
the availability of panel data for the campaign period. The 2008-2009 Panel Study of the
American National Election Study covers the entire campaign period and the first year
of the Obama presidency, starting in January 2008 until September 2009. Measurements
of policy preference from at least two points in time during the electoral campaign,
are necessary to obtain estimates for the campaign-persuasion model. The panel-
survey contains appropriate measurements, as it includes the same set of eight policy
issues question in the January wave and the wave prior to the campaign in October
200811. The issue questions are concerned with “Gay marriage”, “Taxation”, “Health
care”, “Terrorism”and “Immigration”12. Respondents expressed their attitude towards
these issues on a seven-point scale, ranging from “strongly opposed” to “strongly in
favor”. For the purpose of the analysis, it makes sense to only include respondents
that answered at least one attitude question in both waves. Only a portion of the
respondents was sampled to answer the battery of policy issues in both panel waves,
which leaves us with 357 observations. The answering pattern of these respondents
for both waves are presented in Figure 6.3. Many respondents show strong attitudes
towards the issues. For example, the modal attitude for raising taxes on incomes over
200k a year is in both waves strongly in favor. The attitude patterns do not show strong
aggregated shifts in any direction between the two waves.
In the October wave, respondents also placed Obama and McCain on the same eight
policy-issues. In the following, I will rely on this information to construct the two
candidates’ policy platforms. Figure 6.3 further shows the average placements for
Obama (straight line) and McCain (dotted line). On issues concerning taxes and health
care, the two candidates possess clearly different perceived positions. On the other
issues the difference between the two is less distinct. What can not be observed is any
trend towards the candidates’ positions. This is not surprising, as campaign effects are
fundamentally heterogeneous, in a way that a stable distribution of attitudes yields
little insights about individual attitude changes.
I employ factor analytical methods to obtain measurements of citizens’ policy prefer-
ences that correspond to the outlined theoretical model 13. For the eight policy-issues, I
11Unfortunately, the three panel waves in between do not include the same policy-questions. Moreover,
two of the three were conducted in February and March which is before the campaign started. As a result,
only the two mentioned are of relevance for the analysis.
12The eight issues are the same employed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The wording can be seen in
Figure 6.3.
13Measurement of citizens’ policy preferences and candidates’ platforms is a widely discussed topic
in the political science literature (see e.g. Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008). Most often, tests of
spatial voting theory rely on liberal-conservative self-placements as well as candidate-placements on the
same scale, to approximate the theoretical concepts (see e.g. Kedar, 2005; Lewis and King, 1999). In the
application here, this measurement can be problematic for two specific reasons. First of all, single-item
measurements will result in large measurement error, which is of special concern when comparing
policy-changes. Second of all, projection and scale-perception might affect the classification. Respondents
have different perceptions of the standard issue scales (Hare et al., 2014), which makes comparisons
of changes over time to a fixed candidate platform especially challenging. Additionally, placements of
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of policy attitudes
calculate a one dimensional explanatory factor model, obtaining factor scores for both
panel waves14. The one-dimensional model has a reasonable fit (RMSE 0.09 for the
January Wave, 0.06 for the October wave). The factor scores approximate a citizen’s
mean policy belief from the theoretical specification (which are denoted with xit). I
recoded the resulting factor-scores to facilitate our understanding, such that higher val-
ues indicate more conservative positions. The distribution for both waves are depicted
in Figure 6.4. Both distributions have a similar shape, except for the higher density
around zero in the January wave.
Relying on the factor loadings further permits me to calculate measurements of
both Obama’s and McCain’s campaigned platform. Based on the perception of each
candidate’s policy positions in the October wave, policy platforms can be constructed
by projecting candidates on the same dimension as the respondents. To approximate
candidates’ platforms, I rely on the average factor scores for Obama (C1) and McCain
(C2). While the average score for Obama is at -0.54, the average score for McCain is at
0.9115 The mean platforms are depicted in the panel on the right hand side of Figure 6.4,
candidates are issued to projection bias (Grynaviski, 2006; Krosnick, 1990). Projection should result in
an adjusted perception of the candidates’ platforms over the campaign. To the contrary, a persuasion
process results in a changing in preferences(Visser, 1994). The aggregation of multiple policy-issues based
on factor analytical models, and the use of mean candidate platforms, should help to overcome the two
issues.
14For a description of the factor model please see Appendix C.2
15I employ respondent’s mean platform perception instead of individual perceptions, to mirror the
conceptualization of the theoretical model, in which all voters perceive candidates’ platforms in a similar
way. Relying on the mean platform further minimizes projection bias (Grynaviski, 2006). Projection is
another mechanism of how voters preference can be endogenous to a candidate’s campaigned platform.
Voters perceive one candidate as being closer than this candidate actually is to themselves. Using mean
platforms precludes this psychological effect.
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of citizens’ mean policy beliefs and candidates’ platform
where again Obama is shown with a straight, and McCain with a dotted line. Based on
these distributions in Figure 6.4, one can not infer to what extent a voter’s preference
evolved according to the theoretical specification.
Closely following the implications of the theoretical model reveals the persuasion
effect of the campaign and is a test of the first hypothesis. For respondents with a
certain predisposition, the distance to a candidate should be smaller after the campaign,
when compared to before the campaign. To analyze this, I calculate the quadratic
distance for both time points, using a respondent’s prior campaign preference and
end-of-campaign preference, and the two candidates’ platforms. Figure 6.5 shows the
difference in distance for different partisan groups. Using a standard seven-point scale
on which respondents could indicate if they perceive themselves as strong Democrats,
strong Republicans or as Independents, I would expect that a certain share of the
partisans are more likely to be persuaded, and as a result decrease their distance to
their candidate over the course of the campaign. The box-plots for Obama (to the left)
show that the variance in distance-difference for Democrats is generally smaller, when
compared to Republicans. One can further observe that for democratic partisans, the
median in all three groups is around or below zero, while for Republicans the median
values are clearly above zero. This implies that a higher share of Democrats decreased
their distance to Obama, when compared to Republicans. A similar pattern can be
observed for the difference in distance to McCain. Although this supports the theoretical
expectation, it also highlights the strong heterogeneity within the groups, for which I
would expect a clear shift towards the candidate. For example, 50 percent of strong
democratic partisans even increase their distance to Obama. This finding highlights the
importance of developing an empirical specification that takes the heterogeneity of this
process sufficiently into account.
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Figure 6.5: Difference in distance to Obama and McCain before and after campaign by different
levels of party identification
In order to test the second implication of the theoretical model, which is that voters
with higher variance in policy beliefs show stronger shifts as a result of campaign-
persuasion, an appropriate measurement of respondents variance in policy beliefs is
needed. I employ the same measurement as discussed in Chapter 4. The intuition
behind this measurement is that an increasing belief variance should result in additional
error when estimating the relationship between answering patterns for concrete policy
proposals and underlying platforms. I estimate the varying randomness as a respon-
dent’s average sum of squared errors from separate regressions of each respondent’s
liberal-conservative self-placement on the eight different policy attitudes16. Based on
the results, I calculate the average sum of squared residuals for each respondent to
approximate the belief variance. Higher values indicate a higher belief variance, while
lower values indicate more precise beliefs. The values I obtain for the October wave
vary from close to zero to just above ten17
6.3.2 A latent class model to estimate persuasion-processes
Based on the estimates of citizens’ preferences and Obama’s and McCain’s policy
platform, I formulate a latent class model to estimate the persuasion-process of electoral
campaigns. Generally, identifying persuasion processes from observable data with two
opposing sources is challenging. The major challenge is the strong heterogeneity of
this process: While some citizens are persuaded in one direction, others are persuaded
16The measurement can be derived more formally relying on a linear item response model that uses
self-placements as a measurement of the latent trait. For a detailed discussion of this measurement I
would like to refer the reader to Chapter 4.3.2 The results from the auxiliary regression are reported in
Appendix A.2.
17For descriptives of covariates used in this chapter, please see Appendix C.3.
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in the opposite direction. With equal shares in both of these groups, researchers will
observe no average effect of persuasion during campaigns. Because of this, researchers
have turned to experimental designs to identify persuasion processes. Studies in
political psychology have showed that individual preferences can be shaped under
different circumstances (Mutz, Brody and Sniderman, 1996; Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997;
Druckman, 2004; Arceneaux, 2012; Jerit, 2009). This, however, does not permit any
inference about the persuasion-effect in a particular electoral campaign. Only recently
have studies started to employ natural variation to identify the persuasive effects of
campaigns and party position-taking (see e.g. Huber and Arceneaux, 2007; Lenz, 2013).
This approach does not permit researchers to analyze any particular campaign, as the
applicability is limited to situations in which natural variation exists.
My research design relies on the observable implication of the outlined campaign-
persuasion model. Building on latent class models, I am able to estimate the share of
voters that are not persuaded by any of the candidates, when compared to the share
that alter their preferences in accordance with the persuasion models, in the direction
of one of the candidates18. This variation permits me to identify the importance of
persuasion processes in a specific electoral campaign. For citizens’ preferences prior
and at the end of the campaign, I calculate the quadratic distance of voters’ preferences
to the two candidates’ platforms. For both, I employ the estimates from factor models
discussed above. The distance at the end of the campaign is modeled conditionally
on the latent class of each respondent: Either a respondent is persuaded by one of the
candidates, or sticks with his or her prior distance. In the following, I outline how this
class-assignment can be estimated as a function of covariates.
The empirical expectations can be formulated similar to the theoretical expectations
of the persuasion process in Equation 6.4. The three classes of voters correspond
to three empirical models that relate prior campaign distance to end-of-campaign
distance. First, for respondents with exogenous preferences (who are not persuaded)
Ki = 0, quadratic distance −(xi1 − Ck)2 of respondent i at end of the campaign t = 1
to candidate k should be centered around the prior distance −(xi0 − Ck)2. While this
systematic component comes from the theoretical model, in the empirical specification
the observed distance is described by additional random error eij ∼ N(0, σ2). Second,
if a respondent is persuaded by a candidate him-or herself, Ki = k distance should
systematically be lowered by a factor of γ2ik. Again, the observed distance is influenced
by an additional random error 19 eij ∼ N(0, σ2). And finally, for a respondent who is
persuaded by the other candidate q (where q 6= k), the expected distance at the end of
the campaign to candidate k depends on the respondent’s prior preference according
to the equation. The complete model can be expressed as:
18For a comprehensive overview of latent class models please see Hagenaars and McCutcheon (2002).
Within the political science literature, this class of statistical models has recently been discussed by Imai
and Tingley (2012).
19I assume that the error-variance is the same for the three models. This assumption is necessary so as
to assure that different class assignments do not simply capture respondents whose distance-decrease
is explained by a higher error-variance. The assumption is plausible as the measurement model should
generate the same error variance in citizens’ policy preferences and candidates’ platforms independent of
their class.
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−(xi1 − Ck)2 =

−(xi0 − Ck)2 + eij if Ki = 0
−γ2ik(xi0 − Ck)2 + eij if Ki = k
−γ2iq(xi0 − Ck)2 − (Cq − Ck)2 + 2γik(Ck − Cq)(xi0 − Cq) + eij if Ki = q
(6.5)
One challenge that arises in using measured policy preferences to cluster respondents
in the different persuasion classes is the measurement error. It might be that the
underlying preferences (and thereby distance) remain stable between two points in
time, but researchers take any observed shift in the direction of one of the candidates
(that is actually due to measurement error) as an indication for persuasion, leading
them to misclassifying this respondent. One aspect about measurement error might
be helpful in this regard: It should be unrelated to other political attributes of the
respondent. For example, if a decrease in distance to a candidate is more likely for
partisans than non-partisans, the results are unlikely to be driven by measurement
error alone. In this, the theoretical argumentation relating to how predispositions affect
the likelihood of being persuaded cannot only be tested, but can also help to further
identify the empirical patterns.
Accordingly, I model the class membership Ki as a function of a respondent’s parti-
sanship. Let us denote the first class as those being persuaded by Obama’s platform
k = 1, and the second by McCain k = 2. The probability of being part of a specific
class is modeled using a multinomial logit formalization. This allows us to meet the
constraint that each respondent’s probability of being in either of three classes add up
to one. I rely on the partisanship question asked in the wave before the campaign. For
the analysis, the values are recoded such that negative values indicate partisanship with
the Democratic party, and positive values with the Republican party. Values of zero
describe independent respondents. Let us denote Pr(Ki = K) = pii to be the probability
that voter i is in class K ∈ (0, 1, 2) and pidi as a voter’s party identification.
Pr(Ki = K) = pii0 =
exp[µiK]
∑Kk=1 exp[µiK]
(6.6)
where µiK describes a linear propensity to be part of class K. The equation maps this
to the probabilities of being in a specific class. In order to identify the model, I set
the linear propensity of being not persuaded (µi0) to zero. In a next step, I model the
linear propensity of being persuaded by Obama µi1 or McCain µi2 as a linear function
of partisanship.
µi1 = δ1 + δ3 pidi (6.7)
µi2 = δ2 + δ4 pidi (6.8)
Given estimates of the δ’s, the above allows to calculate the probability that a respon-
dent shifts her preference according to the a specific persuasion-model. The hypothesis
expects a negative effect of partisanship on the latent propensity to be persuaded
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by Obama’s platform δ3, and a positive effect on the McCain’s platform δ4. Since
each respondent can only be part of one class, class membership itself is distributed
according to a categorical distribution.
Ki ∼ Cat(pii0,pii1,pii2) (6.9)
While Ki is the latent class of a respondent, piiK represents the probability that a
respondent is of class Ki. Where piiK is determined given the parameter estimates of
δ1− δ3, Ki can still vary for two individuals with the same partisanship. In the Bayesian
estimation framework I will pursue in this chapter, class membership is drawn at each
iteration of the sampling procedure. At each iteration the class-assignment conditions
the observations used to estimate the parameters in Equation 6.5 that describe the
persuasion-shift.
The second hypothesis from the theory section argued that respondents with higher
belief variance should show stronger persuasion-shifts. The persuasion-shifts are
represented by γik. The variance in beliefs measurement discussed above is used to
test this argument. In addition, we can derive the hypothesis that candidate platform
ambiguity affects the persuasion-shift. Although the data at hand does not permit me
to relate the size of the persuasion-shift to a candidate’s platform ambiguity (since there
are only two), I can allow for varying shifts by each candidate. Therefore, to model γik
as a function of campaign belief variance, I employ a logit link to meet the theoretical
constraint that the parameter should be constrained between 0 and 1.
γik =
1
1+ exp(−ζ j − ζ3σ2Θi)
(6.10)
If the argumentation holds, I should estimate a negative effect of increasing variance
in beliefs. A higher belief variance σ2Θi should result in lower mixing parameters, which
would indicate that the persuasion-shifts are larger for those respondents.
In the following, I estimate three models, slowly building up the complete specifi-
cation. As a baseline model, I put informative beta priors on the two separate γ’s to
meet the constraint (between 0 and 1) and avoid identification problem with γ close
to 120. I choose beta-priors located around 0.5 (γk ∼ Beta(10, 10)). In this model, I do
not include an effect of partisanship on the class-assignment probabilities. Instead, I
only include different constants. In a second model, I include the effect of partisan-
ship on class-assignment as outlined above. In a third model, I additionally model the
persuasion-shift as a function of belief variance. I use informative priors for the constant
terms ζ j ∼ N(0, 1), and uninformative priors for the effect parameter ζ3 ∼ N(0, 10) and
ζ4 ∼ N(0, 10). In all models, I choose uninformative priors for the δ’s, uninformative
gamma priors for the two variance terms σj. For the ζ’s MCMC Sampling is used to
obtain draws from the posterior of the model. The model seems to converge quickly.
20If γk = 1 there is no difference between the three classes, as there is no persuasion-shift.
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Figure 6.6: Parameter estimates latent class models
Using 2 chains for 32000 iterations discarding the first 30000 as burn-in, I find no sign
of dis-converging using standard diagnostic techniques21. The model is implemented
in JAGS 3.0.1. The next section describes the results from the model.
6.3.3 Results and the electoral consequences
The results confirm the importance of the outlined campaign-persuasion model. I find
support for the hypotheses discussed in the theory section. Respondents with a party
identification are likely to alter their policy-distance in line with their party’s candidate.
For both Obama and McCain, the average probability that a respondent will adjust her
prior-campaign preference increases according to her respective partisanship for either
the Democrats or the Republicans. Modeling the heterogeneity in persuasion-shifts
reveals further interesting patterns. For respondents who show stronger variance
in policy beliefs, the persuasion-shifts over the entire campaign are estimated to
be substantially larger. However, after analyzing the shares of voters that follow
implications from the persuasion-models in the 2008 presidential election, I conclude
that the individual effects of persuasion (on aggregate) level out. Among respondents
for whom persuasion would make a difference (in terms of voting-probabilities) there
are equal shares of those persuaded to shift their position in either the direction of
Obama or McCain.
The parameter estimates are shown in the Figure 6.6. The figure presents median
estimates, as well as, 95% and 99% Bayesian credible intervals for the three model
21I checked convergence using (Heidelberger and Welch, 1981) half-width test as well as the Gelman-
Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992)
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Figure 6.7: Probabilities to be assigned to the different classes by Partisanship
specifications. The first column shows estimates from the baseline model. The mean
estimate of the constant for Obama δ1 has about the same value compared to McCain
δ2. The negative values (and the fact that the credible intervals do not include zero)
show that the average size of the class with exogenous preferences is estimated to
be substantially large (mean estimate around 55%). On average, less than half of the
respondents are likely to shift their preference according to the persuasion-process.
The mean estimates for the two mixing parameters γ1 and γ2 are both located slightly
below 0.5 (for γ1 0.34, for γ2 it is 0.47). This indicates that the small share who are
persuaded, alter their policy preference to lie close to their candidate. Results from the
model, that includes the effect of partisanship are found in the second column. That
δ3 is negative shows that respondents who identified with the Democrats are more
likely to adjust their preference in direction of Obama. That δ4 is positive reveals that
the opposite holds true for Republicans. They are more likely to be in the McCain’s
persuasion group. In this model, the negative mean estimates for the δ1 and δ2 imply
that independents (partisanship value of 0), are most likely to show exogenous policy
preference.
The parameter estimates obtained from the second model confirm the first hypothesis.
This can be seen more directly by calculating the class-assignment probabilities for
different levels of partisanships, depicted in Figure 6.7. The estimates show similar
patterns for Democrats and Republicans. The chance that policy-distance follows
the implications of the persuasion model increases with stronger partisanship. For
respondents with strong democratic identification, the mean probability to alter their
distance towards Obama is 0.51. This probability steadily decreases with decreasing
democratic partisanship. The reverse pattern can be found for the probability to be
part of the McCain persuasion-class. Republicans are substantially more likely to be
characterized by this model when compared to Democrats. The pattern for exogenous
preferences (policy-distance stays stable) fits the the Independents. Over the full
range of partisanship, the probability never falls significantly below 0.5, but is highest
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Figure 6.8: Size of persuasion shift for different levels of inconsistency
among Independents. This indicates that the majority of respondents show exogenous
preferences. Still, the pattern confirms the hypothesis that among partisans, there is a
significantly larger share that follow implications derived from the campaign-persuasion
model.
I also find support for the second hypothesis. The third column of Figure 6.6 shows
the estimates that model the heterogeneity in persuasion-shifts γk. The effect of variance
in policy beliefs is captured by ζ3. The negative mean estimate as well as the credible
intervals confirm the expectation: Persuaded respondents with higher variance in
beliefs, are characterized by stronger shifts towards the candidate. In particular, the
difference in the estimates for the constants is striking. While the estimate for the
Obama-class ζ1 is negative, the constant for McCain ζ2 is positive. In theoretical terms
this implies that those who were persuaded by Obama showed stronger persuasion-
shifts when compared to those who were persuaded by McCain. Figure 6.8 shows the
persuasion-shift at different levels of belief variance. Among persuaded voters who
are quite certain about their ideal-policy platform (low belief variance), the γk’s are
substantially higher, revealing a lower decrease in policy-distance over the campaign.
The size of the policy-decrease increases with wider belief variance, such that for high
values the shift is basically zero. This implies that all respondents in this class alter
their preferences to exactly match the candidate’s platform. For those persuaded by
Obama, the persuasion-shifts are generally at a low level, ranging from to 0.29 to 0.01.
For McCain respondents for low belief variance the shift is estimated to minor (0.89),
with high levels the shift is almost perfect (0.078). Theoretically, the difference could be
explained by clearer position-taking by Obama during the campaign.
To understand the electoral consequences of the outlined process, the prior-campaign
preference of the respondents is of importance: Only if candidates manage to persuade
a large share of voters during their campaigned platforms can they substantially
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Figure 6.9: Distribution of share of class-assignment by prior-campaign platform
increase their expected vote share. In the example in the theory chapter22, the highest
increase for a candidate is obtained from persuaded voters between mid-point of the
two platforms and the other candidate’s platform. No electoral-advantage is obtained
by persuading voters more extreme than the own position. Based on the estimates of
Ki, I can analyze the share of class assignments. For each respondent, I take the share
of class-assignments to Obama minus McCain and plot the distribution over different
prior campaign positions: for respondents more extreme than Obama, for respondents
in between the two candidates, those closer to Obama and closer to McCain (cut point
middle position between the candidates), and for respondents who are more extreme
than McCain. Figure 6.9 shows the distribution of difference in class-shares for the
four groups. Respondents more extreme than the candidates are likely to be of this
candidate’s persuasion-class. In between the candidates, the shares are about the same
size. Following the theoretical considerations, this highlights that the potential increases
in electoral support due to the persuasion-process are likely to even out. Because the
two candidates persuaded an equal share of respondents.
To summarize: From the outlined model I obtained estimates that stress the impor-
tance of an individual persuasion process in campaigns. In the theory section I argued
that for candidates there is the chance of electoral support being gained from this
process. The empirical examination, however, highlights that the electoral consequences
in the case of the 2008 presidential elections might be ignorable. For groups where
an increase of voting prob- abilities is the highest, the share of voters that follow
implications from the persuasion model are about the same for both candidates. This is
not to say that the persuasion process is of smaller importance for electoral campaigns.
Indeed, respondents shifted their policy beliefs according to the theoretical expectations.
This simply means that it seems as if McCain and Obama persuaded those voter groups
22The estimates obtained from the data-set are comparable to the illustrative example, as the estimated
shift-size (from Model 1 and 2) is close to the one used in the illustrative example of the theory chapter.
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from whom they could not expect to gain large margins of vote share. This is not to say
that this pattern holds for all elections, and subsequent research can use this method to
identify elections in which this process yields a considerable electoral advantage. In
the next subsection, I discuss the robustness of the results.
6.3.4 Robustness checks
In this subsection, I describe robustness checks I conducted to assure the validity of the
conclusions drawn in the previous section. There are valid concerns about using the
outlined method to make inferences about changes in policy-distance.
Among the most important concerns is measurement error in policy preferences.
Despite the fact that, as argued, measurement error should be unrelated to covariates of
the respondents, there is one good reason why the model results might still be spurious.
Respondents with extreme factor scores in the first wave are likely to have lower factor
scores in the next wave. This revision to the mean effect for factor scores evolves
because measurement on the seven-point attitude-scales are truncated. Measurement
error cannot increase the score of a respondent who answered extreme attitudes on
all issues, but can easily decrease it. This effect becomes a problem as the covariate
that should explain these shifts is related to the strength of attitudes. Partisans are
generally more likely to respond with strong attitudes. Figure 6.9 highlights why this
challenges the results: Class assignment to persuasion-groups is especially high among
respondents with extreme prior-campaign positions. For this group, a shift towards the
candidate is more likely than a shift towards more extreme values, which can obviously
drive the complete results. I employ two robustness checks to investigate this possibility.
First, I rerun the analyses on a subsample of respondents who find their prior campaign
preference in between the two candidates. For this group, the reasoning above does not
apply. I find a similar pattern for this subgroup. Partisanship increases the probability
of a persuasion-shift in the direction of the candidate. Second, I analyze the effect of
partisanship controlling for prior-campaign preference. The effects are unchanged by
this. For a discussion of these results see Appendix C.4.1.
On a more general note, I investigate the effect that measurement error has on the
model results. For this, I take the dataset at hand and add random noise to the factor
scores in the October Wave, increasing the variance of this additional measurement
error. With increasing measurement error, I no longer find support for the effect of
partisanship on class-assignment. This emphasizes that measurement error can cause
class assignments to be independent of partisanship and leads to the conclusion that the
results I find are unlikely to be generated by mere measurement error. For a description
of the set-up and results please see Appendix C.4.2.
An additional concern addresses the measurement of the candidates’ platforms.
One can question if the results are due to the fact that the measurement captures the
orientation towards actual candidates platforms, or if they are an artefact in a way that
other values would yield similar results. In Appendix C.4.3, I approach this question
using placebo-treatments, by moving candidate platforms around. The results confirm
that the estimate truly capture partisans oriented towards the platform. For example,
an interesting placebo-effect is also found in making the platforms less extreme, by
moving one candidate towards the other candidate. From a certain point onwards,I
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find no significant effect of partisanship anymore. In general, the effect of partisanship
on class-assignment is among the strongest for the platform in the original dataset.
Of further interest is the comparison of the model - that allows for heterogeneity in
distance development over the campaign - to one that assumes that distance evolves
homogeneous between the two time-points. Using posterior predictive measures, I
show that my model yields a better fit in explaining the standard deviation in policy-
distance at the end of the campaign using the prior campaign distance. This confirms
that the model is able capture important heterogeneity in the development of policy
distance that a standard model is not able to reveal. For details I would like to refer the
reader to Appendix C.4.4.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have discussed the importance of persuasion-processes in electoral
campaigns. Despite long-standing knowledge that campaigns show ”minimal effects”
it does not necessarily follow that campaigns do not persuade voters to accept or move
towards a candidate’s policy preference. Candidates’ campaigns actually affect voters’
policy-decisions by shifting their prior preference in the direction of one particular
candidate. In order to analyze this process carefully, I developed an extension to spatial
voting models, building on the theoretical model of this dissertation. The extension
is tailored to a campaign situation where two competing candidates not only inform
citizens about their platforms, but also attempt to persuade them. The theoretical
model can be used to identify the importance of this process empirically. For the
2008 presidential elections, I found that although the process explains the way voters’
policy-distance evolves during the course of the campaign, the electoral consequences
are insignificant, as candidates do not manage to persuade a broad enough share of
voters to actually vote differently.
Another contribution to our understanding, demonstrated in this chapter, is a method-
ological one. Many re- searchers find it hard to make deductions about persuasion-
effects from the observable data. I have demonstrated that specifying an empirical
model that matches the heterogeneity revealed in the theoretical model, permits a
researcher to make valid inferences about the underlying process. I discussed latent
class models as a way of doing this. I ran multiple robustness checks that took into
account potential problems arising from measurement error, and finally, I dealt with
causality of the platform treatments and compared the model fit to homogeneous
specifications.
Theorists who rely on spatial models often question the importance of campaigns
in understanding representative democracy. I claim that this perspective is deceptive.
It is based on the implicit assumption that political preferences are exogenous to the
electoral processes. However, campaigns are more than a mere information-device
about the candidates’ platforms. They can persuade a share of citizens to follow a
candidate’s policy lead. I show that spatial models are ideally suited for studying
the effect of persuasion on preference, provided researchers employ the extension put
forward in this dissertation. This permitted the adoption of a broader theoretical
approach to the study of campaign effects and the examination of the effects on voting
behavior.
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The presented theoretical conceptualization brings sociological as well as behavioural
research on electoral campaigns back into spatial analysis of the electoral process.
The expectations derived, coincide with the first systematic empirical investigations
of electoral campaigns in the last century. To underscore this, I would like to quote
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954):
“As time goes on as we compare materials collected early in the campaign
with those obtained at later stages, we find that people abandon deviant
opinions on specific issues to agree with the position taken by their party
(or at least to perceive such agreement)” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee,
1954, p.285).
While findings in this direction have been ignored by spatial analysis for decades,
the presented modeling approach is a promising way to synthesize these contrasting
perspectives on the electoral process.
The extension can certainly be used for further in-depth research in this field. First, it
can be employed to study the effect of projection, which is another mechanism showing
how a citizen’s preference might be endogenous to the candidate’s platform. Second,
the model can be extended to a campaign situation involving multiple candidates. Last
and most important, it can be adopted to a situation in which one party, for specific
reasons, has a definite advantage over the others in persuading voters. For example, in
cases where one party has control of the national media, which strengthens its ability
to promote its own platform and policies, at the opponents’ expense. While classic
spatial voting models would see no difference in any of the situations outlined above,
the newly presented extended model takes account of factors that can directly impact
citizens’ voting decisions and thereby the overall electoral outcome.
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Conclusion
Theories of democracy oftentimes draw on a description of citizens’ political capabilities
that has been criticized for being out of touch with reality. Indeed, accumulated
knowledge in political science about a citizen’s involvement in politics and her political
behavior, verifies concerns with the sort of simplified depiction regularly used in
democratic theory.
“There can be little doubt that the sophisticated electorates postulated by
some of the more enthusiastic democratic theorists do not exist, even in the
best educated modern societies”(Achen, 1975, p.1218).
The cause of greatest worry for democratic theory is a general public whose political
preferences do not equip them to elect representative leaders, because “without prefer-
ences [..] democratic theory - at least in its most liberal guise - loses its starting point”
(Bartels, 2003, p.50). In light of this, it is of utmost importance to ask if representation
can be achieved with a general public that is “innocent of ideology” (Kinder, 1983,
p.391)? And how do citizens that can be “persuaded to leave behind their private
judgments” (Garsten, 2009, p.11) affect the electoral linkage? Do politicians who do
not “pander” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000) to public opinion, but rather shape attitudes
through extensive campaigns, shape our portrayal of electoral democracy?
This dissertation directly addresses the century-long debate about the merits of
representative democracy. The origin of the argumentation lies in the principal that
the central linkage between citizens and their representatives can only be affected if
voters with policy preference that deviates from a restrictive theoretical description,
also behave differently at the ballot box. Following this line of thought, I study how
citizens’ electoral decisions are influenced when we assume a wider notion of policy
preference; a notion that can be inconsistent with ideological dimensions, persuadable
by arguments and endogenous to politicians’ position-takings. The central contribution
of this dissertation is a theoretical framework that enables us to study such a portrayal,
by relaxing implicit assumptions employed in earlier theoretical models. Specifically, I
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offer an extension to the wide-reaching theory of spatial voting, which is the work-horse
theory in contemporary political science, in order to analyze the connection between
citizens’ policy views, their voting decisions and representatives’ behavior.
The theoretical considerations in combination with the empirical findings underline
the significance of a wider notion of policy preference in the study of electoral behavior.
In Chapter 2, I identify that researchers in the fields of political behavior, political
psychology and public opinion, who question the usefulness of the restrictive definition
of voters’ policy preferences in spatial voting theory, generally define policy preference
in terms of policy beliefs. Policy beliefs represent the idea that citizens themselves
can be uncertain about their ideal policy platform. In Chapter 3, I integrate this
idea into spatial voting theory, showing that standard models can be expressed as a
special case of the conceptualization I put forward. Furthermore, I show how this
facilitates studying inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous policy preferences. In
Chapters 4 to 6, I focus on understanding how these aspects impact voting decisions
and hypothesize that voters with inconsistent preferences put considerably less weight
on policy when deciding between political candidates. Using survey data from the
American Presidential Elections of 2008, I find support for the hypothesis. In Chapter 5,
I analyze the consequences of persuasive political arguments on voting decisions.
Building on a novel survey experiment, I find that respondents who were asked to
read through a political argument (about a concrete policy) differ in their voting
decisions. In Chapter 6, I derive empirical implications for a campaign-persuasion
process that permit me to analyze the share of respondents who altered their preference
in the direction of either Obama or McCain during the 2008 campaign period. I find
that especially party identifiers are likely to follow implications from the theoretical
campaign-persuasion model. In all instances where I deal with assumptions which
were previously made by researchers about citizens’ preferences in spatial voting, I find
evidence that voters’ behavior can indeed be greatly affected.
In the conclusion, I summarize the central contributions made by this dissertation
and discuss the implications for further research based on the theoretical framework
set out in this dissertation. Finally, I show how the results presented are of the utmost
importance for our basic assessment of democratic representation as a model for
governing any country
7.1 Theoretical contribution
The central contribution of this dissertation is the conceptualization of policy beliefs that
represent a wider notation of policy preferences. This portrayal is oftentimes employed
by behavioural political scientists to explain mechanisms of the electoral aggregation of
the people’s will that they deem to be of importance. Assumptions made within spatial
voting, preclude these aspects in studying the electoral process. Relying on the wider
definition, I show that policy beliefs derive novel expectations about electoral behavior
and affect the central electoral linkage between citizens and their representatives. In the
concluding remarks, I will stress how, on theoretical grounds, this manages to bring
together researchers from many different schools of thought within political science.
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7.1.1 Ideology and voting decisions
I put forward the argument that the varying degrees to which citizens adopt ideology
to structure their beliefs, condition the importance of voting based on ideology. Without
doubt, ideology structures the political process. Ordinary citizens who employ the
same ideological structures as political elites would find it easy to make well-considered
voting decisions. However, many political scientists question this premise: from those
who allege that the general public are entirely innocent of any ideological thought,
to those who suppose that each citizen possesses an ideal political outcome in the
multi-dimensional ideological space. These differing propositions created a division in
the way research about electoral democracy has so far been approached. On theoretical
grounds the different camps seldom found a means of uniting their viewpoints, instead
tending to get lost in details about the empirical applicability of their assumptions. In
this dissertation, I follow a innovative theoretical approach. Instead of just offering yet
another empirical test, I take a well-established theoretical concept from those who
have raised doubts about the public’s ideological capabilities and incorporate it into
the influential spatial voting theory (which is already well-accepted by the ‘opposition’
group). In the future, my theoretical contribution will permit spatial theorists to take
critics’ concerns seriously, by checking if their conclusions are affected if voters do
not mimic the restrictive assumptions they had made, and thus enable researchers in
the “other camp” to study the electoral consequences of their suppositions about the
ideological structure.
7.1.2 Political arguments and the study of electoral behavior
The theoretical framework of this dissertation shows how the evaluation of political
arguments can be incorporated into spatial voting theory. The exchange of political
arguments enables citizens to form reliable opinions about matters of politics and to
make informed voting decisions. For many theorists, public debate about political
issues, and the transmission of political arguments are the building blocks for a
democratic society. Only by the permanent evaluation of arguments can citizens learn
what policy options are best for them personally, and society in general. Researchers in
political psychology and public opinion have focused their attention on this aspect of
the democratic process. Theoretical arguments as well as empirical examination have
greatly enhanced our knowledge of: 1) where policy preferences come from; 2) how
they are formed by the evaluation of political arguments and 3) how they change. What
has so far been missing,in order to understand electoral representation in general, is
how such a process influences citizens’ electoral behavior. The theoretical model of
this dissertation creates potential for researchers to study the electoral consequences of
argument-evaluation processes and thereby accentuates the central role that arguments
play in the democratic process.
7.1.3 Partisanship and the electoral process
Policy beliefs can be endogenous to party position-taking, by means of a persuasion
process. This process is especially likely to shape partisans’ policy beliefs. It has
been argued that partisanship anchors citizens’ perceptions of the political process.
While behavioral theorists maintain that the identification with a political party is in
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fact,the driving factor for most of political behavior, spatial voting theorists have never
completely acknowledged this proposition. In line with a revisionist’s perspective,
early spatial voting theories contended that party loyalties are updated in response
to a number of short-term political forces, such as a party’s positions, so that they
are secondary when analyzing the political process. Although newer studies (see e.g.
Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005) incorporate the idea that partisanship works next
to policy, they do not completely respect the original conceptualization of partisanship
as the unmoved mover. My formulation, which asserts that partisanship increases the
likelihood of being persuaded about policy, combines the original formulation with
spatial voting models. This will allow further research to investigate the interplay of
partisanship, policy preferences and electoral outcome on the basis of an integrative
theoretical framework.
7.2 Empirical contribution
The second central contribution of this dissertation is the full reliance on the “empirical
implications of theoretical models approach” (EITM). I hope that I have convinced the
reader that this approach is fruitful when researcher not only want to introduce novel
theoretical concepts, but also want to disclose the empirical explanatory power of these
concepts. Three core aspects were developed within this framework:
7.2.1 Theoretically motivated empirical models
In all the empirical chapters (4 to 6), I develop the empirical models from the theoretical
specifications that directly estimate parameters taken from the theoretical process.
I am convinced that this should be the standard approach to social science data
analysis. However, the dull routine of everyday life deviates from this ideal. All too
often, researchers rely on a linear approximation of their theoretical mechanisms that
sometimes matches these processes, but often does not. In nine out of ten cases, social
scientists who are asked to analyze the pattern of data generated by a simple law
of physics will run a linear approximation of process, without even considering that
the underlying structure might be non-linear1. Reliable data analysis requires careful
guidance about the correct specification for the empirical model. I have shown that
theory can offer guidance as to how the systematic as well as stochastic components of
empirical models should be formalized. It is clear that empirics need theory, as much as
theory needs empirics.
7.2.2 Modeling political processes that defy direct observation
I offer a way to model hard-to-observe political processes, employing latent class models.
Social scientists frequently face situations in which they want to explain phenomena
that defy direct observation. Building on their theoretical arguments, researchers still
have substantial expectations about the implications of these phenomena. I use this
modeling approach to classify voters that were persuaded during an electoral campaign.
In a similar way, it can also be used to explain other political phenomena. For example,
1For a empirical evidence of this brought claim see (Taagepera, 2008, Chapter 2)
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researchers interested in investigating whether states comply with international treaties,
never actually observe the intentions. The expectation that compliance should result in
changes in state behavior can be used to explain which countries comply and which do
not. Another application relates to the literature regarding strategic voting: Researchers
interested in the question of which citizens cast their votes strategically, and which
of them vote sincerely, can use different empirical expectations to classify voters and
explain these two classes as a function of covariates.
7.2.3 Survey experiments
Experimental methods are a valuable addition to the empirical tool-kit used in research
on electoral behavior. In many situations, theories require premises that are impossible
to test using survey data, as direct variation can only be generated using external
manipulation. For this reason, research in political science is increasingly relying on
experiments. I combine survey experiments used in political psychology to estimate
the effects of political arguments, with experiments used in spatial voting theory to
infer the effect of political arguments on spatial voting decisions.
7.3 Implications for further research
This dissertation is innovative on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Future studies
will be able to address fundamental research questions, building on the spatial voting
extension outlined in detail. In particular, I wish to highlight five aspects that I consider
to have far-reaching implications for a greater understanding of electoral democracy:
7.3.1 Estimating policy beliefs instead of ideal policy platforms
The theoretical argumentation builds on a novel conceptualization of citizens’ policy
preferences in terms of policy beliefs. While I propose an indirect measurement of this
concept, by separately estimating mean beliefs and belief variance, further research can
derive a direct estimation of each citizen’s policy beliefs. Newer studies in political
science are concerned with estimating citizens’ ideological positions (see e.g. Jessee,
2009; Hare et al., 2014; Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008). Most of this research
builds on item response specifications, and/or scaling methods to obtain estimates
of citizens’ ideal policy platforms. These methods take care of problems concerning
different scale-perceptions, projection and measurement error. They do not model
heterogeneity in ideological structure: the idea that citizens also vary in how strongly
they adopt ideological platforms to structure their policy views, is not integrated into
the derivation of these empirical models. Following a similar approach to the one
now used to derive the measurement of inconsistency, policy beliefs can be directly
integrated into these measurement models. Such a model approximates policy beliefs,
instead of restricting estimation to ideal policy platforms.
7.3.2 Multi-dimensional ideology
The political process described in this dissertation is tailored to a situation where citizens
can choose between two candidates who position themselves in a one dimensional
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ideological space. Contrary to this idea, most researchers stress that the ideology is
at least two-dimensional, defined by a cultural and an economic dimension (see e.g.
Dalton, 1996; Kenneth and Micheal, 2006; De Vries and Marks, 2012). Further research
can extend policy beliefs to cover multi-dimensional ideology. This may yield novel
hypotheses regarding the weight voters put on different policy dimensions. The relative
variance in beliefs (a voter holds on one dimension compared to the other dimension),
should affect the relative weight this voter puts on this dimension when deciding whom
to vote for. For example, if a voter has no clue about economic policies, but is sure
that she does not want the state to intervene in her private life, this second cultural
dimension will become more important in her voting decision.
7.3.3 Beyond two-party systems
Most conclusions reached in this dissertation will also directly apply to multi-party
systems. More interesting for these systems (i.e. than merely adopting the results),
would be the question of how policy beliefs can affect strategic voting. In multi-party
systems, one party seldom determines the complete political outcome, because in
building governments most often parties have to form a coalition with other(s), after
the election. As a result, the need to take into account post-election bargaining between
different parties gains importance for voters, when deciding whom to vote for (Kedar,
2009; Duch, May and Armstrong, 2010). While it is often argued that sophisticated, well-
informed voters are more likely to employ strategic calculus, uncertainty about the ideal
policy platform might affect an otherwise rational decision, more directly. Thus voters
with wide policy beliefs do not generally take post-election-bargaining into account,
because their expected benefit is less strongly affected by strategic considerations.
7.3.4 Projection as a source of endogenous policy preference
The main concern of this dissertation was with policy preference that can be endogenous
to party position-taking as a result of a persuasion process. Another way in which
policy preference can be endogenous is the psychological effect of projection (Brody and
Page, 1972; Bartels, 2006). Parties or candidates signal their position, but voters perceive
these signals differently. Voters who possess loyalties to a specific party perceive
themselves as being closer to this party than is actually the case, and perceive other
parties as being further away. It is clear that such misperceptions can directly influence
voting decisions. Because voters themselves do not possess fixed platforms, these
effects might be amplified by the uncertainty a voter has about her own ideal policy
platform. I propose that projection effects can be modeled in terms of correlated errors
between a perceived candidate’s platform and a voter’s policy beliefs. Partisans have a
positive covariance between their own position and their party’s signaled position, and a
negative covariance for other parties’ signals. This specification allows for a formalized
estimation of projection effects. Furthermore, it yields the interesting implication that
the variance in policy beliefs affects the magnitude of projection.
7.3.5 Party-competition with endogenous policy preference
I employ the theoretical model to study the effect that endogenous policy preferences
can have on voters’ decisions. Further research can build on this, analyzing how
114
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
parties act, knowing that a share of voters has an endogenous preference to their
position-taking. Do endogenous policy preferences affect the equilibrium in two party-
competition? Will parties that enjoy a considerable advantage in persuading voters,
tend towards the extreme of the political spectrum in order to pull their supporters
‘out of the middle’? The policy belief model can address the electoral consequences of
endogenous preferences by employing party competition models.
7.4 The overall implications for democracy
If ordinary voters are not equipped with rigorous policy preferences, does this distort
the simple model of representative democracy? The findings of this dissertation indicate
that it does. The assumption that citizens have policy preferences which are inconsistent,
persuadable and endogenous led, in a variety of ways to a better explanation of the
voting act as the central link between citizens and their representatives. a) A general
public that does not adopt the same ideology as the candidates, in order to structure
personal beliefs, will put considerably less weight on ideology; the voters will be
potentially influenced by other aspects that are less important in guaranteeing their
political representation. b) Preferences that are persuadable thus open the potential
for parties to promote their programs via extensive media coverage and campaign
efforts. c) Party-identifiers who follow their party loyalty in electoral campaigns and
adjust their policy views accordingly, will make it considerably easier for politicians
to propose unpopular policies. These three aspects highlight that the electoral linkage
can greatly affected if voters do not mirror the conceptualization in simple models of
representation.
Nonetheless, the theoretical considerations reveal the conditions under which voters
are able to use policy platforms to make informed, considerate decisions and find
matching representatives. If all citizens possess policy beliefs with only a small belief
variance (which implies that they exactly know their ideal policy platform), the model
presented in this dissertation shows convergence with the classic perspective: a) voters
will find it easy to find the closest match to their beliefs b) political arguments do
not alter their positions, and c) parties cannot shift voters’ position during electoral
campaigns. While the empirical results of this dissertation indicate that such a situation
is utopian, the theoretical models show how this desirable state can, potentially-
speaking, be achieved. Citizens need to be able to learn about their expected benefit
from different policy platforms. The central mechanism by which this can be assured,
is the ongoing evaluation of political arguments. This enables the public to make
inferences about the consequences and value to be gained from political programs, and
to elect matching representatives who reflect the “public’s will”.
If this is the case, it is not enough to presume that holding an election every other
year will assure true democratic representation in any country. Democratic institutions
need to provide an environment that makes it possible for all citizens to become
informed about the potential consequences of different voting decisions. I conclude
with the important insight that a perceptual conception of democracy as “a system
in which parties lose elections” (Przeworski, 1991, p.10) definitely does not ensure
democratic representation, as it is based on the presumption of a very homogeneous
public: something which does not actually exist, per se. If political systems adhere
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to the goal of political representation, they must ensure the provision of competent
independent institutions which enable their citizens to receive a balanced flow of
information. This is the crucial factor in the formation of reliable opinions which, in
turn, then result in the election of truly representative governments.
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Chapter 4
A.1 Factor model
To extract factor loadings for respondents and candidates I rely on 8 policy-issues
included in the ANES. The policy-questions were asked in wave 10. All of the policy-
questions first asked respondents if the are in favor or opposed to a specific proposition,
afterwards asking them about the strength of their attitude. In total, this creates a
seven-point scale on which each respondents attitude towards a specific proposition.
The exact wording of the propositions are:
• Favor or oppose constant amendment to ban gay marriages
• Favor or oppose raising taxes on incomes over 200k/yr
• Favor or oppose government should pay drugs for low income seniors
• Favor or oppose government payment for all health care
• Favor or oppose suspend habeas for terror suspects
• Favor or oppose court order to wiretap terror suspect
• Favor or oppose 3 year work for illegal immigrants
• Favor or oppose that illegal immigrants become citizens
A.1.1 Respondents mean policy belief
The eight issues give a reasonable mix between cultural (like amendment to ban
gay marriages) and economic issues (such as raising taxes on incomes over 200k/yr),
Table A.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the different policy-questions. Most
answering patterns are distributed around the mid-point.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for policy issues
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
gay marriage 1,348 0.321 2.343 −3 3
taxes high income 1,350 0.875 2.130 −3 3
drugs low income seniors 1,348 1.487 1.830 −3 3
health care 1,348 −0.033 2.349 −3 3
terrorism suspend 1,347 1.030 2.090 −3 3
terrorism wiretap 1,347 0.781 2.247 −3 3
illegal immigrants work 1,347 −0.843 2.146 −3 3
illegal immigrants citizenship 1,349 −0.011 2.232 −3 3
I calculate an explanatory factor model using psych library in R, imputing missing
values with the mean and using minimum residuals (OLS) to estimate the factor
loadings. I recoded all answers, such that positive values indicate liberal attitudes. The
factor loadings are reported in Table A.2. The loadings are strongest for high-income
taxation and health care, clear-cut liberal issues have a lower loading (e.g. illegal
immigration and gay marriage). The one-factor solution still seems to be sufficient, with
a small root mean square error (0.09) and a reasonable eigen value of 1.83, that explains
23 % of the variance. Although, including a second factor-dimension slightly increase
the fit (RMSE 0.04), I rely on the one-factor solution. Simply because my theoretical
argumentation is tailored to one policy dimension.
Factor Loadings
gay marriage 0.33
taxes high income 0.61
drugs low income seniors 0.61
health care 0.68
terrorism suspend 0.35
terrorism wiretap 0.46
illegal immigrants work 0.25
illegal immigrants citizenship 0.35
Table A.2: Results of a explanatory factor analysis
Based on the factor loadings I extract each respondents factor score using regression
based methods. Higher values generally indicate more liberal attitudes. As Figure A.1
shows, the resulting distribution has longer tails to the left. In the chapter the factor
scores are taken as each respondents mean policy belief. They highly correlate with
respondents self-placement on the liberal conservative scale (-0.62) and a respondents
party identification (0.6).
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Figure A.1: Distribution of factor-scores
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics for candidate positions
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Obama gay marriage 1,321 0.741 1.876 −3 3
Obama taxes high income 1,334 2.061 1.553 −3 3
Obama drugs low income seniors 1,335 1.780 1.514 −3 3
Obama health care 1,333 1.221 1.850 −3 3
Obama terrorism suspend 1,312 1.540 1.617 −3 3
Obama terrorism wiretap 1,330 1.190 1.834 −3 3
Obama illegal immigrants work 1,328 0.723 1.722 −3 3
Obama illegal immigrants citizenship 1,328 1.275 1.569 −3 3
McCain gay marriage 1,315 −0.239 2.381 −3 3
McCain taxes high income 1,312 −1.643 1.871 −3 3
McCain drugs low income seniors 1,316 −0.707 1.937 −3 3
McCain health care 1,316 −1.578 1.648 −3 3
McCain terrorism suspend 1,308 −0.443 2.083 −3 3
McCain terrorism wiretap 1,307 −0.257 2.067 −3 3
McCain illegal immigrants work 1,313 −0.091 1.957 −3 3
McCain illegal immigrants citizenship 1,315 0.124 1.894 −3 3
A.1.2 Obama and McCain platform
In the ANES respondents were asked to place both Obama and McCain on the same
eight policy-issues. This can be used to obtain platform estimates for the two candidates
on the same dimension than the respondents. Table A.3 reports the statistics for the two
candidates over the different policy-issues. The issues have the same order than above.
Unsurprisingly on average, on most issues Obama was perceived to have a more liberal
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Figure A.2: Distribution of perceived position of Obama and McCain
position. The most drastic difference between Obama is observed for the high-income
question. While Obama mean position is located at 2, average placement of McCain is
at -1.6. For some issues the perceived positions are closer together (e.g. 3 year work for
illegal immigrants).
For perceived positions of the two candidates, the platform can be predicted based
on the factor loadings for each of respondent. This gives an approximately perceived
platform for Obama and McCain. The resulting distribution shows a clear dived
between the candidates platforms (see Figure A.2). Obama is mean platform is located
at 0.54 and McCain platform at -0.92.
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A.2 Measurement of inconsistency
(Intercept) Mean Self-Placement
gay marriage 2.60 -0.53
taxes high income 3.28 -0.56
drugs low income seniors 2.91 -0.33
health care 2.62 -0.62
terrorism suspend 2.79 -0.41
terrorism wiretap 2.70 -0.45
illegal immigrants work 0.27 -0.26
illegal immigrants citizenship 1.61 -0.38
Table A.4: Results of auxiliary regressions to construct measurement of inconsistency
The measurement of inconsistency relies on auxiliary regressions that captures the
randomness when relating respondents liberal-conservative self-placement to their
policy attitudes. The results of the auxiliary regressions are reported in the Table A.4.
Again, all issues are coded in a way that higher values indicate more liberal positions,
which is confirmed by the coefficients of the regression. Only for the issue if the gov-
ernment should pay for drugs for low income seniors we find no statistical significant
effect. Based on the residuals from the regressions I am able to calculate the estimate of
σ∗i as the average sum of squared errors.
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A.3 Controls
Controls and other covariates are described in the Table A.5.
Table A.5: Descriptives for control variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Vote Obama 2,212 0.535 0.499 0 1
Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement 2,212 4.312 1.829 1.000 7.000
Liberal-Conservative Obama 2,212 2.239 1.608 1 7
Liberal-Conservative McChain 2,212 5.693 1.588 1 7
Income 2,212 12.720 3.830 1 19
Age 2,212 52.390 14.440 18 90
Gender (Male) 2,212 0.577 0.494 0 1
Race (African-American) 2,212 0.094 0.293 0 1
Education 2,212 3.492 1.050 1 5
Home Owner 2,212 1.198 0.490 1 3
Party Identification 2,212 0.175 2.275 −3 3
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A.4 Parameter estimates for policy-weighted probit model
Figure A.3 shows the complete parameter estimates (point estimate and 95% confidence
intervals) obtained from the policy-weighted model, using perceived candidate posi-
tions (in dark) and mean candidate platforms (in light grey). Party-identification as
well as race have a strong effect on the expected utility. More liberal party-identification
positively effects the voting probability to vote for Obama. African-Americans have a
higher chance to vote for Obama. Income also has an substantial effect on the voting
decisions. With increasing income a respondent gets more likely to vote for Obama.
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Figure A.3: Parameter estimates policy-weighted model
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A.5 Robustness checks
A.5.1 Interaction effect models
Another modeling strategy to test the mediating effect of inconsistency are interaction
effect models. Within a linear specification a interaction term between policy-distance
and inconsistency allows to test if respondents with higher inconsistency put less
weight on policy distance than their counterparts. A substantial interaction effect would
confirm the hypothesis from the learning model and allow to reject the hypothesis
derived from the expected utility model. The results are reported in Table A.6 below.
What the analysis is mainly concerned with is in how far an increase in policy-
distance affects voting probabilities given different levels of policy-consistency. The
marginal effect can be depicted from the interaction term in model (2) and model (4).
In both models the coefficient of policy-distance is interacted with the measurement
of inconsistency. While the coefficient of policy distance in both models increases
(compared to the standard models) the interaction coefficient is negative. This hints in
the direction that the marginal effect of policy-distance on voting intention is generally
higher among respondents with higher consistency in policy preferences. However,
in probit models the marginal effect further depends on the predicted probabilities.
One has to be especially cautious when interpreting the statistical significance of the
interaction term - a standard t-test does actually not apply to all respondents in assessing
the moderation (Ai and Norton, 2003). I calculate the marginal interaction effect finding
that the effect is strongest for observation with average predicted probability to vote
for Obama (See Figure A.4 and Figure A.5). Nonetheless, the t-test of the coefficient
can potentially hint in the direction if the inclusion of the interaction is relevant (Berry,
DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010), for both cases the effect is significant different from zero.
Comparing model (3) and (4) the likelihood substantially increases for the interaction
models.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept −1.74∗∗∗ −1.56∗∗ −1.41∗∗ −1.22∗∗
(0.49) (0.50) (0.43) (0.45)
Policy-Distance 0.38∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07)
Inconsistency −0.02 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Policy-Distance X Inconsistency −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
PID 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Black 0.97∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25)
Education 0.15∗ 0.13∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Home Owner 0.28∗ 0.27 0.18 0.19
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Income 0.06∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
AIC 529.39 522.23 659.33 647.29
BIC 569.26 572.06 699.42 697.39
Log Likelihood −256.70 −251.12 −321.67 −313.64
Deviance 513.39 502.23 643.33 627.29
Num. obs. 1079 1078 1109 1108
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.6: Results from probit interaction model with positions from factor model as a measure-
ment of policy-distance
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Figure A.4: Interaction effect model (2)
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Figure A.5: Interaction effect model (4)
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A.5.2 Robustness measurement: Results using liberal-conservative scale
I re-run the model using a different measurement of policy platforms. I rely on self-
placements and candidate placements on a liberal-conservative scale. I calculate the
quadratic distance of a respondent to the candidates mean placement as well as the
perceived candidate position. Based on this I calculate two models, one for perceived
positions and one for mean positions.
The results from the policy-weighted model are reported in Figure A.6. In both
specifications, negative quadratic distance has a positive effect on the probability to vote
for Obama. In the case of perceived platform measurements, this effect is moderated
by inconsistency. Increasing inconsistency decreases the effect policy-distance has on
expected utility. In the case of the mean positions, the effect of inconsistency on the
weight is not significantly different from zero.
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Figure A.6: Parameter estimates policy-weighted model relying on liberal-conservative scale
I further run interaction effect models employing the same measurements. The results
are reported in the Table A.8 below. The interaction-models reveal the same empirical
pattern: Only in the case of mean platform positions there is significant interaction
effect of inconsistency. It shall be noted that this does not directly allow to conclude
that there is no moderation at all - for some parts of the respondents the effect might
still be substantial.
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Model 5 Model 6
Intercept −0.51 −0.16
(0.45) (0.44)
Policy-Distance 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Inconsistency 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Policy-Distance X Inconsistency −0.00 −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00)
PID −0.07∗ −0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.40∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Black −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Education 1.03∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25)
Home Owner 0.09 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
Income 0.22 0.16
(0.13) (0.13)
AIC 615.57 637.88
BIC 665.47 687.78
Log Likelihood −297.79 −308.94
Deviance 595.57 617.88
Num. obs. 1086 1086
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.7: Results from probit interaction model with self-placement as a measurement of
policy-distance (1)
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A.5.3 Results using variation over self-placements
I re-run the analysis using a different measurement of inconsistency, employing the
standard deviation of self-placements in different panel waves. Results are found in
Table A.8. The results are reported in the tables below - the estimates for the controls
are excluded from the table. All interaction effect are negative - indicating that with
increasing variation of self-placements th marginal effect of policy-distance decreases.
However, only for Model 7 and Model 8, which use liberal conservative scale to calculate
policy-distance, the interaction effects are significant.
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept 0.09 0.23 −1.63∗ −1.31∗
(0.48) (0.48) (0.74) (0.64)
P.-D. perceived (lib-con) 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01)
Inconsistency −0.22 −0.22 −0.27 −0.13
(0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19)
P.-D. perceived (lib-con) X Inconsistency −0.02∗∗
(0.01)
P.-D. mean (lib-con) 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01)
P.-D. mean (lib-con) X Inconsistency −0.03∗
(0.01)
P.-D. perceived (Factor) 0.61∗∗∗
(0.13)
P.-D. perceived (Factor) X Inconsistency −0.09
(0.14)
P.-D. mean (Factor) 0.41∗∗∗
(0.08)
P.-D. mean (Factor) X Inconsistency −0.09
(0.11)
AIC 503.15 533.82 255.26 329.46
BIC 551.68 582.40 296.85 371.34
Log Likelihood −241.58 −256.91 −117.63 −154.73
Deviance 483.15 513.82 235.26 309.46
Num. obs. 947 951 473 487
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.8: Results from probit interaction model with self-placement as a measurment of
policy-distance (2)
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A.5.4 Unobserved confounders
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Figure A.7: Unobserved confounders: Estimate from five three quarter subsets, combined with
multiple imputation techniques
In further checked if the main results are due to a small share of the sample that
greatly affect the moderation of inconsistency. I sample five three-quarter subsets and
estimate the policy-weighted model once for policy-distance with perceived platforms
and mean platforms calculated from the factor model. The (two times) five estimates of
inconsistency on the weight are reported in Figure A.7. In the case of the perceived
positions 2 out of 5 confidence intervals do not include zero. In the case of mean
positions all five confidence intervals do not include zero. This again hints in the
direction that argumentation of the learning model works better with mean platforms.
The combined effect over the different samples is in all cases different from zero. To
reach this conclusion, I us methods from multiple imputation that takes into account
variation within the samples and between the samples (King, 2002).
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B.1. QUESTIONNAIRE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
B.1 Questionnaire experimental study
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Policy-Preference
[]
We would like to know your opinion about three highly debated policy issues.
One issue is whether marijuana should be legalized as a medical option. What is your opinion on this
issue: Are you in favor or opposed to the medical use of marijuana? You can use the 5-point scale
below to indicate your opinion.
*
Please choose only one of the following:
 Strongly opposed
 Opposed
 Neither in favor nor opposed
 In favor
 Strongly in favor
[]Another issue is whether gay marriage should be legalized. What is your opinion about it: Are you in
favor, have no opinion, or opposed to the legalization of gay marriage? *
Please choose only one of the following:
 Strongly opposed
 Opposed
 Neither in favor nor opposed
 In favor
 Strongly in favor
[]Finally, there is much debate concerning illegal immigration. One such issue is whether illegal
immigrants should be granted a pathway to citizenship. What is your opinion about it: Are you in favor,
have no opinion, or opposed to granting illegal immigrants a pathway to citizenship? *
Please choose only one of the following:
 Strongly opposed
 Opposed
 Neither in favor nor opposed
 In favor
 Strongly in favor
LimeSurvey - Voting Behavior Study https://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/survey/medw...
2 of 33 30.11.2014 12:35
Ideology
[]
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Some people see themselves as
extremely liberal. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at -5. Others see themselves as
extremely conservative. Suppose these people are at the other end of the same scale, at +5. And, of
course, other people have ideological views between these two extremes. Where would you place
yourself on this scale?
  *
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Liberal Conservative
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Political Argument
[]
People with different ideological views often differ in their opinions about concrete policy questions.
One highly debated issue is whether gay marriage should be legal. Proponents and opponents argue in
different directions. Please read the quote carefully, as we would like to know your opinion about it.
Marriage has its own dignity and purpose and its own mission: bringing together male and female
so that children can know and be known by, love and be loved by, their own mother and father.
Same-sex marriage is unjust because it is founded on an untruth. Same-sex unions are not
marriage. Only a fairly small minority of same-sex couples actually enter marriages where they
are available.
What gay marriage will do and is doing is disconnect marriage as an idea from its natural roots,
and increasingly stigmatize the people (and institutions) who adhere strongly to our traditional
views of marriage. Same-sex marriage is profoundly unjust because it misuses the law to require
something that is not true: these unions, however great they are in other ways, are not marriages
and nobody should be required by law to treat them as marriages.
In your opinion, are the arguments of the quote in favor or opposed to the issue that gay marriage
should be legal?
*
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was at question '1 [Q00001]' ({rand(1,4)})
Please choose only one of the following:
 In favor
 Opposed
LimeSurvey - Voting Behavior Study https://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/survey/medw...
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[]
People with different ideological views often differ in their opinions about concrete policy questions.
One highly debated issue is whether marijuana should be legalized as a medical option. Proponents
and opponents argue in different directions.  Please read the quote carefully, as we would like to know
your opinion about it.
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency charged with protecting the health of
Americans, has never found smoking marijuana to be a safe and effective drug. In April 2006,
following my request, the FDA released an interagency advisory confirming that smoked
marijuana is not medicine because: (1) marijuana has a high potential for abuse; (2) it has no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and (3) it has a lack of accepted
safety for use under medical supervision. The advisory also stated: ...there is currently sound
evidence that smoked marijuana is harmful.
In your opinion, are the arguments of the quote in favor or opposed to the issue that marijuana should
be legalized as a medical option? *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was at question '1 [Q00001]' ({rand(1,4)})
Please choose only one of the following:
 In favor
 Opposed
[]
People with different ideological views often differ in their opinions about concrete policy questions.
One debated issue is whether illegal immigrants should be granted a pathway to citizenship.
Proponents and opponents argue in different directions.Please read the quote carefully, as we would
like to know your opinion about it.
Do not grant amnesty to illegal aliens. Regardless of the penalties imposed, any program that
grants individuals who are unlawfully present the legal permission to remain here rewards illegal
behavior and is unfair to those who obey the law and go through the regulatory and
administrative requirements to enter the country legally. Those who enter the United States
illegally should not be rewarded with permanent legal status or other such benefits, and they
should be penalized in any road to citizenship. Those who enter and remain in the country
illegally are violating the law, and condoning or encouraging such violations increases the
likelihood of further illegal conduct
In your opinion, are the arguments of the quote in favor or opposed to the issue that illegal immigrants
should be granted a pathway to citizenship?
*
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was at question '1 [Q00001]' ({rand(1,4)})
Please choose only one of the following:
 In favor
 Opposed
LimeSurvey - Voting Behavior Study https://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/survey/medw...
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[]How persuasive do you find the argument? You can use the following 5-point-scale to indicate if you
find the argument  persuasive, or not. *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
((( ! is_empty(Q00007.NAOK)) || ( ! is_empty(Q00006.NAOK)) || ( ! is_empty(Q00008.NAOK))))
Please choose only one of the following:
 Not at all persuasive
 Not persuasive
 Neither persuasive nor not persuasive
 Persuasive
 Very persuasive
LimeSurvey - Voting Behavior Study https://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/survey/medw...
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Voting Decision
[]
Political candidates differ in their opinions about concrete policy questions. Some candidates are more
liberal, some are more conservative. 
Here are two candidates with distinct ideological positions, whose names will remain confidential. 
Based on their political ideology, do you prefer one of the two candidates, or are you undecided
between the two? *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was '-4' at question '5 [Q00005]' ( We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Some people see
themselves as extremely liberal. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at -5. Others see themselves as extremely
conservative. Suppose these people are at the other end of the same scale, at +5. And, of course, other people have ideological
views between these two extremes. Where would you place yourself on this scale?   (Liberal | Conservative))
Please choose only one of the following:
 Candidate 1 (C1)
 Undecided between the two candidates
 Candidate 2 (C2)
LimeSurvey - Voting Behavior Study https://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/survey/medw...
7 of 33 30.11.2014 12:35
Policy Preference Change
[]After reading the argument opposed to gay marriage we would like to know if the argument changed
your previously stated opinion in any specific direction. *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was at question '1 [Q00001]' ({rand(1,4)})
Please choose only one of the following:
 1 More in favor
 2 Argument did not change my opinion
 3 More opposed
[]After reading the argument against the medical marijuana we would like to know if the argument
changed your previously stated opinion in any specific direction. *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was at question '1 [Q00001]' ({rand(1,4)})
Please choose only one of the following:
 1 More in favor
 2 Argument did not change my opinion
 3 More opposed
[]After reading the argument opposed to gay marriage we would like to know if the argument changed
your previously stated opinion in any specific direction? *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was at question '1 [Q00001]' ({rand(1,4)})
Please choose only one of the following:
 1 More in favor
 2 Argument did not change my opinion
 3 More opposed
LimeSurvey - Voting Behavior Study https://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/survey/medw...
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B.2. AN ORDERED LOGIT MODEL FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT
B.2 An ordered logit model for the experimental treatment
The next paragraphs describe how the ordered logit model, employed to estimate the
treatment effect, can be derive more formally. Denote expected utility from voting
for the first candidate (C1) as E[Ui1] and from C2 as E[Ui1]. Utility is further affected
by a stochastic component eij , where j ∈ (1, 2) referees to the candidates. Overall
utility is, then, given by Vij = E[Uij] + eij. A respondent should vote for the more
liberal candidate, if utility from this candidate is higher than for the more conservative
candidate and vise versa. Moreover, a respondent should be indifferent if the utility
derived from the two candidates is equal. Denote yi as respondents decision to vote for
C1 yi = C1, C2 yi = C2, or being indifferent yi = I.
yi =

C1 if Vi1 > Vi2
I if Vi1 = Vi2
C2 if Vi1 < Vi2
The conditions highlight the latent continuum for this choice situation. What matters
for decisions is the difference in utility Vi1 − Vi2. If this difference is positive, voters
should choose candidate one, if it is negative they should vote for candidate two. Only
a utility difference of zero results in indifference. The same latent continuum is also
assumed in ordered logit models. The above can be rewritten to include thresholds:
yi =

C1 if Vi1 −Vi2 < τ1
I if τ2 > Vi1 −Vi2 > τ1
C2 if τ2 < Vi1 −Vi2
This set-up can be extended further integrating the theoretical utility model 5.12.
Which shows the effect of an argument’s can be understood as mean preference shift
xi − ξi. Where ξi reveals the direction of the shift. The probability to observe a specific
outcome (e.g. yi = C1) can, then, be derived by:
Pr [yi = C1] = Pr[Vi1 −Vi2 < τ1]
= Pr[E[Ui1] + ei1 − E[Ui2] + ei2 < τ1]
Extending the systematic component of the left hand side expression to see which
aspects cancel out, gives:
E[Ui1]− E[Ui2] = −(C1 − µ− ξ)2 + (Cj − µ− ξ)2
= −(C21 − 2C1xi + x2i − 2C1ξ − 2xiξ − x2i ) + . . .
= −(C1 − xi)2 + 2C1ξ − 2xiξ − x2i + . . .
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Because −(C1 − xi)2 = −(C2 − xi)2 and only 2C1xi and 2C2xi depend on the candi-
date, this can be simplified:
E[Ui1]− E[Ui2] = 2C1ξ − 2C2ξ
= 2(C1 − C2)ξ
The difference in expected utility can be re-formalized as the treatment effect. (C1 −
C2) is constant for all respondents. ξ is the effect of receiving a political argument. It
is zero for the control group and either positive or negative for the treatment groups.
For the controls group the differnce in expected utility is zero: E[Ui1]− E[Ui2] = 0 and
for the treatment group it can be expressed as a linear effect from reading through teh
argument:
E[Ui1]− E[Ui2] = β1Treatmenti
Integrating this in the above ordered logit formulation, thus allows to obtain an
estimate of treatment effect, which directly correspondents to ξi from the theoretical
formulation.
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C.1 Evolution of policy distance, conditional on persuasion
process
The following describes how I obtain expression 6.4 that shows the conditional rela-
tionship between prior campaign and end of the campaign policy distance. I substitute
the conditional expectation of the posterior given the deliberate decisions to accept a
candidate’s offer Ki from 6.3 in the quadratic distance to the first candidate at the end
of the campaign, defined as −(xi1 − C1)2.
• For Ki = 0 the expression from 6.3 is xi1 = xi0, hence:
− (xi1 − C1)2 = −(xi0 − C1)2 (C.1)
• For Ki = 1 the expression from 6.3 is xi1 = γi1xi0 + (1− γi1)C1, hence:
−(xi1 − C1)2 = −(γi1xi0 + (1− γi1)C1 − C1)2 (C.2)
= −(γi1xi0 + C1 − C1γi1 − C1)2
= −(γi1xi0 − C1γi1)2
= −γ2i1(xi0 − C1)2
• For Ki = 2 the expression from 6.3 is xi1 = γi2xi0 + (1− γi2)C2, hence:
−(xi1 − C1)2 = −(γi2xi0 + (1− γi2)C2 − C1)2 (C.3)
= −(γi2xi0 + C2 − C2γi2 − C1)2
= −(γi2(xi0 − C2) + C2 − C1)2
= −γ2i2(xi0 − C2)2 − 2γi2(xi0− C2)C2+ 2γi2(xi0 − C2)C1− C22 + 2C1C2 − C21
= −γ2i2(xi0 − C2)2 + 2γi2(C1 − C2)(xi0 − C2)− (C1 − C2)2
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C.2 Factor analytically model
In order to extract factor scores, for respondents and candidates I rely on 8 policy-issues
included in the ANES. The same set of policy-questions was asked in the October and
January wave. The policy-issues in October wave is also used in Chapter 4. Here I
describe the results from the factor model both waves. Table C.2 shows the descriptive
statistics for the different policy-questions from the October wave, Table C.1 for the
January wave.
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics for policy-issues January wave
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
gay marriage 357 −0.272 2.346 −3 3
taxes high income 357 0.829 2.210 −3 3
drugs low income seniors 357 1.683 1.841 −3 3
health care 357 0.087 2.366 −3 3
terrorism suspend 357 −1.266 2.024 −3 3
terrorism wiretap 357 0.703 2.365 −3 3
illegal immigrants work 357 −1.059 2.155 −3 3
illegal immigrants citizenship 357 −0.174 2.372 −3 3
Table C.2: Descriptive statistics for policy-issues October wave
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
gay marriage 357 −0.112 2.303 −3 3
taxes high income 357 0.854 2.173 −3 3
drugs low income seniors 357 1.412 1.838 −3 3
health care 357 −0.241 2.300 −3 3
terrorism suspend 357 −0.891 2.138 −3 3
terrorism wiretap 357 0.734 2.240 −3 3
illegal immigrants work 357 −0.717 2.111 −3 3
illegal immigrants citizenship 357 −0.076 2.196 −3 3
An explanatory factor model is calculated psych library in R, imputing missing values
with the mean and using minimum residuals (OLS) to estimate the factor loadings.
The factor loadings are reported in table C.4 for the October Wave and for the January
wave in C.3. The patterns in the loadings are similar between the two waves. There are
strongest for high-income taxation and health care, clear-cut liberal issues have a lower
loading (e.g. illegal immigration and gay marriage).
Based on the factor loadings I extract each respondents factor score using regression
based methods. For the sake of interpretation, I multiplied all resulting factor scores
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Factor Loadings
gay marriage -0.28
taxes high income 0.51
drugs low income seniors 0.59
health care 0.65
terrorism suspend -0.30
terrorism wiretap 0.32
illegal immigrants work 0.25
illegal immigrants citizenship 0.31
Table C.3: Results of explanatory factor analysis January wave
Factor Loadings
gay marriage -0.31
taxes high income 0.59
drugs low income seniors 0.59
health care 0.70
terrorism suspend -0.33
terrorism wiretap 0.43
illegal immigrants work 0.22
illegal immigrants citizenship 0.31
Table C.4: Results of explanatory factor analysis October wave
by -1, such that higher values generally indicate more liberal positions. In the paper
the factor scores are taken as each respondents mean policy belief. The fact that
respondents were asked to place both Obama and McCain on the same policy-issues in
the October wave, allows to obtain campaigned platforms for the two candidates on
the same dimension. Table C.5 reports the distribution for the two candidates over the
different policy-issues. Unsurprisingly on average, on all issues Obama was perceived
to have a more liberal position. The most drastic difference between Obama is observed
for the high-income question.
For each respondent’s placement of the two candidates the platform can be predicted.
This gives each respondents perceived platform for Obama and McCain. The resulting
distribution shows a clear dived between the candidates platforms. Obama is mean
platform is located at -0.34 and McCain platform at .94.
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Table C.5: Descriptive statistics for issues
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Obama gay marriage 352 −0.776 1.906 −3 3
Obama taxes high income 354 2.121 1.424 −3 3
Obama drugs low income seniors 354 1.802 1.552 −3 3
Obama health care 353 1.309 1.818 −3 3
Obama terrorism suspend 350 −1.614 1.598 −3 3
Obama terrorism wiretap 354 1.322 1.845 −3 3
Obama illegal immigrants work 352 0.824 1.637 −3 3
Obama illegal immigrants citizenship 352 1.222 1.546 −3 3
McCain gay marriage 348 0.359 2.326 −3 3
McCain taxes high income 350 −1.683 1.801 −3 3
McCain drugs low income seniors 349 −0.653 2.002 −3 3
McCain health care 351 −1.704 1.570 −3 3
McCain terrorism suspend 348 0.230 2.131 −3 3
McCain terrorism wiretap 348 −0.172 2.120 −3 3
McCain illegal immigrants work 350 0.174 1.970 −3 3
McCain illegal immigrants citizenship 348 0.394 1.876 −3 3
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C.3 Controls
Controls and other covariates of respondents are described in the table C.6.
Table C.6: Descriptive statistics of respondents included in analysis
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Liberal-conservative self-placement 343 4.522 1.881 1 7
Party identification 343 3.015 2.229 0 6
Age 343 50.930 14.920 18 88
Gender (male) 343 0.554 0.498 0 1
Race (African-American) 343 0.076 0.265 0 1
Education 343 3.356 1.063 1 5
Home owner 343 1.233 0.539 1 3
Policy belief variance (Inconsistency) 343 4.030 2.100 0.356 12.640
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C.4 Robustness checks
C.4.1 Do extreme respondents bias the results?
Model.4 Model.5
l
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Figure C.1: Parameter estimates for subsample and controlling for prior campaign preferences
Subsample of respondents with middle positions
• Set-up I rerun the the second model on a subset of respondents from the dataset,
only including respondents that posses prior-campaign positions in between the
two candidate platforms. This approach allows to check if results are driven by
measurement problems related with extreme prior campaign positions. Respon-
dents with extreme factor scores are more likely to receive less extreme factor
scores in the next wave due to measurement error. As extreme platforms are
correlated with partisanship this might affects the results.
• Results The general conclusions are unaffected by running the model on this
subset. For Democrats, partisanship still negatively affects δ3 the class-assignment
probability. However, with the smaller number of observations for Republicans
the effect can not be clearly distinguished from zero δ41 Nonetheless, the estimates
highlight that also for respondent in between the candidates platforms, I estimate
an effect of partisanship.
1The model convergence less quickly, it needs up to 40000 iterations until I see no sign of ”dis-
convergence” according to the standard criterion. Figure C.1 shows the parameter estimates. Of further
interest is the increase in estimates for constants of Obama and McCain. They imply that the average
share of respondents who are assigned to any of the two persuasion-classes is substantially larger than for
the model discussed in the text.
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Controlling for prior campaign platform in class-assignment
• Set-up In order to minimize the possibility that the results are driven by extreme
respondents, I further controlled for prior campaign preferences of a respondent
in modeling the class-assignments. If it holds true that the results are only due to
the prior position, we should see no effect of partisanship, once controlling for
prior position.
• Results The results are reported in figure C.1 model 2. δ5 and δ6 estimate the
effect on class-assignment for Obama and McCain. As expect prior campaign
preference have a strong effect on class-assignment. More liberal respondents are
also more likely to adjust their campaign preference in direction of Obama, more
conservative respondents are more likely to decrease distance to McCain. This
does not affect the importance of partisanship in explaining class-assignments,
strengthening the conclusion from the chapter.
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C.4.2 Increasing measurement error
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Figure C.2: Parameter estimates with increasing measurement error
• Set-up I check if measurement error in policy preference influences the result. I,
therefore, add random noise to the measurement of respondents preference in
the October wave. With increasing measurement error, one should not observe
an effect of party identification on the class assignments anymore. I add random
variation to the the factor-scores in the October Wave from a normal distribution
with increasing standard deviation. I increase the standard deviation from 0 to 1
in 0.1 steps. This creates 10 new data-sets on which I re-estimate Model 2.
• Results The results are reported in Figure C.2. The figure shows the estimate of
δ3 and δ4, which capture the effect partisanship class-assignment, for the different
datasets with increasing measurement error. The estimate to the left (with no
additional measurement error (sd=0), basically using the same data set as the
original analysis) recovers the same estimates. The estimates are greatly effected
when adding additional variation. For small measurement error (sd=0.25) one can
still reveal the same pattern, the estimates for measurement error with (sd=0.5)
already do not provide evidence for the hypothesis . The relationship gets even
weaker with large measurement error around (sd=1). In this case there is no effect
of partisanship anymore.
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APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 6
C.4.3 Candidates’ platforms: Placebo-treatment
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Figure C.3: Results from placebo-test.
• Set-up Placebo-tests follow an simple idea: Setting placebo treatments and using
the same methods to estimate effect coefficients from the data, the estimates
should be affected (Dafoe and Tuno, 2014). For example, the effect should decrease
the further away the placebo is from the actual treatment2. For the application
at hand, such placebo-effects are useful to test in how far the model captures
orientation towards the actual candidate’s platforms, by manipulating candidates
platforms in the analysis. Moving one of the candidate’s platform while holding
the other constant, the model should estimate no effect of partisanship on class-
assignments from a certain point on.
• Results The results are presented in Figure C.3. The top panel shows estimates
for the effect of partisanship on class-assignments when manipulating Obama’s
platform and holding McCain’s platform constant at -0.93. The lower panel
shows the estimates of δ3 and δ4 when moving Mccain’s platform around and
holding Obama’s platform constant at 0.53. In both cases the effect vanishes by
moving the candidate’s platform closer to the other candidate. E.g. supposing
that Obama’s platform is at -0.11 instead of 0.53 - there is no effect of partisanship
on class-assignment anymore. There is still an effect from making the candidates’
platforms more extreme. Nonetheless, In both cases the coefficient is strongest
around the true value. E.g. If McCain is presumed to be around -0.9 there is the
largest difference between the effect parameters. The same holds for Obama if he
is presumed to be around 0.5. This indicates that the model captures partisans
orientation towards the candidates platforms.
2For a recent application of placebo-treatments in political science see Gohdes (2015).
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C.4.4 Posteriori predictive to compare model fit to homogeneous model
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Figure C.4: Posteriori predictive of the standard deviation in distance to compare model fit to
homogeneous model
• Set-up Posterior predictive distributions are well-suited to compare model fit
(Gelman, Meng and Stern, 1996). I compare the posteriori predictive distribution
for distance, at the end of the campaign from model 1 (without predisposition)
with a model that assumes that distance evolves homogeneous over the two time
points. For the the homogeneous model, I assume that all respondents posses
exogenous preference Ki = 0. This can be set-up using a linear function between
the end of the campaign distance to the prior campaign distance −(xi1 − Ck)2 ∼
N(−(xi1 − Ck)2, τ). The test should reveal that the heterogeneous model is better
in explaining the standard deviation at the end of the campaign. This which would
indicate that the model better fits the heterogeneity in the campaign-evolution of
policy distance.
• Results The posteriori predictive distributions for both standard deviations of
distances are depicted in Figure C.4. The vertical lines describe the observed
values. The posterior predictive distribution of the heterogeneous model, fits the
data considerably better. The homogeneous model over predicts the standard
deviation - the 99 credible intervals, do not include the observed value. The
campaign-persuasion model does considerable better in fitting the heterogeneity
in distance.
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